TSHA
Texas State Historical Association

Civil War In The Lone Star State

A *Handbook of Texas*, *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, and *Texas Almanac* Companion

Dear Texas History Lover,

Texas has a special place in history and in the minds of people throughout the world. It has a mystique that no other state and few foreign countries have ever equaled. Texas also has the distinction of being the only state in America that was an independent country for almost 10 years, free and separate, recognized as a sovereign government by the United States, France and England. The pride and confidence of Texans started in those years, and the “Lone Star” emblem, a symbol of those feelings, was developed through the adventures and sacrifices of those that came before us.

The Handbook of Texas Online is a digital project of the Texas State Historical Association. The online handbook offers a full-text searchable version of the complete text of the original two printed volumes (1952), the six-volume printed set (1996), and approximately 400 articles not included in the print editions due to space limitations. The Handbook of Texas Online officially launched on February 15, 1999, and currently includes nearly 27,000 entries that are free and accessible to everyone. The development of an encyclopedia, whether digital or print, is an inherently collaborative process. The Texas State Historical Association is deeply grateful to the contributors, Handbook of Texas Online staff, and Digital Projects staff whose dedication led to the launch of the Handbook of Civil War Texas in April 2011.

As the sesquicentennial of the war draws to a close, the Texas State Historical Association is offering a special e-book to highlight the role of Texans in the Union and Confederate war efforts. Additionally, this e-book will connect readers to the Handbook of Civil War Texas website that includes more than 800 entries relating to the war in the Lone Star State. Many of the new entries are enriched with illustrations provided by the Texas State Library and Archives Commission in Austin, and the Lawrence T. Jones III Texas Photographs Collection at Southern Methodist University. Civil War in the Lone Star State: A Handbook of Texas Companion offers selected entries from The Handbook of Civil War Texas and articles from the Southwestern Historical Quarterly to provide a better understanding of individuals and events such as:

- John Bell Hood
- Edmund Jackson Davis
- Battle of Sabine Pass
- Battle of Galveston
- Juneteenth

At 4:30 on the morning of April 12, 1861, the Confederate States of America artillery opened fire on United States troops in Fort Sumter, South Carolina, beginning the American Civil War. Texans, who had voted overwhelmingly in February 1861 to secede from the Union and then watched their state join the Confederacy in March, thus became involved in a four-year conflict that would take the lives of many and leave none untouched. Texas escaped much of the terrible destruction of the war for a simple reason—United States troops never managed to invade and occupy the state’s interior. Nevertheless; Texans paid a huge price for the

war, primarily in terms of lives lost and ruined in the Confederate Army and in the privations of families left at home. The only Texans who benefited significantly from the war were the state's approximately 200,000 black slaves who gained freedom at the close of the conflict in 1865.

For more than a century, the Texas State Historical Association has played a leadership role in Texas history research and education, helping to identify, collect, preserve, and tell the stories of Texas. It has now entered into a new collaboration with the University of Texas at Austin to carry on and expand its work. In the coming years these two organizations, with their partners and members, will create a collaborative whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. The collaboration will provide passion, talent, and long-term support for the dissemination of scholarly research, educational programs for the K-12 community, and opportunities for public discourse about the complex issues and personalities of our heritage.

The TSHA's core programs include the Texas Almanac, the Southwestern Historical Quarterly, the Handbook of Texas Online, the TSHA Press, and an Education Program that reaches out to students and teachers at all levels throughout the state. The central challenge before the TSHA is to seize the unprecedented opportunities of the digital age in order to reshape how history Texas State Historical Association will be accessed, understood, preserved, disseminated, and taught in the twenty-first century. In the coming years, we will capitalize on these momentous opportunities to expand the scope and depth of our work in ways never before possible. In the midst of this rapid change, the Texas State Historical Association will continue to provide a future for our heritage and to ensure that the lessons of our history continue to serve as a resource for the people of Texas. I encourage you to join us today as a member of the Texas State Historical Association, and in doing so, you will be part of a unique group of people dedicated to standing as vanguards of our proud Texas heritage and will help us continue to develop innovative programs that bring history to life.

With Texas Pride,

Brian A. Bolinger
CEO
Texas State Historical Association

Randolph "Mike" Campbell
Chief Historian
Texas State Historical Association

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*All photographs, maps and illustrations are courtesy of Texas State Library and Archives Commision, The Library of Congress, Austin History Center and the Public Domain.

*SPECIAL BONUS:

ARTICLES FROM THE SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

XXVII. Texas and the Riddle of Secession by Walter Buenger. Vol. 87, No. 2, October 1983.

XXVIII. Rarin' for a Fight by Ralph A. Wooster and Robert Wooster. Vol. 84, April 1981.

XXIX. The Battle of Sabine Pass by Jo Young. Vol. 52, No. 4, April 1949.

XXX. The Breakup: The Collapse of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Army in Texas by Brad R. Clampitt. Vol. 108, No. 4, April 2005.

SPECIAL INTERACTIVE FEATURE!

As an added special feature to this ebook, we have included the entire table of contents of the Handbook of Civil War Texas online. Browse over 800 articles relating to the war in the Lone Star State, many of which appeared in earlier versions of the Handbook, but more than 325 of which are new. For example, for the first time there are entries on all units from Texas in the Confederate Army, and there are hundreds of new biographies of Texans who held the rank of major or higher.

XXXI. Handbook of Civil War Texas Online Table of Contents

I. Civil War

Written by Ralph A. Wooster

The sectional controversies that divided the North and South in the 1850s deeply troubled Texans. While most Texans had a strong attachment to the Union that they worked so hard to join in 1845, they expressed increasing concern over the attacks upon Southern institutions by Northern political leaders. Although only one Texas family in four owned slaves, most Texans opposed any interference with the institution of slavery, which they believed necessary for the continued growth of the state.



Sam Houston

Many Texans considered the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency (November 1860) as a threat to slavery. They urged Governor Sam Houston to call a convention of the people to determine what course of action the state should take. Houston, devoted both to Texas and the Union, paid little heed to these requests, refusing to take any step that might aid secession. The demands for a convention increased, however, with the secession of South Carolina in December 1860 and the calling of state secession conventions in Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana in early January. A group of secessionist leaders, including O. M. Roberts, John S. (Rip) Ford, George M. Flournoy, and William P. Rogers, issued an address to the people calling for the election of delegates to a state Secession Convention in early January. Houston attempted to forestall the convention by calling a special session of the legislature and recommending that it refuse to recognize the convention. Instead, the legislature gave approval to the convention, on the condition that the people ratify its outcome by a final vote.

The convention, which assembled in Austin on January 28, 1861, was dominated by secessionists. On February 1 the delegates adopted an ordinance of secession by a vote of 166 to 8. This ordinance was approved by the voters of the state, 46,153 to 14,747, on February 23. The convention reassembled in early March, declared Texas out of the Union, and adopted a measure uniting the state with other Southern states in the newly formed Confederate States of America. Governor Houston, who refused to recognize the authority of the convention to take this action, refused to take an oath of allegiance to the new government, whereupon the convention declared the office of governor vacant and elevated Lieutenant Governor Edward Clark to the position. President Lincoln offered to send troops to assist Houston if he would resist the convention, but Houston rejected the offer rather than bring on civil conflict within the state. He retired to his home in Huntsville, where he died on July 26, 1863.

While the campaign for ratification of the secession ordinance was being waged in mid-February, the Committee of Public Safety assembled by the secession convention took steps to take over federal property in the state. The committee opened negotiations with Maj. Gen. David E. Twiggs, the commander of United States troops stationed in Texas. Twiggs, an aging Georgian in poor health, was awaiting orders from the War Department. On the morning of February 16, Benjamin McCulloch, a veteran Texas Ranger and Mexican War hero and now colonel of Texas cavalry, led at least 500 volunteers into San Antonio, where they surrounded Twiggs and his headquarters garrison. Twiggs agreed to surrender all federal property in Texas and evacuate the 2,700 Union troops scattered in frontier forts throughout the state.

The Committee of Public Safety authorized the recruiting of volunteer troops during late February and March 1861. In addition to troops recruited by Ben McCulloch, regiments of cavalry were enrolled by Henry E. McCulloch, Ben's younger brother, and John S. Ford, veteran ranger captain and explorer. The firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861 and the subsequent call for volunteers by Confederate president

Jefferson Davis stimulated efforts by Texas authorities to raise additional troops. Governor Clark divided the state first into six and later into eleven military districts for recruiting and organizing the troops requested by Confederate authorities.

By the end of 1861, 25,000 Texans were in the Confederate army. Two-thirds of these were in the cavalry, the branch of service preferred by Texans. Lt. Col. Arthur Fremantle of the British Coldstream Guards, who visited Texas during the war, observed this fondness for cavalry service: “it was found very difficult to raise infantry in Texas,” he said, “as no Texan walks a yard if he can help it.” Governor Clark observed that “the predilection of Texans for cavalry service, founded as it is upon their peerless horsemanship, is so powerful that they are unwilling in many instances to engage in service of any other description unless required by actual necessity.”

Francis R. Lubbock, who defeated Clark by a narrow margin in the 1861 gubernatorial election, worked closely with Confederate authorities to meet manpower needs as the war expanded. Recruitment became more difficult as some of the early enthusiasm waned. The passage of a general conscription law by the Confederate Congress in April 1862 momentarily gave impetus to volunteering. Under this law all white males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were liable for military service. In September the upper age limit was raised to forty-five, and in February 1864 the age limits were extended to seventeen and fifty. The Confederate conscription laws did contain many exemptions, however, and for a time conscripted men could hire substitutes.



Governor Edward Clark

Approximately 90,000 Texans saw military service in the war. Governor Lubbock reported to the legislature in November 1863 that the army numbered 90,000 Texas residents, but this figure seems high for Texans in service at any one time. The 1860 federal census lists 92,145 white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years living in the state. Allowing for a slight increase in population during the four years of the war and considering that some Texans younger than eighteen and older than fifty served, one may say that between 100,000 and 110,000 Texans were potential soldiers.

Two-thirds of the Texans enrolled in the military spent the war in the Southwest, either defending the state from Indian attacks and Union invasion or participating in expansionist moves into New Mexico Territory. One regiment, recruited mainly in the area, served under the colorful Rip Ford in South Texas. Ford commanded the military district of the Rio Grande, which extended from the mouth of the river for more than 1,000 miles to above El Paso. During the course of the war, Ford’s men battled Union invaders, hostile Comanches, and Mexican raiders led by Juan N. Cortina.

Juan N. Cortina

Other Texas regiments patrolled North and West Texas. In May 1861 Col. William C. Young and the Eleventh Texas Cavalry, recruited in North Texas, crossed the Red River and captured federal forts Arbuckle, Cobb, and Washita. Another regiment, enrolled originally as state troops and known as the Frontier Regiment, patrolled Northwest Texas between the Red River and the Rio Grande. The regiment, commanded first by Col. James M. Norris and later Col. James E. McCord, was transferred to Confederate service as the Forty-sixth Texas Cavalry. Part of the regiment was later moved to the Houston area, and its place on the frontier was taken by state troops commanded by Brig. Gen. James W. Throckmorton, who was appointed commander of the northern military district by state authorities.

Texans played a major role in Confederate efforts to expand into New Mexico Territory. In June 1861 four companies of Ford’s cavalry, under the command of Lt. Col. John R. Baylor, were ordered to occupy the extreme western part of Texas. Baylor reached Fort Bliss at El Paso in early July and later in the

month moved into New Mexico. He occupied the small town of Mesilla, located on the left bank of the Rio Grande about forty miles north of El Paso. After a small skirmish, federal troops commanded by Maj. Isaac Lynde surrendered Fort Fillmore, on the opposite bank of the Rio Grande. On August 1, 1861, Baylor decreed the existence of the Confederate Territory of Arizona, with its capital at Mesilla and himself as the military governor.

Henry H. Sibley

Meanwhile, Henry H. Sibley, a West Point graduate and veteran soldier, convinced President Davis that the Confederates could capture New Mexico and Arizona. Sibley was commissioned brigadier general with orders to raise and equip a brigade of cavalry to drive federal forces from New Mexico. In August he established his headquarters in San Antonio, where he began recruiting men for the "Army of New Mexico." In early November the brigade, consisting of three regiments, began the long march to El Paso, nearly 700 miles distant. Sibley's brigade reached El Paso on December 14. On January 11, 1862, it marched to Mesilla, where Sibley assumed the command of Baylor's forces. Sibley moved northward along the west bank of the Rio Grande to Fort Craig, where he encountered Union forces commanded by Col. Edward R. S. Canby, perhaps Sibley's brother-in-law. The Confederates won a battle at nearby Valverde ford but were not strong enough to capture the fort. Sibley decided to bypass the fort and move northward to capture Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Morale in his army was low. Commissary supplies were virtually exhausted, the weather was bitterly cold, and many of the men were highly critical of Sibley himself. On March 26 his men fought a spirited battle with Colorado militia at Apache Canyon to the east of Santa Fe. Two days later a larger battle was fought in Glorieta Pass between federals led by Col. Maj. John M. Chivington and Texans commanded by Col. William R. Scurry. In the fierce engagement the Texans drove the federals from the field. Late that afternoon, however, Scurry's supply train was captured by Union forces. The loss of the supply train was a major blow to Sibley's plans. With Union forces receiving reinforcements from Colorado and California, Sibley determined to retreat down the Rio Grande. By early May the Confederates were back at Fort Bliss, where Sibley issued an address praising his men for their sacrifices. Many of the Texans who served under Sibley blamed the commander for their failure and expressed the view that better leadership would have brought success to the campaign.

The defense of the Texas coastline was more successful than the New Mexico invasion. Brig. Gen. Earl Van Dorn, commander of the Texas district from April to September 1861, organized defense companies, authorized the use of slave labor for building fortifications, and worked to secure heavy cannons for coastal defense. His successor as district commander, Brig. Gen. Paul Octave Hébert, also made efforts to secure heavy ordnance, but with only limited success. Hébert concluded that he would be unable to prevent a landing on the coast and determined to fight the enemy in the interior.

In November 1861 Union naval forces began a series of harassing activities along the Texas coast. The Confederate patrol schooner Royal Yacht was partially burned, and Confederate positions near Aransas Pass, Port Lavaca, and Indianola were shelled. The naval blockade of the Texas coastline was intensified in 1862; the United States bark Arthur, commanded by Lt. John W. Kittredge, was especially active along the middle coast. In August Kittredge, commanding a small flotilla, attempted to capture Corpus Christi but was repulsed by Confederates commanded by Maj. Alfred M. Hobby. Another, more successful, Union force commanded by Lt. Frederick Crocker destroyed a small fort at Sabine Pass and burned the railroad bridge at Taylor's Bayou.

The main Union attack against the Texas coast in 1862 was aimed at the state's largest seaport, Galveston. On October 4, 1862, a small Union fleet commanded by W. B. Renshaw sailed into Galveston harbor. Confederate artillery at Fort Point opened fire but was quickly silenced by superior Union gunpower. Renshaw demanded and received the surrender of the city. The loss of Galveston was followed by a change in Confederate command in Texas. General Hébert, who had never been popular with Texans, was replaced by Gen. John Bankhead , a Virginian with a reputation as an aggressive soldier. Magruder quickly made plans for the recapture of Galveston. He called for land forces to move across the railroad bridge from the mainland at night to surprise Union garrison troops, while two river steamers converted to gunboats, the Bayou City and the Neptune, sailed into the harbor to attack federal warships. The Confederate assault began shortly after midnight on New Year's Day, 1863. At 1:00 A.M., while federal troops slept, Magruder led his forces across the railroad bridge connecting the island and the mainland. Between 4:00 and 5:00 A.M., Confederate artillery opened fire on federal ships and positions along the waterfront. The two Confederate gunboats attacked the Union fleet soon thereafter. The Neptune was hit by a shell from the U.S.S. Harriet Lane, veered into shallow water, and sank. The Bayou City meanwhile moved alongside the Harriet Lane. The "Horse Marines" stormed aboard, captured the vessel, and hauled down her colors. Other Union ships in the harbor had troubles of their own. The Union flagship, the Westfield, ran aground on Pelican Spit, and efforts by a sister ship, the Clifton, to move her were unsuccessful. Three other small Union vessels, Sachem, Owasco, and Corypheus, fired on Confederate troops near the waterfront without much success. In the midst of the excitement, the Westfield was rocked by an internal explosion caused by premature detonation as her commander, Renshaw, prepared to destroy the ship rather than risk capture. The explosion killed Renshaw and fourteen crewmen. Union naval forces now pulled out of the harbor, and the Union infantry soon surrendered to Magruder. Galveston was once again in Confederate possession.

John B. Magruder

Union naval forces continued to maintain a blockade of the Texas coastline throughout the war, but its effectiveness is difficult to measure. Ships loaded with cotton sailed out of Galveston and other Texas ports several times a week, while other vessels sailing from Havana and Caribbean ports returned with trade goods, munitions, and Enfield rifles. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the Texas blockade runners, like those elsewhere in the South, were never adequately directed and organized for the highest degree of efficiency. Furthermore, the number of Union warships in the blockade increased with each passing month of the war. In an effort to tighten control of the Texas coastline, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, the Union commander of the Department of the Gulf, with headquarters in New Orleans, planned a major operation in the fall of 1863. He intended to land a large military force near Sabine Pass, march overland to Houston, and capture Galveston. To this effort he assigned 4,000 troops of the Nineteenth Army Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin. Transport vessels carrying the troops were to be protected by four light-draft gunboats, the Clifton, Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City.

The Union fleet appeared off the upper Texas coast in early September. Franklin planned to move his gunboats up the narrow channel at Sabine Pass, knock out the guns of the small Confederate fort guarding the waterway, and bring his transport vessels into Sabine Lake, where landings could be made. The only obstacle was the rough earthwork fortification known locally as Fort Griffin and defended by a battery of Confederate artillery of forty-seven men commanded by Lt. Richard W. Dowling, an Irish barkeeper from Houston. On September 8, 1863, the four Union gunboats entered the channel and opened fire on Fort Griffin. The six cannon from the Confederate installation responded with high accuracy, firing 107 rounds in thirty-five minutes. The Sachem was hit on the third or fourth round and

driven up against the Louisiana side of the channel, a helpless wreck. The Confederates then turned their fire on the Clifton. A cannonball cut her tiller rope, throwing her out of control, and she soon ran aground. Many of the crew jumped overboard and made it to shore, where they were captured by the Confederates. The two other Union gunboats, the Arizona and the Granite City, turned and withdrew from the pass. General Franklin, overestimating the size and nature of the Confederate defense, ordered a withdrawal back to New Orleans. Dowling and his men were awarded medals by the Confederate government for their victory.

Union troops were temporarily more successful in southern Texas. In November 1863, 7,000 soldiers commanded by General Banks landed at the mouth of the Rio Grande and captured Brownsville, cutting the important trade between Texas and Mexico. Banks then sent one wing of his army upriver to capture Rio Grande City and another column along the coast to capture Corpus Christi, Aransas Pass, and the Matagorda peninsula. General Magruder called upon state and Confederate authorities for additional forces to halt the advance. Fortunately for the Confederacy, many of Banks's troops were transferred to Louisiana, where a major Union offensive was planned for the spring of 1864. This allowed Confederate and state troops commanded by John S. Ford to retake most of the area occupied by Union forces. In the summer of 1864 Ford recaptured Brownsville and reopened the vital trade link with Mexico. By the end of the war the only Union holding on the lower Texas coast was Brazos Island.

Union campaigns in Arkansas and Louisiana in 1864 involved thousands of Texans. In March, General Banks moved an army of 27,000 men and a naval flotilla up the Red River toward Shreveport. He hoped to link up with federal troops under Gen. Frederick Steele, who was moving southward from Little Rock, and then extend federal control over Northeast Texas. In an effort to prevent this, Texas troops in Indian Territory commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel Maxey-Gano's Brigade, Walker's Choctaw brigade, and Krumbhaar's battery, which was attached to Gano's brigade-were moved to Arkansas, where they joined Sterling Price in halting the Union advance at Camden.

Nathaniel P. Banks

Banks, meanwhile, continued his advance in northwest Louisiana. On April 8, 1864, part of his army was defeated at Sabine Crossroads, near Mansfield, by Confederates under the command of Richard Taylor. Texans played a major role in the battle, which halted Banks's advance. Confederates resumed the attack the next day at Pleasant Hill, fourteen miles to the south, but superior Union numbers prevented a Southern victory. Once again Texas units-including Walker's Texas Division; Thomas Green's cavalry, which consisted of five brigades in three divisions led by Hamilton P. Bee, James Patrick Major, and William Steele; and Polignac's Brigade-figured prominently in the fighting. Green, one of the most popular of all the Texans, was killed three days later while leading an attack on the retreating federals at Blair's Landing. Banks continued to retreat and in mid-May crossed the Atchafalaya River, thus ending attempts to invade Northeast Texas.

The large battles of the Civil War were fought beyond the Mississippi River, far from Texas. The state contributed thousands of men who participated in the great battles of the war. Texan Albert Sidney Johnston was killed in the battle of Shiloh in April 1862 while commanding a major Confederate army. Another Texas officer, Gen. John Bell Hood, lost the use of an arm at Gettysburg and a leg at Chickamauga. The Texas Brigade, originally commanded by Hood, had one of the finest reputations of any military unit. The brigade, including the First, Fourth, and Fifth Texas Infantry regiments, fought with honor at Gaines' Mill, Second Manassas, Sharpsburg, Gettysburg, and Chickamauga. A Texas regiment, the Eighth Texas Cavalry, better known as Terry's Texas Rangers, distinguished itself on battlefields in

Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Georgia, and South and North Carolina. Another brigade, commanded late in the war by Lawrence Sullivan Ross, won praise for combat in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia. Granbury's Texas Brigade, commanded by Waco lawyer Col. Hiram B. Granbury, also saw extensive action in Georgia and Tennessee. Granbury himself was killed in the futile Confederate assault at Franklin, Tennessee, in November 1864. Ector's Brigade, consisting of the Tenth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Texas Dismounted Cavalry and commanded by Brig. Gen. Mathew Duncan Ector, saw action in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Georgia and participated in Hood's invasion of Tennessee.

The task of recruiting and equipping the thousands of Texans in military service required diligent efforts by state authorities. Francis R. Lubbock, who served as governor during the first half of the war, was a most capable and energetic chief executive. At his request the legislature provided for reorganization of the state militia system, passed a revenue act raising taxes, and established the Military Board of Texas, which had power to purchase military supplies and establish ordnance foundries and arms factories. Lubbock met frequently with Confederate political and military leaders in efforts to provide better cooperation in the war. Although Texas and the Southwest were cut off from the rest of the South with the fall of Vicksburg in the summer of 1863, Lubbock continued to emphasize the need for unity in support of the Confederacy.

The governor entered the military in December 1863 and did not seek reelection. In the contest to choose his successor, Pendleton Murrah, a Harrison County lawyer and former state legislator, defeated Thomas Jefferson Chambers, four-time gubernatorial candidate and pioneer Gulf Coast rancher. The election centered upon support for the war effort. Although Murrah was less well known than Chambers, the Marshall lawyer benefited from Chambers's reputation as a political maverick and a critic of Jefferson Davis's administration. Most Texans regarded Murrah as the safer candidate. In office Murrah soon found himself involved in controversy with Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department. The disagreements related to a variety of relationships between the state and the central Confederate authority, including conscription laws, impressment of slave labor, transfer of Texas troops outside the war area, and supply matters. Particularly bitter was the controversy over government purchase of cotton, a disagreement that divided Smith, who had set up the national Cotton Bureau for purchasing and selling cotton, and Murrah, who developed a state plan for the same purpose. The matter was resolved in a meeting between Smith and Murrah at Hempstead in June 1864. Shortly thereafter, the governor requested that the people of Texas deliver their cotton to the army's agents for compensation and declared that the state would no longer compete with the military for the cotton.

The majority of Texans approved the efforts of governors Clark, Lubbock, and Murrah to support the Confederacy. Even so, Unionism remained strong in some sections of the state. This was especially true in some of the German counties in the Hill Country and in a group of counties north of Dallas. Some of the early Texas Unionists such as James W. Throckmorton, who cast one of the eight votes against secession in the Secession Convention, and Ben H. Epperson, a leader of East Texans opposed to secession, accepted the Confederacy after Fort Sumter and vigorously supported the Southern cause. Others, such as David G. Burnet, Elisha M. Pease, and Sam Houston, withdrew from public life and attempted to avoid controversy. Another group left the state or attempted to do so. Some of these, such as S. M. Swenson, the father of Swedish migration to Texas, and William Marsh Rice, a native of Massachusetts who made a fortune in the mercantile business in Texas, quietly left. Others joined the Union army in their efforts to defeat the Confederacy. Though most of the Mexican Americans from

James E. Throckmorton

Texas who fought in the war joined the Confederate Army, some joined the Union Army, partly in memory of the events of the Texas Revolution and its aftermath. The Second Texas Cavalry (U.S.), for example, was made up of mostly Texas Mexicans and Mexican nationals; the unit suffered a high desertion rate. Some 2,132 whites and forty-seven blacks from Texas served in the Union Army. The best known of the Texans who supported the Union were Edmund J. Davis, a district judge who organized and commanded the First Texas Cavalry Regiment (Union), and Andrew J. Hamilton, Texas legislator and congressman, whom Lincoln appointed military governor of Texas after the war.

Texas Confederates dealt harshly with those attempting to assist the enemy. In August 1862 Fritz Tegener led sixty-five Unionists, mostly Germans from the Hill Country, in an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Rio Grande and flee from Texas. They were overtaken near the Nueces River by state troops commanded by Lt. C. D. McRae. Thirty-five of the Unionists were killed, and several others were wounded in the battle of the Nueces. Another fifty Union sympathizers were hanged in Gillespie County several weeks later. The greatest roundup of suspected Unionists occurred in Cooke and Grayson counties, north of Dallas. A citizens' court at Gainesville tried 150 individuals for Unionist activities. Some confessed, some were convicted, and thirty-nine were executed in what contemporaries called the Great Hanging at Gainesville.

The life of ordinary Texans was much affected by the war. Although the state suffered less economically than other Confederate states, many adjustments were necessary. The blockade resulted in shortages of many commodities, especially coffee, medicine, clothing, shoes, and farm implements. Homespun clothing was worn as in early days; Governor Lubbock was inaugurated in a homespun suit. The British visitor Colonel Fremantle reported that "the loss of coffee afflicts the Confederates even more than the loss of spirits; and they exercise their ingenuity in devising substitutes, which are not generally very successful." These substitutes included barley, corn, okra, peanuts, and sweet potatoes. Salt was so scarce that some Texans dug up the floors of their smokehouses and leached the dirt to recover the salt drippings. Thorns were used for pins, willow-bark extract and red pepper were mixed to substitute for quinine, and pieces of wallpaper served as writing paper. Several Texas newspapers suspended or discontinued operations for periods of time due to the lack of paper.

On the other hand, trade with Mexico made more materials available to Texas than to other Confederate states. In return for cotton, Texans received military supplies, medicines, dry goods, food, iron goods, liquor, coffee, and tobacco. Matamoros, on the Rio Grande across from Brownsville, and Bagdad, Tamaulipas, a seaport village at the mouth of the Rio Grande, were the centers of this activity, in which hundreds of vessels from Europe and the United States engaged in a flourishing business. The trade was interrupted from time to time by Union military activities along the lower Texas coast, but even so it provided many items needed by Texans during the war.
The war brought other changes to Texas. Some adjustments were made in agriculture as farmers planted more corn to meet food needs and requests of the government to reduce cotton production. The absence of men away at the war front placed greater responsibilities and burdens upon women and children, who assumed increased duties. The shortage of free labor was partially offset by the increase in the number of slaves sent from other Southern states to Texas in an attempt to avoid the invading enemy armies. On occasion, military units were assigned harvesting duties.

Transportation was seriously affected by the war. The outbreak of fighting halted all railroad building for seven years, and difficulties in maintaining rolling stock caused existing service to be interrupted.

General Magruder ordered segments of the Eastern Texas road and the Texas and New Orleans torn up for coastal fortifications. Several miles of track between Swanson's Landing and Jonesville in East Texas was taken up and relaid eastward from Marshall to Waskom for military purposes. Stagecoach lines continued to operate, but coaches were overcrowded and behind schedule. Roads and bridges suffered from lack of repair as labor and materials were diverted elsewhere.

The requirements of the military and the impact of the blockade caused rapid expansion of manufacturing in the state. The Texas State Military Board had the promotion of manufacturing as one of its responsibilities. Under its direction a percussion-cap factory and a cannon foundry were established in Austin. The board established a textile mill in the Texas State Penitentiary at Huntsville. During the war three million yards of cotton and wool cloth was produced at the Huntsville facility. The Confederate quartermaster department operated, or contracted for, facilities at Houston, Dallas, Austin, Tyler, Rusk, Paris, Jefferson, Marshall, Waco, and Hempstead for the manufacture of clothing, shoes, iron products, wagons, tents, harness, and saddles. A major ordnance works was established at Tyler, and smaller plants were located in or near Rusk, Jefferson, Houston, and Galveston. A beef-packing plant at Jefferson provided meat for the Confederate Army.

Although political and military leaders attempted to keep up the morale of Texans, military defeats in Georgia, Tennessee, and Virginia in late 1864 caused increased anxiety in the state. Newspaper editorials urged civilians to remain calm, and Governor Murrah and General Smith asked Texans to continue the struggle. News of Robert E. Lee's surrender in April 1865, followed by that of Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina, made further resistance appear futile. Rip Ford defeated Union troops in the battle of Palmito Ranch, near Brownsville, on May 13, 1865, the last battle of the war. From captured prisoners Ford learned that Confederate forces were surrendering all over the South. Kirby Smith attempted to keep his command intact, but found his soldiers heading for their homes. Some Texans, including Murrah and former governor Clark, joined other Confederates fleeing to Mexico. On June 2, 1865, generals Smith and Magruder signed the formal terms of surrender for their commands, and on June 19 (Juneteenth) Gen. Gordon Granger arrived in Galveston with Union forces of occupation. Reconstruction was in the offing. The Civil War had ended.

TSHA
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Civil War Ships

II. Star of the West

Written by Jack D. L. Holmes

The Star of the was a two-deck, side-wheel, schooner-rigged merchant ship fired upon by Confederate batteries as she attempted to relieve Fort Sumter on January 9, 1861. Hired out of New York as a troop transport for $1,000 a day, under its master, Elisha Howes, the Star sailed for Texas to pick up seven companies of United States troops assembled at Indianola.On April 18, while anchored off Pass Caballo bar leading into Matagorda Bay, the ship was captured by Col. Earl Van Dorn and members of two Galveston militia units, the Wigfall Guards and the Island City Rifles. Two days later the ship was taken to New Orleans, where Louisiana's Governor Moore changed its name to the C.S.S. St. Philip. The old name persisted, however, and the Star served as a naval station and hospital ship until Adm. David G. Farragut captured New Orleans. Then the Star carried millions in gold, silver, and paper currency to Vicksburg and continued to Yazoo City. When federal Lieutenant Commander Watson Smith tried to lead two ironclads and five smaller vessels through Yazoo Pass into the Tallahatchie River to attack Vicksburg from the rear, Confederate defenders hurriedly constructed Fort Pemberton, and Major Gen. William W. Loring had the Star sunk athwart the Tallahatchie to block the passage of the Union flotilla. In a skirmish on April 12, 1863, the Union forces suffered heavy casualties and were forced to withdraw. The owners of the Star collected $175,000 in damages from the United States government for their loss.



III. Harriet Lane

Written by Norman C. Delaney



The Harriet Lane, named after the niece and official hostess of President James Buchanan, was built in 1857 for service as a revenue cutter for the United States Treasury Department. The 619-ton copper-plated steamer could make speeds of up to eleven knots. Her battery consisted of three thirty-two-pounders and four twenty-four-pound howitzers. Except for her participation in the Paraguay expedition of 1858, the Harriet Lane served the revenue service until September 17, 1861. While still in revenue control, she became part of the naval squadron that was sent to reinforce the United States garrison at Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor. After her transfer to the navy, she participated in several major naval operations. The first of these was the Burnside expedition, which captured forts Hatteras and Clark on the North Carolina coast. Later the Harriet Lane served as the flagship of Commander David D. Porter, whose mortar flotilla contributed to the surrender of forts Jackson and St. Philip, at the entrance to the Mississippi. Then, after participating in Porter's unsuccessful operations against Vicksburg during July 1862, she took her station with the West Gulf Blockade Squadron outside Mobile Bay.

On October 4, 1862, the Harriet Lane and four other steamers composing a squadron commanded by William B. Renshaw brought Galveston under control with their firepower. Only three months later-on January 1, 1863-Confederate major general John B. Magruder launched a surprise land and sea attack on Galveston. Three "cotton-clad" steamers manned by Confederate sharpshooters attacked the Harriet Lane, and she was rammed by two of them. Armed Confederates boarded her, and, in fierce hand-to-hand fighting, killed five of her crew, including her captain and executive officer. All of the surviving officers and crew were taken prisoner. The capture of the Harriet Lane provided the Confederates with invaluable information: aboard the steamer was found a complete copy of the United States signal-service code.

Although Galveston remained Confederate until the end of the war, only a week elapsed before Galveston harbor was once again under a Union blockade. The Harriet Lane was under the jurisdiction of the Confederate Army's Marine Department of Texas until March 31, 1863, when control of her was transferred to the War Department.
Early in 1864 the Harriet Lane was converted to a blockade runner, the Lavinia. She escaped to sea with a cargo of cotton on April 30, 1864; after her arrival in Havana, Spanish authorities detained her until the war's end. She was returned by Spain to the United States in 1867, then sold and converted to a freighter, the Elliot Richie. She met her end in a gale off Pernambuco, Brazil, on May 13, 1884.

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Texas State Historical Association

Battles & Campaigns

IV. Battle of Sabine Pass

Written by Alwynn Barr

The battle of Sabine Pass, on September 8, 1863, turned back one of several Union attempts to invade and occupy part of Texas during the Civil War. The United States Navy blockaded the Texas coast beginning in the summer of 1861, while Confederates fortified the major ports. Union interest in Texas and other parts of the Confederacy west of the Mississippi River resulted primarily from the need for cotton by northern textile mills and concern about French intervention in the Mexican civil war. In September 1863 Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks sent by transport from New Orleans 4,000 soldiers under the command of Gen. William B. Franklin to gain a foothold at Sabine Pass, where the Sabine River flows into the Gulf of Mexico. A railroad ran from that area to Houston and opened the way into the interior of the state. The Western Gulf Blockading Squadron of the United States Navy sent four gunboats mounting eighteen guns to protect the landing. At Sabine Pass the Confederates recently had constructed Fort Griffin, an earthwork that mounted six cannon, two twenty-four pounders and four thirty-two pounders. The Davis Guards, Company F of the First Texas Heavy Artillery Regiment, led by Capt. Frederick Odlum, had placed stakes along both channels through the pass to mark distances as they sharpened their accuracy in early September. The Union forces lost any chance of surprising the garrison when a blockader missed its arranged meeting with the ships from New Orleans on the evening of September 6. The navy commander, Lt. Frederick Crocker, then formed a plan for the gunboats to enter the pass and silence the fort so the troops could land. The Clifton shelled the fort from long range between 6:30 and 7:30 A.M. on the 8th, while the Confederates remained under cover because the ship remained out of reach for their cannon. Behind the fort Odlum and other Confederate officers gathered reinforcements, although their limited numbers would make resistance difficult if the federal troops landed.



Richard W. Dowling

Finally at 3:40 P.M. the Union gunboats began their advance through the pass, firing on the fort as they steamed forward. Under the direction of Lt. Richard W. Dowling the Confederate cannoneers emerged to man their guns as the ships came within 1,200 yards. One cannon in the fort ran off its platform after an early shot. But the artillerymen fired the remaining five cannon with great accuracy. A shot from the third or fourth round hit the boiler of the Sachem, which exploded, killing and wounding many of the crew and leaving the gunboat without power in the channel near the Louisiana shore. The following ship, the Arizona, backed up because it could not pass the Sachem and withdrew from the action. The Clifton, which also carried several sharpshooters, pressed on up the channel near the Texas shore until a shot from the fort cut away its tiller rope as the range closed to a quarter of a mile. That left the gunboat without the ability to steer and caused it to run aground, where its crew continued to exchange fire with the Confederate gunners. Another well-aimed projectile into the boiler of the Clifton sent steam and smoke through the vessel and forced the sailors to abandon ship. The Granite City also turned back rather than face the accurate artillery of the fort, thus ending the federal assault. The Davis Guards had fired their cannon 107 times in thirty-five minutes of action, a rate of less than two minutes per shot, which ranked as far more rapid than the standard for heavy artillery. The Confederates captured 300 Union prisoners and two gunboats. Franklin and the army force turned back to New Orleans, although Union troops occupied the Texas coast from Brownsville to Matagorda Bay later that fall. The Davis Guards, who suffered no casualties during the battle, received the thanks of the Confederate Congress for their victory. Careful fortification, range marking, and artillery practice had produced a successful defense of Sabine Pass.

V. Battle of Galveston

Written by Alwynn Barr

As part of the Union blockade of the Texas coast, Commander William B. Renshaw led his squadron of eight ships into Galveston harbor to demand surrender of the most important Texas port on October 4, 1862. Brig. Gen. Paul O. Hébert, commanding the Confederate District of Texas, had removed most of the heavy artillery from Galveston Island, which he believed to be indefensible. The Fort Point garrison fired on the federal ships, which responded by dismounting the Confederate cannon with return shots. Col. Joseph J. Cook, in command on the island, arranged a four-day truce while he evacuated his men to the mainland. The Union ships held the harbor, but 264 men of the Forty-second Massachusetts Infantry, led by Col. I. S. Burrell, did not arrive until December 25 to occupy Kuhn's Wharf and patrol the town.

When Maj. Gen. John Bankhead Magruder replaced Hébert in the fall of 1862, the new district commander began to organize for the recapture of Galveston. For a naval attack he placed artillery and dismounted cavalry from Sibley's brigade, led by Col. Thomas Green, aboard two river steamers, the Bayou City and the Neptune, commanded by Capt. Leon Smith. Magruder gathered infantry and cavalry, led by Brig. Gen. William R. Scurry, and supported by twenty light and heavy cannons, to cross the railroad bridge onto the island to capture the federal forces ashore. To meet the attack Renshaw had six ships that mounted twenty-nine pieces of heavy artillery.

The Confederates entered Galveston on New Year's night, January 1, 1863, and opened fire before dawn. Cook failed to seize the wharf because of the short ladders provided for his men. Naval guns helped drive back the assault. Then the Confederate "cottonclads" struck from the rear of the Union squadron. The Harriet Lane sank the Neptune when it tried to ram the Union ship, but men from the Bayou City boarded and seized the federal vessel despite the explosion of their own heavy cannon. Renshaw's flagship, the Westfield, ran aground, and the commander died trying to blow up his ship rather than surrender it. The other Union ships sailed out to sea, ignoring Confederate surrender demands, which could be enforced only upon the abandoned federal infantry in town.

Magruder had retaken Galveston with a loss of twenty-six killed and 117 wounded. Union losses included the captured infantry and the Harriet Lane, about 150 casualties on the naval ships, as well as the destruction of the Westfield. The port remained under Confederate control for the rest of the war.



VI. Red River Campaign

Written by Art Leatherwood

Edmund Kirby Smith

The Red River campaign of March to May 1864 occurred during the Civil War after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. At that time President Abraham Lincoln authorized a campaign against Shreveport, Louisiana, then the temporary capital of Confederate Louisiana. It was a major supply depot and a gateway to Texas. Though the operation was opposed by generals Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Nathaniel P. Banks, it was favored by General in Chief Henry W. Halleck. Banks was commander of the Department of the Gulf and was engaged in operations against the Confederacy along the Texas Gulf Coast. Under some pressure from Halleck, Banks concentrated his forces on a campaign to secure the area along the Red River to Shreveport. Objectives for this campaign included preventing a Confederate alliance with the French in Mexico; denying southern supplies to Confederate forces; and securing vast quantities of Louisiana and Texas cotton for northern mills. By 1863 Confederate general Richard Taylor, with his headquarters in Alexandria, was aware that Union operations up the Red River were under consideration as a means to penetrate the Department of Texas. The Red River was navigable by steamship for as many as six months of the year and could provide for cooperative army and naval operations. It could support shifting bases as an invading force pressed into the interior. He made his concerns known to Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, and through him, to President Jefferson Davis. Taylor began to establish supply bases up the Red River; this included the rehabilitation by Walker's Texas Division of Fort DeRussy near Simmesport, Louisiana. He began to warn citizens of the impending operations, and to limit the sale of cotton to speculators who were selling to northern buyers. After failing to stem significantly the sale of cotton, Taylor by early 1864 had ordered that all bailed and seeded cotton be burned.

In the spring of 1864 General Banks began to gather his forces-an army of about 17,000-for a march to Alexandria, Louisiana. In Alexandria, Banks was to join a 10,000-member troop detachment from General Sherman's Mississippi command and a 15,000-member troop detachment under Gen. Frederick Steele. The detachment from Sherman's Army of the Tennessee was under the command of Gen. Andrew J. Smith. Smith's forces, escorted up the Red River by a fleet of ironclads and gunboats under Adm. David D. Porter, disembarked at Simmesport and captured the partially completed Fort DeRussy on March 14. Smith and Porter occupied Alexandria on March 19. Banks arrived on March 25, a week late. Steele was delayed and was too late to take part in the campaign. The movement of the Union forces up the Red River was slowed by unseasonably low water levels, which hampered Porter in getting his ships over the rapids. Gen. Richard Taylor, in command of the Confederate forces opposing Banks, was retreating upriver as he awaited Confederate troops that were on the way to assist him. Taylor's forces consisted of Maj. Gen. John George Walker's Texas Division, Col. William Vincent's Second Louisiana Cavalry, and William Mouton's Louisianans, with a small brigade of Texans under the command of Brig. Gen. Camille A. J. M. Prince de Polignac; reinforcements of cavalry and infantry were coming from Texas. On March 21 the Federals captured 250 of Vincent's men near Henderson Hill after a small skirmish. Brig. Gen. Thomas Green's Texas cavalry joined Taylor at Pleasant Hill. Green was placed in command of Taylor's rear guard and Taylor fell back to Mansfield.

The Union forces had reached the Natchitoches area by April 2, 1864, and remained there until April 6, when they took a road to Mansfield toward Shreveport. Banks was unaware that another road followed the river and would have allowed support from the Union gunboats. The column was led by the cavalry,



Maj. Gen. John G. Walker

under Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee; following were a large supply train of some 350 wagons, the Thirteenth Corps, the Nineteenth Corps, and a force under Gen. A. J. Smith. On April 7, three miles north of Pleasant Hill, Lee's cavalry skirmished with Green's rear guard. On April 8 the Union column was strung out single file along some twenty miles of road when it encountered the Confederate force about three miles south of Mansfield. Upon contact with the Confederate forces, General Banks came up the column and assumed command. He ordered reinforcements under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin from the rear, but they were delayed by road congestion. Before the reinforcements could reach the front, General Taylor, with a total force of 8,800, attacked. The Federals, even with Franklin's arrival, were routed. The battle of Mansfield may have been the most humiliating defeat of the entire war. The Union forces of 12,000 had 700 men killed or wounded and 1,500 taken prisoner; 20 Union artillery pieces and 200 wagons were captured, and almost 1,000 horses and mules were lost. The Confederate army of 8,800 had 1,000 killed or wounded. Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill. William H. Emory and the Nineteenth Corps moved up and met with Taylor's pursuing forces at Pleasant Grove. On the late afternoon of April 9, the Confederate forces attacked. They were repulsed and retired from the battlefield. During the night of the 9th General Banks gave the order to retire to Grand Ecore, Louisiana. The expedition seems to have been abandoned at this point, as the retreat continued down the Red River. The Union forces, especially those under the command of Gen. A. J. Smith, looted, burned, and destroyed everything in their path as they moved south. Admiral Porter, under harassment, also retreated down the river, and on reaching Alexandria he was once more slowed by low water over the rapids. Army Engineer lieutenant colonel Joseph Bailey constructed a series of wing dams that permitted Porter and his boats to pass on May 13. That same day A. J. Smith's troops burned the city of Alexandria to the ground. Taylor continued to harass the retreating Union army, with the final skirmishes of the Red River campaign occurring at Mansura, Louisiana, on May 16 and at Yellow Bayou on May 18.

VII. Battle of Palmito Ranch

Written by Jeffrey William Hunt

On May 13, 1865, more than a month after the surrender of Gen. Robert E. Lee, the last land action of the Civil War took place at Palmito Ranch near Brownsville. Early in the war the Union army had briefly occupied Brownsville but had been unable to hold the city. They established a base at Brazos Santiago on Brazos Island from which to blockade the Rio Grande and Brownsville. They were, however, unable to blockade the Mexican (and technically neutral) port of Bagdad, just below the river. The Confederates landed supplies at Bagdad and then transported them twenty-five miles inland to Matamoros to be shipped across the Rio Grande into Brownsville.



In February 1865 the Union commander at Brazos Island, Col. Theodore H. Barrett, reported to his superiors that his base was secure from attack and that with permission he could take Brownsville. The superiors refused to sanction the attack. Instead, Maj. Gen. Lewis Wallace sought and received Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's permission to meet the Confederate commanders of the Brownsville area, Brig. Gen. James E. Slaughter, commander of the Western Sub-District of Texas, and Col. John Salmon (Rip) Ford, commander of the southern division of Slaughter's command, at Port Isabel on March 11, 1865, in hopes of arranging a separate peace. Wallace promised no retaliation against former Confederates so long as they took an oath of allegiance to the United States. Anyone who preferred to leave the country would be given time to gather up property and family before doing so. An informal truce was arranged while Ford and Slaughter sent Wallace's proposals up the chain of command, and Wallace informed Grant that the rebels in Texas would soon be surrendering. Slaughter's superior in Houston, however, Maj. Gen. John G. Walker, denounced Wallace's terms and wrote a stinging letter to Slaughter for having listened to them in the first place. The commander of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department, Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, was not ready to abandon the cause either. On May 9, 1865, he told the governors of the western Confederate states that despite Lee's surrender, his own army remained, and he proposed to continue the fight.

The Confederates in Texas were aware of the fate of the Confederacy's eastern armies. On May 1, 1865, a passenger on a steamer heading up the Rio Grande towards Brownsville tossed a copy of the New Orleans Times to some Confederates at Palmito Ranch. The paper contained the news of Lee's surrender, Lincoln's death, and the surrender negotiations between Johnston and Sherman. Within the next ten days several hundred rebels left the army and went home. Those who remained were as resolute as their commanders to continue the fight in Texas. The federals, meanwhile, had received an erroneous report that the southerners were preparing to evacuate Brownsville and move east of Corpus Christi. In light of this intelligence Colonel Barrett ordered 250 men of the Sixty-second United States Colored Infantry and fifty men of the Second Texas United States Cavalry (dismounted) to cross to the mainland from Brazos Island at Boca Chica Pass to occupy Brownsville. Carrying five days' rations and 100 rounds of ammunition per man, the Union troops crossed over to the coast at 9:30 P.M. on May 11, 1865. Under the command of Lt. Col. David Branson, this detachment marched all night and reached White's Ranch at daybreak. There Branson's men halted and tried to conceal themselves in a thicket along the Rio Grande. The camp was spotted by "civilians" (probably Confederate soldiers) on the Mexican side of the river. Realizing that any hope of surprising the Confederates was lost, Branson immediately resumed his march toward Brownsville.

At Palmito Ranch the federals encountered Capt. W. N. Robinson's 190-man company of Lt. Col. George H. Giddings's Texas Cavalry Battalion, which skirmished briefly with the Union force before retiring. The federals, too, fell back to a hill overlooking the ranch to rest and cook dinner. Camping for the night, the Union troops remained undisturbed until 3:00 A.M., when Robinson's company reappeared. Colonel Ford, at Fort Brown, had ordered Robinson to maintain contact with Branson's column and promised to reinforce him as soon as possible. Under pressure from Robinson, the federals fell back to White's Ranch, from where Branson sent a courier to Brazos Santiago asking Colonel Barrett for reinforcements. Barrett himself arrived at 5:00 A.M. on May 13, 1865, with 200 men of the Thirty-fourth Indiana Infantry, bringing the Union strength up to 500 officers and men. Under Barrett's command the column moved on Palmito Ranch once more, and a "sharp engagement" took place in a thicket along the riverbank between Barrett's 500 troops and Robinson's 190 Confederates. The outnumbered but persistent southerners were soon pushed back across an open prairie and beyond sight, while the exhausted federals paused on a small hill about a mile west of Palmito Ranch. At three that afternoon, Colonel Ford arrived to reinforce Robinson with 300 men from his own Second Texas Cavalry, Col. Santos Benavides's Texas Cavalry Regiment, and additional companies from Giddings's battalion, as well as a six-gun battery of field artillery under the command of Capt. O. G. Jones.

With mounted cavalry and artillery, Ford had the perfect force to deal with Barrett's infantry on the flat, open land around Palmito Ranch. Hidden by a group of small trees, Ford's men formed their line of battle. At 4:00 P.M. Jones's guns began to fire. After a brief bombardment, Robinson's men attacked the Union left near the river, while two other companies of Giddings's battalion struck its right. At the same time, the rest of Ford's men charged the enemy center. The southern assault came as a great surprise, and the Union line rapidly fell apart. Barrett later reported that "Having no artillery to oppose the enemy's six twelve-pounder field pieces our position became untenable. We therefore fell back fighting." Ford remembered it differently when he wrote in his memoirs that Barrett "seemed to have lost his presence of mind" and to have led his troops off the field in a "rather confused manner." Forty-six men of the Thirty-fourth Indiana were put out as skirmishers and left to be captured as the federals fell back toward Brazos Island. Only by deploying 140 men of the Sixty-second Colored in a line running from the Rio Grande to three-quarters of a mile inland did the Union troops slow the Confederate attack enough to allow the northerners to get away. Ford wrote that the battle from its beginning had been "a run," and demonstrated "how fast demoralized men could get over ground." The Confederates chased the federals for seven miles to Brazos Island. There the routed Union troops were met by reinforcements, and Ford's men ceased their attack. "Boys, we have done finely," said Ford. "We will let well enough alone, and retire." The action had lasted a total of four hours. Confederate casualties were a few dozen wounded. The federals lost 111 men and four officers captured, and thirty men wounded or killed. Ironically, at the same time as the battle of Palmito Ranch, the Confederate governors of Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas were authorizing Kirby Smith to disband his armies and end the war. A few days later federal officers from Brazos Santiago visited Brownsville to arrange a truce with General Slaughter and Colonel Ford.

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General And Brigade Commanders

VIII. Thomas Green

Written by Alwynn Barr

Thomas Green, military leader, was born in Buckingham County, Virginia, on June 8, 1814, to Nathan and Mary (Field) Green. The family moved to Tennessee in 1817. Green attended Jackson College in Tennessee and Princeton College in Kentucky before he received a degree from the University of Tennessee in 1834. He then studied law with his father, a prominent judge on the Tennessee Supreme Court. When the Texas Revolution began, he left Tennessee to join the volunteers. He reached Nacogdoches by December 1835 and enrolled for military service on January 14, 1836. He became one of Isaac N. Moreland's company, which operated the Twin Sisters cannons in the battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. A few days after the battle Green was commissioned a lieutenant; in early May he was made a major and aide-de-camp to Thomas J. Rusk. He resigned on May 30 to continue studying law in Tennessee.

When he returned and settled in Texas in 1837, he was granted land in reward for his army service and became a county surveyor at La Grange, Fayette County. After his nomination by fellow San Jacinto veteran William W. Gant, he was elected engrossing clerk for the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas, a post he held until 1839, when he represented Fayette County in the House of the Fourth Congress. After a term he chose not to run again and resumed the office of engrossing clerk. During the Sixth and Eighth congresses he served as secretary of the Senate. From 1841 to 1861 he was clerk of the state Supreme Court.

Between legislative and court sessions Green served in military campaigns against the Indians and Mexico. In the fall of 1840 he joined John H. Moore in a foray up the Colorado River against the Comanches. After Rafael Vásquez's invasion of San Antonio in March 1842, Green recruited and served as captain of the Travis County Volunteers, a unit that did not see battle. That fall he served as inspector general for the Somervell expedition after Adrián Woll's foray into San Antonio.

When the United States went to war with Mexico, Green recruited and commanded a company of Texas Rangers in La Grange as part of the First Texas Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, led by John C. Hays. The Texans helped Zachary Taylor capture Monterrey, Nuevo León, in September 1846. After returning home, Green married Mary Wallace Chalmers, daughter of John G. Chalmers, on January 31, 1847. Five daughters and one son were born to them.

After secession in 1861, Green was elected colonel of the Fifth Texas Volunteer Cavalry, which, as part of a brigade led by Gen. H. H. Sibley, joined the invasion of New Mexico in 1862. There Green led the Confederate victory at the battle of Valverde in February. After a difficult retreat into Texas he led his men, aboard the river steamer Bayou City, to assist in the recapture of Galveston on January 1, 1863. In the spring of 1863 Green commanded the First Cavalry Brigade in fighting along Bayou Teche in Louisiana. On May 20 he became a brigadier general. In June he captured a Union garrison at Brashear City but failed to seize Fort Butler on the Mississippi. At Cox's Plantation he defeated a Union advance in July. In September the First Cavalry captured another Union detachment at Stirling's Plantation. A similar success followed in November at Bayou Burbeaux. In four victories Green's men inflicted about 3,000 casualties and suffered only 600. In April 1864 he led a division in successful attacks against Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks at the battle of Mansfield and against Maj. Gen. William H. Emory at the battle of Pleasant Hill. A few days later, on April 12, 1864, Green died while leading an attack on federal gunboats patrolling the Red River at Blair's Landing. He was buried in the family plot at Oakwood Cemetery in Austin. Tom Green County was named for him in 1874.

IX. John Bell Hood

Written by Thomas W. Cutrer



John Bell Hood, United States and Confederate States Army officer, was born at Owingsville, Bath County, Kentucky, on June 1, 1831, the son of John W. and Theodocia (French) Hood. He was appointed to the United States Military Academy at West Point on July 1, 1849, and graduated forty-fourth in the class of 1853; his classmates included Philip H. Sheridan, James B. McPherson, and John M. Schofield. He was brevetted on July 1 as a second lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry. After service in Missouri and California, he was promoted on March 3, 1855, to second lieutenant and assigned to Company G of the elite Second United States Cavalry, with which he served on the Texas frontier. Hood, commanding a reconnaissance patrol from Fort Mason, sustained an arrow wound to the left hand in action against the Comanches near the headwaters of the Devils River on July 20, 1857. This was one of the most severe fights engaged in by the Second Cavalry in Texas. Hood was promoted to first lieutenant on August 18, 1858, but resigned from the army on April 16, 1861. Dissatisfied with his native Kentucky's neutrality, Hood declared himself a Texan.

Upon his resignation from the United States Army, he was commissioned a captain in the regular Confederate cavalry on March 16, 1861, and on September 30 was appointed colonel of the Fourth Texas Infantry, superseding Robert T. P. Allen. On March 3, 1862, Hood was promoted to brigadier general and given command of what became known as Hood's Texas Brigade, perhaps the finest brigade of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. This unit, originally composed of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Texas Infantry and the Eighteenth Georgia regiments, plus the infantry companies of Wade Hampton's legion, displayed remarkable courage at the battle of Gaines Mill, Virginia (June 27, 1862); Hood's superiors noticed and, on October 10, 1862, promoted him to major general. His division, which he commanded at Second Manassas (Second Bull Run), Sharpsburg (Antietam), Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg, originally consisted of his own Texas brigade under the command of Jerome Bonaparte Robertson, plus those of Evander McIvor Law, Henry Lewis Benning, and Micah Jenkins. At Gettysburg Hood received a severe wound to his left arm, which was incapacitated for the rest of his life. In the autumn of 1863 he and his division accompanied Gen. James Longstreet's First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia to Tennessee, where the corps played a crucial role in the battle of Chickamauga. Hood's command spearheaded the Rebel attack that broke the Union line on September 20, but Hood was shot in the upper right thigh, a wound that necessitated the amputation of his leg. On February 1, 1864, after a period of convalescence, he was promoted to lieutenant general and transferred to the Army of Tennessee, where he was given command of a corps consisting of the divisions of Thomas C. Hindman, Carter L. Stevenson, and Alexander P. Stewart. Hood managed his corps aggressively during the Atlanta campaign, and on July 18, 1864, he was given command of the Army of Tennessee, superseding Joseph E. Johnston, and a temporary promotion to the rank of full general. This promotion, however, was never confirmed by the Confederate Congress. William T. Sherman forced the evacuation of Atlanta on September 1, 1864, and Hood, hoping to force him back out of Georgia, moved his army onto the Union line of communications in Tennessee. Sherman responded to this threat to his rear by detaching Gen. George H. Thomas's command to deal with Hood while he led the rest of his army toward Savannah, Georgia, and the sea. Strapped to his saddle, Hood led his men toward Nashville, but met disastrous defeats at Franklin on November 30 and at Nashville on December 15 and 16. As the remains of the Army of Tennessee retreated toward Tupelo, Mississipi, it sang, to the tune of "The Yellow Rose of Texas," "You can talk about your Beauregard and sing of General Lee, but the Gallant Hood of Texas played Hell in Tennessee." Relieved of command at his own request on January 23, 1865, Hood was attempting to make his way to Edmund Kirby Smith's army in Texas when the Confederacy collapsed. Accordingly, he surrendered to federal authorities at Natchez, Mississippi, on May 31, 1865.

After the war Hood moved to New Orleans, where he was involved in merchandising, real estate, and insurance businesses. He died there of yellow fever on August 30, 1879. His wife, the former Anna Marie Hennen, and eldest daughter preceded him in death by only a few days, and the couple left ten orphans. General Hood was originally buried in Lafayette Cemetery, New Orleans, but was reinterred in the Hennen family tomb at the Metairie Cemetery. His memoir, Advance and Retreat (1880), is one of the classics of Confederate literature. Hood County is named in his honor, as is Fort Hood in Bell and Coryell counties.

X. Benjamin McCulloch

Written by Thomas W. Cutrer

Benjamin McCulloch

Ben McCulloch, Indian fighter, Texas Ranger, United States marshal, and brigadier general in the Army of the Confederate States of America, was born in Rutherford County, Tennessee, on November 11, 1811, the fourth son of Alexander and Frances F. (LeNoir) McCulloch. His mother was the daughter of a prominent Virginia planter, and his father, a graduate of Yale College, was a major on Brig. Gen. John Coffee's staff during Andrew Jackson's campaign against the Creeks in Alabama. Ben was also the elder brother of Henry Eustace McCulloch. The McCullochs had been a prosperous and influential colonial North Carolina family but had lost much of their wealth as a result of the Revolutionary War and the improvidence of Alexander McCulloch, who so wasted his inheritance that he was unable to educate his younger sons. Two of Ben's older brothers briefly attended school taught by a close neighbor and family friend in Tennessee, Sam Houston. Like many families on the western frontier, the McCullochs moved often-from North Carolina to eastern Tennessee to Alabama and back to western Tennessee between 1812 and 1830. They settled at last near Dyersburg, Tennessee, where David Crockett was among their closest neighbors and most influential friends. After five years of farming, hunting, and rafting, but virtually no formal schooling, Ben agreed to follow Crockett to Texas, planning to meet him in Nacogdoches on Christmas Day, 1835. Ben and Henry arrived too late, however, and Ben followed Crockett alone toward San Antonio. When sickness from measles prevented him from reaching the Alamo before its fall, McCulloch joined Houston's army on its retreat into East Texas. At the battle of San Jacinto he commanded one of the famed Twin Sisters and won from Houston a battlefield commission as first lieutenant. He soon left the army, however, to earn his living as a surveyor in the Texas frontier communities of Gonzales and Seguin. He then joined the Texas Rangers and, as first lieutenant under John Coffee Hays, won a considerable reputation as an Indian fighter. In 1839 McCulloch was elected to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas in a campaign marred by a rifle duel with Reuben Ross. In the affray McCulloch received a wound that partially crippled his right arm for the rest of his life. On Christmas Day of that year Henry McCulloch killed Ross in a pistol duel in Gonzales.

Ben chose not to stand for reelection in 1842 but returned to surveying and the pursuit of a quasimilitary career. At the battle of Plum Creek on August 12, 1840, he had distinguished himself as a scout and as commander of the right wing of the Texas army. In February 1842, when the Mexican government launched a raid against Texas that seized the strategic town of San Antonio, McCulloch rendered invaluable service by scouting enemy positions and taking a prominent role in the fighting that harried Rafael Vásquez's raiders back below the Rio Grande. On September 11, 1842, a second Mexican expedition captured San Antonio. McCulloch again did valuable scouting service and joined in the pursuit of Adrián Woll's invading troops to the Hondo River, where Hays's rangers engaged them on September 21. After the repulse of the second Mexican invasion, McCulloch remained with the ranger company that formed the nucleus of an army with which the Texans planned to invade Mexico. The so-called Somervell expedition was poorly managed, however, and Ben and Henry left it on the Rio Grande only hours before the remainder of the Texans were captured at Mier, Tamaulipas, on December 25, 1842. McCulloch was elected to the First Legislature after the annexation of Texas.

At the outbreak of the Mexican War he raised a command of Texas Rangers that became Company A of Col. Jack Hays's First Regiment, Texas Mounted Volunteers. He was ordered to report to the United States Army on the Rio Grande and was soon named Zachary Taylor's chief of scouts. As such he won his

commander's praise and the admiration of the nation with his exciting reconnaissance expeditions into northern Mexico. The presence in his company of George Wilkins Kendall, editor of the New Orleans Picayune, and Samuel Reid, who later wrote a popular history of the campaign, The Scouting Expeditions of McCulloch's Texas Rangers, propelled McCulloch's name into national prominence. Leading his company as mounted infantry at the battle of Monterrey, McCulloch further distinguished himself, and before the battle of Buena Vista his astute and daring reconnaissance work saved Taylor's army from disaster and won him a promotion to the rank of major of United States volunteers.

McCulloch returned to Texas at the end of the war, served for a time as a scout under Bvt. Maj. Gen. David E. , and traveled to Tennessee on family business before setting out from Austin on September 9, 1849, for the gold fields of California. Although he failed to strike it rich, he was elected sheriff of Sacramento. His friends in the Senate, Sam Houston and Thomas Jefferson Rusk, mounted a campaign to put him in command of a regiment of United States cavalry for duty on the Texas frontier, but largely due to McCulloch's lack of formal education the attempt was frustrated. In 1852 President Franklin Pierce promised him the command of the elite Second United States Cavalry, but Secretary of War Jefferson Davis bestowed the command instead on his personal favorite, Albert Sidney Johnston. McCulloch was, however, appointed United States marshal for the Eastern District of Texas and served under Judge John Charles Watrous during the administrations of Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan. In 1858 he was appointed one of two peace commissioners to treat with Brigham Young and the elders of the Mormon Church; he is credited with helping to prevent armed hostilities between the United States government and the Latter-Day Saints in Utah.

Maj. Gen. David E. Twiggs

When secession came to Texas, McCulloch was commissioned a colonel and authorized to demand the surrender of all federal posts in the Military District of Texas. After a bloodless confrontation at the Alamo on February 16, 1861, General Twiggs turned over to McCulloch the federal arsenal and all other United States property in San Antonio. On May 11, 1861, Jefferson Davis appointed McCulloch a brigadier general, the second-ranking brigadier general in the Confederate Army and the first general-grade officer to be commissioned from the civilian community. McCulloch was assigned to the command of Indian Territory and established his headquarters at Little Rock, Arkansas, where he began to build the Army of the West with regiments from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. Although hampered by logistical nightmares and a total disagreement over strategic objectives with Missouri general Sterling Price, with whom he had been ordered to cooperate, McCulloch, with the assistance of Albert Pike, established vital alliances with the Cherokees, Choctaws, Creeks, and other inhabitants of what is now eastern Oklahoma. On August 10, 1861, he won an impressive victory over the army of Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon at Wilson's Creek, or Oak Hills, in southwest Missouri. McCulloch's continuing inability to come to personal or strategic accord with Price, however, caused President Davis, on January 10, 1862, to appoint Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn to the command of both McCulloch's and Price's armies. Van Dorn launched the Army of the West on an expedition to capture St. Louis, a plan that McCulloch bitterly resisted. The Confederates encountered the army of Union major general Samuel R. Curtis on the Little Sugar Creek in northwest Arkansas. Due largely to McCulloch's remarkable knowledge of the terrain, Van Dorn's army was able to flank the enemy out of a strong position and cut his line of communication to the north. McCulloch, commanding the Confederate right wing in the ensuing battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern, on March 7, 1862, overran a battery of artillery and drove the enemy from his original position. As federal resistance stiffened around 10:30 A.M., however, McCulloch rode forward through the thick underbrush to determine the location of the enemy line, was shot from his horse, and died

instantly. His command devolved upon Brig. Gen. James M. McIntosh, who was killed but a few minutes later while leading a charge to recover McCulloch's body. Col. Louis Hébert, the division's senior regimental commander, was captured in the same charge, and soon McCulloch's division, without leadership, began to fall apart and drift toward the rear. Most participants and later historians attribute to McCulloch's untimely death the disaster at Pea Ridge and the subsequent loss of Arkansas to the Union forces.

McCulloch was first buried on the field, but his body was removed to the cemetery at Little Rock and thence to the State Cemetery in Austin. McCulloch never married. His papers are located in the Barker Texas History Center at the University of Texas at Austin.

XI. Hiram Bronson Granbury

Written by Palmer Bradley and Bob Kent

Hiram Bronson Granbury, Confederate general, was born in Copiah County, Mississippi, on March 1, 1831, the son of Nancy (McLaurin) and Norvell R. Granbury, a Baptist minister. He was educated at Oakland College. In the 1850s he moved to Texas and lived in Waco, where he was admitted to the Bar; he served as chief justice of McLennan County from 1856 to 1858. On March 31, 1858, Granbury married Fannie Sims of Waco; they had no children. At the outbreak of the Civil War he recruited the Waco Guards, which became a unit in the Seventh Texas Infantry in Brig. Gen. John Gregg's brigade of the Confederate Army. In November 1861 at Hopkinsville, Kentucky, the regiment elected Granbury as major. He was captured with the command at the battle of Fort Donelson on February 15, 1862, and was paroled that same year in an officers' exchange. Upon his release he was promoted to colonel. In April 1863 Granbury was at Port Hudson, Louisiana, and in May he participated in the battle of Raymond, Mississippi. Shortly thereafter he joined Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's army, assembled for the relief of Vicksburg. Granbury commanded the Seventh Texas in Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson's brigade of Gen. John B. Hood's corps at Chickamauga, where he was wounded. He participated in the battle of Missionary Ridge, where his commanding officer was James A. Smith; shortly thereafter he succeeded to brigade command. During the retreat from that battle he was particularly distinguished for his conduct at Ringold Gap, where he commanded his own brigade. Granbury was commissioned brigadier general on February 29, 1864. During the ensuing Atlanta campaign, he served in Cleburne's division of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee and was again particularly distinguished at the battle of New Hope Church. After the fall of Atlanta, Granbury led his brigade in Hood's disastrous invasion of Tennessee, and at the battle of Franklin on November 30, 1864, he was killed in action. Granbury was first buried near Franklin, Tennessee. His body was later reinterred at the Ashwood Church Cemetery south of Columbia. On November 30, 1893, his remains were removed to Granbury, Texas, seat of Hood County, as the town was named in his honor.

The correct spelling of the general's name has long been debated. He attended Oakland College under the name Granberry, but after graduating and moving to Texas he changed the spelling to Granbury. Why he changed the spelling of his name is unknown. His sister, Mrs. Nautie Granberry Moss, stated that he changed the spelling of his name based on a peculiar whim. The official records and correspondence of the Civil War show his named spelled as Granbury, although many Texas newspaper articles at the time referred to him as General Granberry. When he was killed at the battle of Franklin and buried in Tennessee, the name on his tombstone was spelled Granberry, perhaps because that was the spelling of the family name in the area. When he was exhumed and reburied in Granbury in 1893, the name on the tombstone was spelled Granberry. Apparently, however, the reburial opened a debate on the proper spelling of his namesake city, and a letter by one J. N. Doyle in the Dallas Morning News reviewed the history of the general's name and concluded by pointing out that deeds for lots in the city, veterans who had served with him, and local citizens all used the spelling Granbury. In 1913, when a statue was erected on the Hood County courthouse square, the name was spelled Granbury. In 1996 a new tombstone with the name spelled Granbury was put in place, and after almost 150 years, the spelling of the general's name on his tombstone, statue, and name city became uniform as Granbury.

XII. Richard Taylor

Written by T. Michael Parrish

Richard Taylor

Richard Taylor, Confederate general, only son of Margaret Mackall (Smith) and Gen. Zachary Taylor, was born at the Taylor family home, Springfield, near Louisville, Kentucky, on January 27, 1826, and named for his grandfather, a Virginian who had served as a Revolutionary War officer. He attended private schools in Kentucky and Massachusetts before being admitted to Yale College in 1843. He graduated two years later, having merited no scholastic honors but instead concentrated on reading widely in classical and military history. He agreed to manage the family cotton plantation in Jefferson County, Mississippi, and in 1850 he persuaded his father (now President Taylor by virtue of his election in 1848) to purchase Fashion, a large sugar plantation in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. After Zachary Taylor's untimely death in July 1850, Taylor inherited Fashion. Steadily he increased its acreage, improved its sugar works (at considerable expense), and expanded its labor force to nearly 200 slaves, making him one of the richest men in Louisiana. But the freeze of 1856 ruined his crop, forcing him into heavy debt with a large mortgage on Fashion, a fragile condition underwritten largely by his generous mother-in-law Aglae Bringier, a wealthy French Creole matriarch whose daughter, Myrthe, Taylor had married in 1851. (They eventually had two sons and three daughters.) Yet he still projected an image of aristocratic affluence by racing thoroughbred horses at the famous Metairie Track and appearing at the gaming tables of the exclusive Boston Club in New Orleans.

Taylor was elected to the Louisiana Senate in 1855; he was affiliated first with the Whig party, then the American (Know-Nothing) party, and finally the Democratic party, veering cautiously toward a strong anti-Republican yet reluctant proslavery position. His sense of nationalistic, Whiggish conservatism, although thoroughly laced with a Southern disdain for agitating abolitionists, also made him distrustful of demagogic Southern fire-eaters' demands for disunion. Both of these volatile expressions of the nation's expansive democracy Taylor found repulsive and ultimately tragic. As a rueful delegate from Louisiana to the 1860 national Democratic Convention in Charleston, he witnessed the party's fatal splintering along sectional lines. There he attempted, but failed, to forge a less radical course for the South, arguing for a compromise between stunned moderates and implacable secessionists. Now viewing war as inevitable, Taylor willingly served as a delegate to the Louisiana secession convention in January 1861 and voted with the convention's majority for immediate secession. Yet his prophetic pleas to protect the state from military invasion went largely unheeded by overconfident fellow secessionists. He retired in disgust to his plantation, recognizing the Confederacy's fundamental lack of unity and even predicting eventual defeat, but he remained willing to serve if called. He was elected colonel of the Ninth Louisiana Infantry, assumed command in July, and took the regiment to Virginia. Surprisingly, in late October he received promotion to brigadier general by order of President Jefferson Davis (his brother-in-law by Davis's first marriage to one of Taylor's sisters). Although devoid of formal military training or combat experience, Taylor enjoyed his brigade's strong respect along with a reputation as a consummate student of military history, strategy, and tactics. "Dick Taylor was a born soldier," asserted a close friend. "Probably no civilian of his time was more deeply versed in the annals of war." Taylor was placed in command of the Louisiana Brigade, which included Maj. Chatham Roberdeau Wheat's notorious battalion of "Louisiana Tigers," and proved vital to Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's brilliant Shenandoah Valley campaign during the spring of 1862. Jackson used Taylor's brigade as an elite strike force that set a crippling marching pace and dealt swift flanking attacks. At Front Royal on May 23, again at Winchester on May 25, and finally at the climactic battle of Port Republic on June 9, he led the

Louisianans in timely assaults against strong enemy positions. He was promoted to major general on July 25, 1862, at thirty-six years of age the youngest Confederate officer to attain such rank to date. He suffered terribly from chronic rheumatoid arthritis, however, and so was given command of the District of West Louisiana and charged with reviving his home state's severely deteriorated war effort. Almost from the start he feuded with his superior, Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, mainly regarding Taylor's desperate need for troops to defend Louisiana's civilian population against destructive federal forays. Smith also thwarted Taylor's desire to free New Orleans from federal occupation, a goal that received strong, although temporary, approval and encouragement from Secretary of War George Wythe Randolph and President Davis. During 1863 Taylor directed an effective series of clashes with Union forces over control of lower Louisiana, most notably at Fort Bisland and Franklin (April 13–14), Brashear City (June 23), and Bayou Bourbeau (November 3).

In the early spring of 1864, after withdrawing up the Red River Valley in the face of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's invasion force of more than 25,000 men, Taylor became appalled at the devastation inflicted by the enemy upon Louisiana's heartland. On April 8, with an army of no more than 9,000 men, mostly Louisianans and Texans, he ignored Smith's explicit instructions to delay, instead attacking Banks's disorganized column a few miles below Mansfield near Sabine Crossroads. The Confederates swept the terror-stricken Yankees through the thick pine forest and then pursued them southward to Pleasant Hill. There, the next day, the federals withstood Taylor's assaults, forcing him to retire from the field. But Banks's generals compelled him to withdraw to Alexandria on the Red River. Taylor was outraged when Smith abruptly detached Walker's Texas Division for fighting in Arkansas, and he was left with only 5,000 men to lay siege to Alexandria. Taylor repeatedly demanded Walker's Division in order to crush Banks and liberate New Orleans, but Smith stubbornly refused. Finally Banks's army escaped from Alexandria on May 13. Convinced of Smith's arrogant ambition and incompetence, Taylor exploded with a series of insulting, insubordinate diatribes against Smith and submitted his resignation. Although unwilling to admit his strategic blunder in failing to allow Taylor to keep Walker's Division, Smith harbored no personal grudge. Taylor, however, never forgave Smith. Despite his heroic status for having saved most of Louisiana and virtually all of Texas from military conquest, Taylor viewed the Red River Campaign as a profound disappointment.

Edward R. S. Canby

Preferring to ignore the Taylor-Smith feud, on July 18 President Davis placed Taylor in command of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana and promoted him to lieutenant general, thus making him one of only three non-West Pointers who achieved such high rank in the South. From September 1864 until war's end Taylor struggled to defend his department, receiving scant cooperation from state governors, legislatures, and local militia units, while also contending with Jefferson Davis's poor coordination of the Confederacy's cumbersome bureaucracy, especially its divisive departmental system. Fortunately, Taylor enjoyed the benefit of Nathan Bedford Forrest's superb cavalry, which resisted federal incursions and supported the embattled Army of Tennessee by raiding enemy supply lines. Forrest showed genuine admiration for Taylor's leadership, remarking candidly, "He's the biggest man in the lot. If we'd had more like him, we would have licked the Yankees long ago." In January 1865 Taylor briefly assumed command of the shattered ranks of the Army of Tennessee after Gen. John Bell Hood's catastrophic defeats at Franklin and Nashville several weeks earlier. As the Southern cause rapidly disintegrated during the spring, Taylor saw his own department gutted by Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson's massive cavalry raid through Alabama and Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. 's triumphant siege of Mobile. Taylor had "shared the fortunes of the Confederacy," as he later recalled, having "sat by its

cradle and followed its hearse." Indeed, the war had inflicted harsh personal sacrifices: he lost his plantation to destruction and confiscation by federal soldiers; his two young sons died of scarlet fever as wartime refugees; and his wife suffered so severely that she lapsed into a slow decline that ended with her premature death in 1875.

After surrendering his department to Canby on May 4, 1865, Taylor took up residency in New Orleans and tried to revive his finances by securing a lease of the New Basin Canal from the state. He also garnered the support of a wealthy New York City attorney, Samuel Latham Mitchell Barlow, one of the Democratic party's most effective powerbrokers. At Barlow's bidding Taylor negotiated with presidents Andrew Johnson and Ulysses S. Grant and also lobbied members of Congress, all in an attempt to advance democratic principles, mainly by gaining lenient treatment for the South. Increasingly distrustful of Radical Republicans, Taylor finally cursed Reconstruction as a loathsome evil, with Johnson as its inept victim and Grant as its corrupt handmaiden. The continual racial and political strife, much of which Taylor witnessed personally in New Orleans, gradually pushed him along with many other genteel conservatives into a reactionary position that lent tacit approval to the corrupt, blatantly violent backlash by Southern white Democrats against freedmens' efforts to assert their new voting rights under Republican sponsorship. Shortly after his wife's death in 1875, Taylor moved with his three daughters to Winchester, Virginia. Intimately involved in New Yorker Samuel J. Tilden's Democratic presidential campaign in 1876, Taylor vainly attempted to influence congressional maneuverings in the wake of the disputed election returns, a national crisis ultimately diffused by the pervasive breakdown of solidarity among Democratic leaders. On April 12, 1879, Taylor died at Barlow's home in New York City, succumbing to severe internal congestion resulting from his long battle with rheumatoid arthritis. Although Taylor had never demonstrated strong religious convictions, an Episcopal clergyman was present to minister to him. He was buried in a family crypt in Metairie Cemetery, New Orleans. Only a few weeks before his death he completed his memoirs, Destruction and Reconstruction, one of the most literate and colorful firsthand accounts of the Civil War era.

TSHA
Texas State Historical Association

Military Units

XIII. Hood's Texas Brigade

Written by Anonymous

Hood's Texas Brigade was organized on October 22, 1861, in Richmond, Virginia. It was initially commanded by Brig. Gen. Louis T. Wigfall and composed of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Texas Infantry regiments, the only Texas troops to fight in the Eastern Theater. The First was commanded by Wigfall and Lt. Col. Hugh McLeod, the Fourth by Col. John Bell Hood and Lt. Col. John Marshall, and the Fifth by Col. James J. Archer and Lt. Jerome B. Robertson. On November 20, 1861, the Eighteenth Georgia Infantry, commanded by William T. Wofford, was attached. On June 1, 1862, eight infantry companies from Wade Hampton's South Carolina Legion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Martin W. Gary, were added, and in November 1862 the Third Arkansas Infantry, commanded by Col. Van H. Manning, joined the brigade. Both the Georgia and South Carolina units were transferred out in November 1862, but the Third Arkansas remained until the end of the war.

Wigfall resigned command of the brigade on February 20, 1862, and on March 7 Hood was promoted to brigadier general and placed in command. Because of his daring leadership the brigade became known as Hood's Texas Brigade, despite his brief service of only six months as commander. The brigade served throughout the war in Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and in James Longstreet's First Corps. It participated in at least twenty-four battles in 1862, including Eltham's Landing, Gaines' Mill, Second Manassas, and Sharpsburg (Antietam). In October the Third Arkansas regiment replaced the Eighteenth Georgia and Hampton's Legion. On November 1, 1862, Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson became brigade commander, and Hood was elevated to command of the division in which the Texas Brigade operated.

In April 1863 the brigade moved to North Carolina; in May it rejoined Lee's army; and on July 1, 2, and 3, it took part in the battle of Gettysburg. In Georgia the brigade fought on September 19 and 20 at Chickamauga, where Hood was wounded and forced to leave his division, ending his official connection with the brigade. In Tennessee the brigade joined in the sieges of Chattanooga and Knoxville. Gen. John Gregg became commander when the brigade returned to Virginia in February 1864. In the battle of the Wilderness, General Lee personally led the Texans in one of the charges. After Gregg was killed in October the brigade was temporarily led by Col. Clinton M. Winkler and Col. F. S. Bass. At the surrender at Appomattox on April 10, 1865, Col. Robert M. Powell commanded the brigade, Capt. W. T. Hill the Fifth regiment, Lt. Col. C. M. Winkler the Fourth, Col. F. S. Bass the First, and Lt. Col. R. S. Taylor the Third Arkansas.

It is estimated that at the beginning of the war the Texas regiments comprised about 3,500 men and that during the war recruits increased the number to almost 4,400. The brigade sustained a 61 percent casualty rate and, at its surrender, numbered close to 600 officers and men. It was praised by generals Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson, James Longstreet, and Robert E. Lee and by high officials of the Confederacy.
The Hood's Brigade Association was organized on May 14, 1872. Sixty-three reunions were held between that date and 1933, when the last two physically able veterans, E. W. B. Leach and Sam O. Moodie, both ninety-one, met for the last time in Houston. Through the efforts of the association a monument in memory of the brigade was erected on the south drive of the Capitol in Austin on October 27, 1910. The monument is a thirty-five-foot marble shaft with a bronze statue of a brigade infantryman on top, mounted on a sixteen-foot base carved with the names of all the battles fought by the brigade.

The association was reactivated at Hill Junior College in the summer of 1966 with a membership of Hood's Brigade descendants. It is an activity of the Texas Heritage Museum at Hill Junior College and meets in even-numbered years.

XIV. Eighth Texas Calvary [Terry's Texas Rangers]

Written by Thomas W. Cutrer

The Eighth Texas Cavalry, a group of Texas volunteers for the Confederate Army popularly known as Terry's Texas Rangers, was assembled by Benjamin Franklin Terry in August 1861. Each man was required to furnish a shotgun or carbine, a Colt revolver, a Bowie knife, and a saddle, bridle, and blanket. The army would provide the mounts. The regiment was mustered into Confederate service at Houston on September 9, 1861. Terry was elected colonel, Thomas S. Lubbock lieutenant colonel, and Thomas Harrison major. With the death of Colonel Terry at the battle of Woodsonville, Kentucky, on December 8, 1861, Lubbock, then sick in a Bowling Green, Kentucky, hospital, was advanced to command of the regiment, but he died within a few days. Subsequently, John Austin Wharton was elected colonel and John G. Walker lieutenant colonel of the regiment. When Wharton was promoted to brigadier general in the fall of 1862, Harrison became the regimental commander; he served in that post until the end of the war.

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston

Although the regiment had been promised duty in Virginia, it was diverted to Bowling Green, Kentucky, at the request of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, who was in command of the Confederate army headquartered there. The Terry Rangers distinguished themselves at the battles of Shiloh (April 6–8, 1862), Perryville (October 8, 1862), Murfreesboro (December 31, 1862–January 2, 1863), Chickamauga (September 19–20, 1863), and Chattanooga (November 24–25, 1863); in the Atlanta campaign (May 1–September 2, 1864); and as raiders in Kentucky and Tennessee under Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest. The rangers were also part of the inadequate force under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston that attempted to slow Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's inexorable "march to the sea" during the final months of the war. Terry's Rangers delivered what was probably the last charge of the Army of Tennessee at the battle of Bentonville (March 19–20, 1865). Rather than surrender with the rest of 's army at Durham Station, North Carolina, on April 26, 1865, 158 of the reported 248 survivors of the regiment slipped through Union lines to join other Confederates yet in the field. With the total collapse of the Southern cause, however, the Terry Rangers drifted home as individuals and in small groups, having never officially surrendered. With the exception of Hood's Texas Brigade, the Eighth Texas Cavalry was probably the best-known Texas unit to serve in the Civil War. It earned a reputation that ranked it among the most effective mounted regiments in the western theater of operations.

XV. Sibley's Brigade

Written by Jerry Thompson



On May 31, 1861, Henry Hopkins Sibley resigned his commission in the Second United States Dragoons and hurried to Richmond, where he persuaded Jefferson Davis to adopt a grandiose plan to capture New Mexico Territory and use it as a gateway for Confederate occupation of Colorado and California. He organized a brigade at San Antonio in the late summer and early fall of 1861. Col. James Reily, a seasoned diplomat with military experience, commanded the Fourth Regiment. Col. Thomas Green, a veteran of the battle of San Jacinto and the Mexican War, was placed in command of the Fifth Regiment, and Col. William Steele, like Sibley a veteran of the Second Dragoons, headed the Seventh Regiment. By Christmas 1861 the brigade had set up headquarters at Fort Bliss, where Col. John Robert Baylor's Second Regiment of Texas Mounted Rifles was incorporated into the brigade's ranks. When the "Confederate Army of New Mexico" marched up the Rio Grande River and attempted to bypass the federal bastion of Fort Craig, the bloody battle of Valverde resulted-a defeat for the Union garrison. After occupying Albuquerque and raising the Stars and Bars over Santa Fe, the territorial capital, General Sibley ordered the brigade to move against Fort Union, a major federal supply depot for the Southwest. The advance guard of the brigade under Maj. Charles L. Pyron was defeated by Colorado "Pikes Peakers" in Apache Canyon, but a larger force under the command of Col. William R. Scurry drove the federals from the field on March 28 in the battle of Glorieta. The battle proved to be the "Gettysburg of the West," however, when the brigade lost its supplies at Johnson's Ranch in Apache Canyon to the Confederate rear. After skirmishes at Albuquerque and Peralta, the brigade took a disastrous route across the eastern slopes of the San Mateo Mountains while evacuating the territory. Col. William Steele, with a force of some 600 men, was left to guard the Mesilla valley, part of Confederate Arizona, but he too retreated into Texas at the approach of Gen. James H. Carleton's California Column. Almost a third of Sibley's more than 2,500 men were lost in New Mexico.

After Sibley was called to Richmond to account for the New Mexico disaster, the brigade was commanded by Col. Green and participated in the recapture of Galveston on January 1, 1863. After transfer to Louisiana, the brigade next saw action in the Acadian bayou country under Gen. Richard Taylor. After the Confederate defeat at the battle of Bisland on April 13 and 14, 1863, in which Col. Reily was killed, Sibley was court-martialed by Taylor and removed from command. In July part of the brigade commanded by Green attacked the federal garrison at Brashear City before moving east to assault Donaldsonville. Although temporarily ordered back to Texas in December 1863 to guard the Texas coast near Galveston, the brigade was countermarched to Louisiana to join Taylor in time to play a major role in the decisive battles of the Red River Campaign at Sabine Cross Roads near Mansfield on April 6, 1864, and at Pleasant Hill on April 9. At Blair's Landing on the Red River, Gen. Green was killed while leading an attack on a fleet of federal gunboats. Back in the Bayou Teche region, Col. William Polk Hardeman assumed command of the brigade. After brief duty at Valdalia, on the Mississippi River opposite Natchez, the brigade was ordered to Arkansas in the fall of 1864. Most of the men were in Houston in May 1865 under the command of Col. Henry C. McNeil when they surrendered as part of the Trans-Mississippi command.

XVI. First Texas Calvary

Written by Eugene M. Ott, Jr. and Glen E. Lich

During the Civil War Texas contributed two regiments and two battalions of cavalry to the federal army. A total of 1,915 men from Texas served the Union; of these 141 died, 12 in action. One source states that “the strength of the Texas Federal Regiments consisted primarily of Mexicans, Germans, and Irishmen.” While it is true that the regiment had a high proportion of Spanish-speaking Texans and first-generation immigrants, among them German Unionists from the Hill Country, the officer cadre was mostly mainstream southern in background. The larger of the two Texas units was the First Texas Cavalry Regiment. It was organized at New Orleans, Louisiana, on November 6, 1862, under the command of Edmund J. Davis, who, before the war’s end, became a brigadier general. The unit was composed of eight companies. Until September 1863 the First Texas Cavalry was assigned to the defense of New Orleans. During that time two companies were sent to Galveston but did not land due to the Confederate capture of that city in January 1863. While in Louisiana, the regiment saw its initial action on the Amite River in May 1863 and participated in operations around Morgan City. In September 1863 the First Texas Cavalry sailed from New Orleans as part of the Sabine Pass expedition but was not in action. Returning to Louisiana, the regiment was engaged in the Western Louisiana (Têche) Campaign from October 3 through October 17, 1863. The regiment was moved back to New Orleans at the end of this assignment and embarked on October 23 as part of the Rio Grande expedition, landing on the south Texas coast on November 2 and occupying Brownsville four days later. Within a month the First Texas Cavalry, which had reached Texas with a strength of 16 officers and 205 enlisted men, grew by slightly over 50 percent. During this time the Second Texas Cavalry Regiment was formed at Brownsville. Both regiments left Texas in July 1864 for Louisiana. Two companies, however, of the First Texas Cavalry remained at Brownsville and did not rejoin their parent regiment until six months later. In September 1864 the First Texas Cavalry was involved in some minor actions near Morganza, Louisiana. On November 1, 1864, the two regiments were merged into one twelve company regiment (normally a regiment at this time had ten companies). The new command was called the First Texas Volunteer Cavalry. Ordered to Baton Rouge on November 19, 1864, the First Texas Volunteers engaged in patrolling and reconnaissance duties until the end of the Civil War. In May and June 1865 the regiment was at Vidalia, Louisiana. On June 29, 1865, the Volunteers were ordered to Texas and mustered out of service on November 4, 1865.

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Women

XVII. Susann Shubrick Hayne Pinckney

Written by Paul M. Lucko

Susanna Pinckney [pseud. Miss McPherson], nineteenth-century romantic novelist, daughter of Thomas Shubrick and Carolene (Finney) Pinckney, was born near Fields Store in what is now Waller County, Texas, in 1843. When she was five her parents sent her to live with relatives in Charleston, South Carolina, for education in southern culture. She returned to Fields Store at the age of thirteen. She never married, having rejected a proposal from a man named Groce Lawrence because her father disliked him. Lawrence, reputedly an alcoholic, enlisted in the Confederate Army as a member of Hood's Texas Brigade and died in the Wilderness Fight in Virginia in May 1864. The Civil War, in which two of Susanna's younger brothers fought, served as the central influence upon her writing career. Pinckney published a few short stories in Texas newspapers before she was forty-nine. In 1892 the Nixon-Jones Printing Company of St. Louis printed her first novel, Douglas; Tender and True. In 1906 the Neale Publishing Company printed In the Southland, which contained two novelettes: "Disinherited" and "White Violets." During the same year Neale also published Darcy Pinckney. Susanna may also have written two or three other books, but no record of those publications survives.

Portions of her novels were set on the Texas frontier, where buffalo, Comanches, and Mexican bandits roam. "White Violets" is about three Texas sisters and their love affairs. Pinckney's writing extolled the antebellum South and the lost cause of the Civil War. Her characters frequently were Confederate colonels and southern belles, who either traveled abroad meeting members of the European aristocracy or worked as military nurses during the war. She refers to Hood's brigade as young soldiers who protected Gen. Robert E. Lee during the wilderness fight only to lose their own lives. Her most tragic characters were jilted male or female lovers; often the heroine saved the hero from the depredations of alcoholism. One critic analyzes the Pinckneian oeuvre as an escape from the drudgery of daily life to the a glorious aristocratic life.

Miss McPherson moved from Fields Store to nearby Hempstead, probably sometime after the Civil War. There she lived with her brother John M. Pinckney, whom she inspired to study law; he entered politics and in 1903 became a member of the United States House of Representatives. Susanna moved to Washington with John after his election. After John and another brother, Thomas, were murdered at Hempstead in 1905, she moved to Houston, where she lived with a niece. Susanna Pinckney was a member of the Episcopal Church and the Texas Press Club. She was a prohibitionist. She died on November 23, 1909, and was buried in the Hempstead City Cemetery.

XVIII. Sarah Emma Evelyn Edmundson Seelye

Written by Paul F. Cecil

Sarah Seelye was born Sarah Emma Evelyn Edmundson in New Brunswick province, Canada, in December 1841. To avoid an unwanted marriage, she ran away from home when she was seventeen, disguised as a boy. She continued her male masquerade as a publisher's agent in the midwestern United States and, on May 25, 1861, enlisted in Company F, Second Michigan Volunteer Infantry Regiment, under the alias Franklin Thompson. For nearly two years she served in the Union Army undetected, with assignments including male nurse, regimental mail orderly, and brigade postmaster, and on special assignments for the secret service. Ironically, in the secret service duty she penetrated Confederate lines "disguised" as a woman. Fearing her guise would be discovered when she became ill with malaria in 1863, she deserted and resumed a normal existence in Ohio as a female. After regaining her health she again volunteered as a nurse, but this time with the Christian Sanitary Commission at Harper's Ferry, and as a female. Under a shortened version of her maiden name, S. Emma E. Edmonds, she wrote a fanciful, but highly successful, account of her experiences in the army, Nurse and Spy in the Union Army (1865). The popularity and exposure she gained from the book and its revelation that she had deserted the army at one time led the government to cancel her pension. She later married a childhood neighbor, Linus Seelye, and reportedly had five children, three of whom died in infancy. A congressional bill in 1884 recognized her service to the Union and granted her a pension of twelve dollars a month. The charge of desertion from the army was removed by Congress in 1886. In the early 1890s the Seelye family moved to La Porte, Texas, and on April 22, 1897, Sarah Seelye became a member of the McClellan Post, Grand Army of the Republic, in Houston, Texas-the only woman member in the history of the GAR, though as many as four hundred women may actually have served in the Union army. At the time of her death Seelye was writing her memoirs of the Civil War. She died in La Porte, Texas, on September 5, 1898. Three years later, at the insistence of her fellow members of the McClellan Post, her remains were transferred to the GAR plot in the Washington (German) Cemetery in Houston.

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Spies And Irregulars



XIX. David Owen Dodd

Written by Laura House

David Owen Dodd

David Owen Dodd, teenage Civil War spy, was born in Victoria, Texas, in 1847, the son of Andrew Marion Dodd. When he was twelve, his family moved to Benton, Arkansas. Dodd spent most of his life in Texas. In 1862 he moved with his parents and two sisters to Little Rock, Arkansas, where he attended St. John's College, then contracted malaria and withdrew from school. Instead of returning to college after his illness, he began working in the Little Rock telegraph office. During the summer of 1862 he and his father moved to Monroe, Louisiana, where Dodd worked in the local telegraph office, in which the lines were controlled by the Confederate Army. He remained there for four or five months, keeping in close contact with Confederate troop movement in Louisiana and Northern Mississippi. In January of 1863 he went to Granada, Mississippi, where for eight months he helped his father, a sutler for the Third Arkansas Regiment. In September of that year he returned to Little Rock to help his mother and two sisters get away and behind the Confederate lines because the federal troops had captured the city. He was not successful. After a few weeks Dodd began working in a sutler's store that aided federal troops. In December 1863 his father unexpectedly arrived in Little Rock to move his wife, son, and daughters to Camden, Arkansas, by wagon. Shortly thereafter, Dodd returned to Little Rock to help with his father's unsettled business.

He received a pass from Gen. James F. Fagan, a family friend, in exchange for information about the Union troops in Little Rock. Dodd was to report his findings to General Fagan when he returned to Camden. On his way to Little Rock, he met Frank Tomlinson of Pine Bluff, who was also a seventeen year-old Confederate spy. Tomlinson, sent on a mission to find military information for Gen. John S. Marmaduke of Mississippi, succeeded in his endeavor. It was later believed that during the Christmas holidays Dodd visited Union headquarters and other military offices in Little Rock to gather strategic military information for General Fagan and wrote his notes in Morse Code. He left Little Rock on December 29 and safely passed by several federal pickets. At dusk he emerged from the woods to find a squad of the federal army and was arrested by Sergeant Miehr of Company B, First Missouri Cavalry, because he did not have his pass, which had been taken by a federal picket, Pvt. Daniel Olderburg. After he was escorted to the picket headquarters, it was confirmed that the pass had been taken. Before Dodd was to be released, he was searched for possession of contraband. He was found worthy of release until a member of one of the troops noticed he was wearing two different shoes. His shoes were inspected, and his small notebook was found in one of the soles. Lieutenant Stopral of the federal troops identified the Morse Code and could read enough to be skeptical. Dodd's papers were taken by Capt. George Hanna, and he was placed in the guardhouse. The next morning, December 30, he was turned over to Capt. John Baird, who took him to Little Rock to stand trial.

The trial, presided over by Brig. Gen. John M. Thayer, began the following day. In its six-day duration witnesses testified that they had seen Dodd at different functions during the holidays and did not notice any evidence of spying. Robert Clowery, assistant superintendent of the United States Military Telegraph and later president of the Western Union Telegraph Company, provided the deciding testimony. Clowery could read Dodd's Morse Code notes, which listed the manpower and weaponry of the Union forces. Dodd maintained his innocence, but on January 5, 1864, was found guilty and sentenced to hang. He then confessed that he had received orders from General Fagan to relay information about the federal troops in Little Rock and stated that he would not have been allowed to visit Little Rock unless he agreed to spy. Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele, who ordered Dodd's trial, believed a federal soldier had assisted Dodd and promised to drop the charges if Dodd would name the traitor. Dodd refused, and his sentence was confirmed. On January 8, 1864, at 3:00 P.M., he was executed by hanging on the grounds of St. John's College, his alma mater, before a crowd of 2,000 citizens and a 4,000-man military escort. Dodd, described by his mother as a "hot-headed Southern boy," may have been the youngest participant in the war who was hanged as a spy.

XX. William Clarke Quantrill

Written by David Paul Smith

William Clarke Quantrill

William Clarke Quantrill (Charley Hart, Charles William Quantrill, and Billy Quantrill), Civil War guerrilla leader, was born at Canal Dover, Ohio, on July 31, 1837, to Thomas Henry and Caroline Cornelia (Clarke) Quantrill. He taught school briefly in Ohio and Illinois; in 1857 he moved to Kansas, and in 1858 he accompanied an army provision train to Utah. At Fort Bridger, Salt Lake City, and elsewhere in the territory, Quantrill was associated with a number of murders and thefts. He fled a warrant for his arrest in Utah in 1860 and returned to Kansas. In December he joined a group in an effort to free the slaves of a Missouri man; he betrayed the plans, and three of the abolitionists were killed. Quantrill collected a group of renegades in the Kansas-Missouri area. He fought with Confederate forces at the battle of Wilson's Creek in Oakhills, Missouri, in August 1861 but soon thereafter began irregular independent operations. Quantrill and his band attacked Union camps, patrols, and settlements. In November 1862 the group murdered twelve unarmed teamsters. Union authorities declared them outlaws. Quantrill's role in the capture of Independence, however, led to his being commissioned a captain in the Confederate Army. Shortly thereafter, he sought a regular command under the Confederacy Partisan Ranger Act, but his reputation for brutality preceded him, and his request was denied, although he was promoted to the rank of colonel.

In mid-October 1863 Quantrill and his band crossed the Red River at Colbert's Ferry and established winter camp on Mineral Springs Creek fifteen miles northwest of Sherman. During his first winter in Grayson County Quantrill and his men may have acted as a police force against cattle thieves who raided farms and ranches from Indian Territory. This winter camp was necessary, in part, for Quantrill's men to escape retribution for two of their recent affairs, the first being their infamous sack of Lawrence, Kansas, on August 21, 1863, during which they looted the town and shot approximately 180 men and boys. Weeks later, while on their way to Texas, Quantrill's well-mounted and armed force of 400 men came upon the 100-man headquarters escort of Union general James G. Blunt. Quantrill's band attacked on October 6, 1863, and killed eighty men and wounded eighteen in the Baxter Springs Massacre. Many were murdered after having surrendered. The raiders also captured several fully loaded supply wagons.

Quantrill reported at Bonham on October 26 to Gen. Henry E. McCulloch. One of the officers described Quantrill as standing about five feet ten inches, weighing about 150 pounds, with fair hair, blue eyes, and a florid complexion. Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy, approved of Quantrill and ordered McCulloch to use Quantrill's men to help round up the increasing number of deserters and conscription-dodgers in North Texas. Quantrill's men captured but few and killed several, whereupon McCulloch pulled them off this duty; McCulloch sent them to track down retreating Comanches from a recent raid on the northwest frontier. They did so for nearly a week with no success. Quantrill is credited with ending a near-riot of county "war widows" who were convinced that the Confederate commissary in Sherman was withholding from them such "luxury goods" as coffee, tea, and sugar. During this winter Quantrill's lieutenant, William (Bloody Bill) Anderson, took some of the men to organize his own group. With two such groups in the area, residents of Grayson and Fannin counties became targets for raids, and acts of violence proliferated so much that regular Confederate forces had to be assigned to protect residents from the activities of the irregular Confederate forces.

Finally, General McCulloch determined to rid North Texas of Quantrill's influence. On March 28, 1864, when Quantrill appeared at Bonham as requested, McCulloch had him arrested on the charge of

ordering the murder of a Confederate major. Quantrill escaped that day and returned to his camp near Sherman, pursued by over 300 state and Confederate troops. He and his men crossed the Red River into Indian Territory, where they resupplied from Confederate stores. Except for a brief return in May, Quantrill's activities in Texas were at an end. His authority over his followers disintegrated completely when they elected George Todd, a former lieutenant to Quantrill, to lead them. In an attempt to regain his prestige Quantrill concocted a plan to lead a company of men to Washington and assassinate President Abraham Lincoln. He assembled a group of raiders in Lafayette County, Missouri, in November and December 1864, but the strength of Union troops east of the Mississippi River convinced him that his plan could not succeed. Quantrill returned, therefore, to his normal pattern of raiding. With a group of thirty-three men, he entered Kentucky early in 1865. In May or early June of that year a Unionist irregular force surprised his group near Taylorsville, Kentucky, and in the evening battle Quantrill was shot through the spine. He died at the military prison at Louisville, Kentucky, on June 6, 1865.

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Political Leaders And Officials

XXI. Francis Richard Lubbock

Written by Louis Mitchell


Governor Francis R. Lubbock

Francis R. Lubbock, governor of Texas, was born on October 16, 1815, in Beaufort, South Carolina, the oldest son of Dr. Henry Thomas Willis and Susan Ann (Saltus) Lubbock and brother of Thomas S. Lubbock. At age fourteen, after his father's death, he quit school and took a job as a clerk in a hardware store. He later pursued a business career in South Carolina and then in New Orleans, and continued his business activities when he moved to Texas in 1836. He was married three times-first to Adele Baron of New Orleans in 1835; then to Mrs. Sarah E. Black Porter, the widow of a Presbyterian minister, in 1883; and then, after his second wife's death, to Lou Scott in 1903. In 1837 Lubbock moved to Houston, Texas, where he opened a general store. During the 1840s he began his ranching operations. Lubbock was a lifelong Democrat. He began his association with the Democratic party during the nullification crisis in South Carolina in 1832. In Texas he continued his political involvement and was appointed comptroller of the Republic of Texas by President Sam Houston. He was also elected clerk of the Harris County district court and served from 1841 to 1857.

In the 1850s Lubbock was active in state Democratic politics. In the party convention of 1856 he fought against the American (or Know-Nothing) party. He was elected lieutenant governor in 1857 but lost his race for reelection in 1859, when Sam Houston and were elected. In 1860 Lubbock served as a Texas delegate to the national Democratic convention at Charleston, where the southern delegation walked out in opposition to the Democratic platform and Stephen A. Douglas, the party's nominee. After the southerners' second walkout on the Democrats at Baltimore, the southern Democratic party nominated John C. Breckinridge at their convention in Richmond, Virginia, a convention chaired by Lubbock.

In 1861 Lubbock won the governorship of Texas by only 124 votes. As governor he staunchly supported the Confederacy and worked to improve the military capabilities of Texas. He chaired the state military board, which attempted to trade cotton and United States Indemnity Bonds for military goods through Mexico. He also worked with the board to establish a state foundry and percussion-cap factory. Lubbock vigorously supported Confederate conscription, opposing draft exemptions for able-bodied men as unfair and the substitution system as advantageous to the wealthy. Viewing the use of whites in government contracting and cattle driving as wasteful, he encouraged their replacement with slaves to increase enlistment. Aliens residing in Texas were also made subject to the draft. Lubbock exempted frontier counties from the Confederate draft and enlisted their residents for local defense against Indian attack.

When his term of office ended, Lubbock chose to enter the military service. He was appointed lieutenant colonel and served as assistant adjutant general on the staff of Maj. Gen. John Bankhead Magruder. He organized troop-transport and supply trains for the Red River campaign against Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks. Lubbock was later transferred to the staff of Brig. Gen. Thomas Green. After Green's death, Lubbock's commander was Maj. Gen. John A. Wharton, whom Lubbock assisted in raising additional Texas troops for the Red River operations. In August 1864 Lubbock was appointed aide-de-camp to Jefferson Davis and traveled to Richmond. As an expert on the Trans-Mississippi Department, he provided Davis with firsthand information on the war west of the Mississippi River. At the end of the war Lubbock fled Richmond with Davis and was captured by federal authorities in Georgia. He was imprisoned in Fort Delaware and kept in solitary confinement for eight months before being paroled.

After his release he returned to Texas. He soon tired of ranching and went into business in Houston and Galveston, where he served as tax collector. From 1878 to 1891 he was treasurer of the state of Texas. From 1891 until his death he continued to live in Austin, where he died on June 22, 1905.

XXII. Oran Milo Roberts

Written by Ford Dixon



Oran Milo Roberts

Oran M. Roberts, jurist and governor of Texas, son of Obe and Margaret (Ewing) Roberts, was born in Laurens District, South Carolina, on July 9, 1815. He was educated at home until he was seventeen, then entered the University of Alabama in 1832, graduated four years later, and was admitted to the bar in 1837. After serving a term in the Alabama legislature, where he was an admirer of John C. Calhoun, he moved in 1841 to San Augustine, Texas, where he opened a successful law practice. Roberts was appointed a district attorney by President Sam Houston in 1844. Two years later, after Texas had become a state, he was appointed district judge by Governor James Pinckney Henderson. In addition to his duties on the bench, he also served as president of the board and lecturer in law for the University of San Augustine, where he showed marked talent as a teacher. In 1856 Roberts ran for and won a position on the Texas Supreme Court, where he joined his friend Royal T. Wheeler, the chief justice. During this time Roberts became a spokesman for states' rights, and when the secessionist crisis appeared in 1860, he was at the center of the pro-Confederate faction. In January 1861 he was unanimously elected president of the Secession Convention in Austin, a meeting that he had been influential in calling. Along with East Texas colleagues George W. Chilton and John S. Ford, Roberts led the passage of the ordinance removing Texas from the Union in 1861. In 1862 he returned to East Texas, where he helped raise a regiment, the Eleventh Texas Infantry of Walker's Texas Division. His military career was brief. After seeing very little combat and after an unsuccessful attempt to gain a brigadiership, Roberts returned to Austin as chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court in 1864. He held this position until he was removed along with other state incumbents in 1865.

During Reconstruction he was elected a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1866 and also, along with David G. Burnet, was elected United States senator. As Roberts had anticipated, the new majority of Radical Republicans in Congress refused to seat the entire Texas delegation along with the delegations of other southern states. After his rejection, about which he later wrote an article entitled "The Experience of an Unrecognized Senator," published in the Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association (now the Southwestern Historical Quarterly) in 1908. Roberts eventually returned to Gilmer, Texas, where he opened a law school in 1868. Among his students were a future Texas Supreme Court justice, Sawnie Robertson, and a Dallas district judge, George N. Aldredge. With the return of the Democrats to power in Austin in 1874, Roberts was first appointed, then elected, to the Texas Supreme Court. He served as chief justice for four years and was involved in rewriting much of Texas civil law. In 1878 he was elected governor of Texas on a platform of post-Reconstruction fiscal reform. His two gubernatorial terms were marked by a reduction in state expenditures. His plan for countering the high taxes and state debt of the Reconstruction years became known as "pay as you go." A major part of this plan involved the sale of public lands to finance the debt and to fund public schools. Though ultimately successful in both reducing the debt and increasing the public school fund, the decreased government appropriations under Roberts halted public school growth for a time. Also, his land policy tended to favor large ranchers and companies in the development of West Texas. Nonetheless he remained popular with rural landowners, largely because he lowered taxes, as well as with land speculators. The present Capitol in Austin was contracted during Roberts's terms, and the cornerstone for the University of Texas was laid in 1882. Railroad mileage increased across West Texas, and the frontier became more secure.

In 1883, shortly before Roberts's term as governor ended, the University of Texas opened in Austin. Upon his retirement Roberts was immediately appointed professor of law, a position he held for the next ten years. During this period he was immensely influential in the state's legal profession. His impact on a generation of young attorneys was symbolized by the affectionate title "Old Alcalde" bestowed on him by his students. During his tenure at the university, Roberts wrote several professional works, among them a text, The Elements of Texas Pleading (1890), which was used for decades after his retirement from teaching. In 1893 he left the university and moved to Marble Falls, where he turned his attention to more general historical writings. His essay "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas for its Fifty Years of Statehood, 1845–1895" was published in an early general history of the state, Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685 to 1897 (1898), edited by Dudley G. Wooten. Roberts's chapters on Texas in volume eleven of C. A. Evans's Confederate Military History (1899) stress the role of the Lone Star State in the Civil War. With his interest in Texas history unabated, Roberts returned to Austin in 1895. Here, along with several other prominent Texans, he participated in forming the Texas State Historical Association. He served as the organization's first president and submitted several of the first articles published in its Quarterly. Roberts was married to Francis W. Edwards of Ashville, Alabama, from 1837 until her death in 1883. They were the parents of seven children. In 1887 Roberts married Mrs. Catherine E. Border. He died at his home in Austin on May 19, 1898, and was buried in Oakwood Cemetery.

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Unionists



FUNERAL OF GERMAN PATRIOTS AT COMFORT, TEXAS, August 30, 1865.—[See Page 30.]

XXIII. Edmund Jackson Davis

Written by Carl H. Moneyhon

Edmund Jackson Davis

Edmund J. Davis, Union Army officer and Reconstruction governor of Texas, was born at St. Augustine, Florida, on October 2, 1827, the son of William Godwin and Mary Ann (Channer) Davis. His grandfather Godwin Davis, an Englishman, had settled in Virginia and had fought and died in the Revolutionary War. His father, who had lived in South Carolina, was a land developer and attorney at St. Augustine. The young Davis received his education in Florida and moved with his family to Galveston, Texas, in January 1848. There he worked as a clerk in the post office and studied law. In mid-1849 he moved to Corpus Christi, where he worked in a store and read law. He was admitted to the bar in the fall of 1849. Between 1849 and 1853 he was an inspector and deputy collector of customs at Laredo. In 1853 he became district attorney of the Twelfth Judicial District at Brownsville. About 1856 Governor Elisha M. Pease named him judge of the same district, and Davis continued to serve as a state judge until 1861. As judge he accompanied the ranger unit of Capt. William G. Tobin, who was involved in the Cortina affair at Brownsville in 1859.

On April 6, 1858, Davis married Elizabeth Anne Britton, daughter of Forbes Britton, a state senator and friend of Sam Houston. The couple had two sons, Britton and Waters. Britton was born in 1860, attended West Point, and became an officer in the United States Army. Waters, born in 1862, attended the University of Michigan and became an attorney and merchant in El Paso.

Davis was a Whig until the mid-1850s. In 1855 he joined the Democratic party in a fusion against the American (Know-Nothing) party, and he remained a Democrat until after the Civil War. In later politics he supported Sam Houston and opposed secession in 1861, when he ran unsuccessfully to become a delegate to the Secession Convention. After secession Davis refused to take the oath of loyalty to the Confederacy, and the state vacated his judgeship on April 24.

As a result of his opposition to the Confederacy, he fled the state in May 1862. With John L. Haynes and William Alexander, he went to New Orleans, then to Washington, where the men met with President Abraham Lincoln, who recommended providing arms to troops that they wanted to raise. On October 26, 1862, Davis received a colonel's commission and authorization to recruit the cavalry regiment that became the First Texas Cavalry (U.S.).

Davis and the First Texas saw extensive service during the remainder of the war. They were at Galveston on January 3, 1863, and barely escaped capture when Confederates took that city back from Union hands. On March 15, 1863, Confederate citizens and off-duty soldiers seized Davis in Matamoros, where he was attempting to take his family out of Texas and recruit men for his unit. This event precipitated diplomatic trouble between the Confederacy and Mexico that lasted until Gen. Hamilton P. Bee released Davis to appease Mexican governor Albino López. From November to December 1863 Davis was in Texas as a part of Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks's unsuccessful Rio Grande campaign. His unit marched to Rio Grande City and seized cotton and slaves in an effort to disrupt the border trade. On November 4, 1864, Davis was promoted to brigadier general. For the rest of the war he commanded Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds's cavalry in the Division of Western Mississippi. On June 2, 1865, he was among those who represented Gen. Edward R. S. Canby at Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith's surrender of Confederate forces in Texas.

Davis participated in state politics as a Unionist and Republican after the war. He served in the Constitutional Convention of 1866 and ran unsuccessfully for the state Senate from his old district in the 1866 general election. He represented the border district and was president of the Constitutional Convention of 1868–69. In this period he consistently supported political programs that would have restricted the political rights of secessionists, expanded rights for blacks, and divided the state. He also favored the ab initio theory, which held that all laws passed since secession were null and void.

In the election of 1869 Davis ran for governor against Andrew J. Hamilton, another Republican, and won in a closely disputed race. His administration was a controversial one. Its program called for law and order backed by a State Police and restored militia, public schools, internal improvements, bureaus of immigration and geology, and protection of the frontier. All of these measures encountered strong attacks from both Democratic and Republican opponents and added to the controversy surrounding Reconstruction in Texas. Davis ran for reelection in December 1873 and was defeated by Richard Coke by a vote of two to one. Davis believed that the Republican national administration was partly responsible for his defeat, and relations between the governor and Washington were strained until he was removed from office by Democrats the following January in what is known as the Coke-Davis controversy.

From 1875 until his death Davis, contemporarily described as a “tall, gaunt, cold-eyed, rather commanding figure,” headed the Republican party in Texas as chairman of the state executive committee. In 1880 he ran again for governor but was badly defeated by Oran M. Roberts. In 1882 he ran for Congress in the Tenth District against John Hancock, again unsuccessfully. He was nominated as collector of customs at Galveston in 1880 but refused the job because of his opposition to the administration of President Rutherford B. Hayes. Supporters recommended him for a cabinet position under President Chester A. Arthur, but he received no appointment. Davis died in Austin on February 7, 1883, and is buried there in the State Cemetery.

XXIV. Andrew Jackson Hamilton

Written by James A. Marten

Andrew Jackson Hamilton

Andrew Jackson Hamilton, governor of Texas, son of James and Jane (Bayless) Hamilton, was born in Huntsville, Alabama, on January 28, 1815. He was educated and admitted to the bar in Alabama. Late in 1846 he joined his older brother, Morgan, in Texas. He practiced law in La Grange, Fayette County, for three years, then moved to Austin. His marriage to Mary Bowen, also of Alabama, produced two sons and four daughters.

Hamilton's political career began in 1849, when Gov. Peter H. Bell appointed him acting attorney general. He also represented Travis County for a single term (1851–53) in the state House of Representatives. By the 1850s he had become a member of the "Opposition Clique" in Texas, a faction of the regular Democratic party that opposed secession, reopening the slave trade, and other Southern extremist demands. As such, in 1859 Hamilton won election to the United States Congress from the Western District of Texas. He served on the House committee formed during the secession winter of 1860–61 to try to solve the sectional crisis. When he returned to Texas in the spring of 1861 he won a special election to the state Senate, and he remained in Austin until July 1862, when alleged plots against his life forced him to flee to Mexico.

Hamilton became a hero in the North and delivered speeches in New York, Boston, and other Northern cities. His rhetorical targets included slavery, disunionists, and the "slave power," which he believed was trying to subvert democracy and the rights of non-slaveowners. After he met with President Abraham Lincoln in November 1862, he accepted a commission as brigadier general of volunteers and an appointment as military governor of Texas. Hamilton accompanied an unsuccessful federal expedition into South Texas in late 1863 and spent most of the rest of the war in New Orleans, where his family joined him late in 1864.

His career during Reconstruction was stormy and frustrating. As provisional governor from the summer of 1865 to the summer of 1866, he pursued a program of trying to limit officeholders to former Unionists, ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and granting economic and legal rights (although not the vote) to freedmen. When the Constitutional Convention of 1866 refused to enact most of Hamilton's suggestions, he rejected presidential Reconstruction and promoted the harsher program of the Radical Republicans. He endorsed black suffrage and helped organize the Southern Loyalists' Convention in Philadelphia in September 1866. For a time he served as a bankruptcy judge in New Orleans, but in 1867 he returned to Texas as an associate justice on the state Supreme Court.

Hamilton played a leading role in the Texas Constitutional Convention of 1868–69 and served on the Republican National Executive Committee. His political views changed again, however; he once again came to favor a quick reconstruction of Texas. He opposed the Radicals' scheme for turning West Texas into a separate, Unionist state and withdrew his support for black suffrage. As a result, although his brother Morgan C. Hamilton was a leading Radical spokesman and United States senator, Hamilton became one of the state's leading moderate Republicans and ran against Radical Edmund J. Davis in the 1869 governor's race. Davis won, but Hamilton remained a vocal opponent of Radical policies.

Hamilton never sought public office after this defeat. In 1871 he was a leader in the Tax-Payers' Convention. He practiced law and worked on his farm near Austin. He died of tuberculosis on April 11, 1875, and was buried in Oakwood Cemetery, Austin.

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Events

XXV. Great Hanging at Gainesville

Written by Richard B. McCaslin



Forty suspected Unionists in Confederate Texas were hanged at Gainesville in October 1862. Two others were shot as they tried to escape. Although the affair reached its climax in Cooke County, men were killed in neighboring Grayson, Wise, and Denton counties. Most were accused of treason or insurrection, but evidently few had actually conspired against the Confederacy, and many were innocent of the abolitionist sentiments for which they were tried. The Great Hanging was the result of several years of building tension. The completion of the Butterfield Overland Mail route from St. Louis through Gainesville brought many new people from the upper South and Midwest into Cooke County. By 1860 fewer than 10 percent of the heads of households owned slaves. The slaveholders increasingly feared the influence of Kansas abolitionists in every unrest. In the summer of 1860 several slaves and a northern Methodist minister were lynched in North Texas. Cooke and the surrounding counties voted against secession and thus focused the fears of planters on the non-slaveholders in the region. Rumors of Unionist alliances with Kansas Jayhawkers and Indians along the Red River, together with the petition of E. Junius Foster, editor of the Sherman Patriot, to separate North Texas as a new free state, brought emotions to a fever pitch.

Actual opposition to the Confederacy in Cooke County began with the Conscription Acts of April 1862. Thirty men signed a petition protesting the exemption of large slaveholders from the draft and sent it to the Congress at Richmond. Brig. Gen. William Hudson, commander of the militia district around Gainesville, exiled their leader, but others who remained used the petition to enlist a nucleus for a Union League in Cooke and nearby counties. The members were not highly unified, and their purposes differed with each clique. Most joined to resist the draft and provide common defense against roving Indians and renegades. Rumors began to circulate, however, of a membership of over 1,700 and of plans for an assault when the group had recruited enough men. Fearing that the stories of Unionist plots to storm the militia arsenals at Gainesville and Sherman might prove to be true, Hudson activated the state troops in North Texas in late September 1862 and ordered the arrest of all able-bodied men who did not report for duty.

Texas state troops led by Col. James G. Bourland arrested more than 150 men on the morning of October 1. In Gainesville he and Col. William C. Young of the Eleventh Texas Cavalry, home on sick leave, supervised the collection of a “citizen’s court” of twelve jurors. Bourland and Young together owned nearly a fourth of the slaves in Cooke County, and seven of the jurors chosen were slaveholders. Their decision to convict on a majority vote was a bad omen for the prisoners, all of whom were accused of insurrection or treason and none of whom owned slaves. The military achieved its goal of eliminating the leadership of the Union League in Cooke County when the jury condemned seven influential Unionists, but an angry mob took matters into its own hands and lynched fourteen more before the jurors recessed. Violence in Gainesville peaked the next week when unknown assassins killed Young and James Dickson. The decision already made to release the rest of the prisoners was reversed, and many were tried again. Nineteen more men were convicted and hanged. Their execution was supervised by Capt. Jim Young, Colonel Young’s son. Brig. Gen. James W. Throckmorton prevented the execution of all but five men in Sherman, but in Decatur, Capt. John Hale supervised a committee that hanged five suspects. A Southern partisan shot a prisoner in Denton.

Texas newspapers generally applauded the hangings, disparaged the Unionists as traitors and common thieves, and insisted they had material support from Kansas abolitionists and the Lincoln administration. The state government condoned the affair. Gov. Francis Richard Lubbock, an ardent Confederate, praised Hudson for his actions, and the legislature paid the expenses of the troops in Gainesville. Articles from the Texas press were reprinted across the South. President Jefferson Davis, embarrassed, abandoned his demand for an inquiry into a similar incident involving northern troops in Palmyra, Missouri, and dismissed Gen. Hébert as military commander of Texas for his improper use of martial law in several instances, including the hangings. The northern press heralded the story as another example of Rebel barbarism. Andrew Jackson Hamilton, a former congressman from Texas and a Unionist, had been speaking in the North warning of the danger to loyal citizens in Texas. Reports of the Great Hanging and other incidents lent support to his campaign and led to his appointment as military governor of Texas and the disastrous Red River campaign of 1864.

Paul Octave Hébert

The unrest did not end with the hangings in North Texas. Albert Pike, Confederate brigadier general in charge of Indian Territory, was implicated in testimony and arrested. Although later released, Pike continued to be regarded with suspicion and served the rest of the war in civilian offices. Capt. Jim Young killed E. Junius Foster for applauding the death of his father. He also tracked down Dan Welch, the man he believed to be his father's assassin, then returned with him to Cooke County and had him lynched by some of the family slaves. The Union League was powerless to exact revenge; many members fled along with the families of the slain prisoners, leaving bodies unclaimed for burial in a mass grave. A North Texas company of Confederate soldiers in Arkansas learned of the executions and almost mutinied, but tempers were defused by Brig. Gen. Joseph O. Shelby, their commander. Several men later deserted to return home, but Shelby prevented a mass assault on Gainesville. The half-hearted prosecution of those responsible for the hangings after the war, resulting in the conviction of only one man in Denton, increased resentment among the remaining Unionists in North Texas, but the failure of a Union League march on Decatur indicated the futility of further attempts at retaliation.

XXVI. Juneteenth

Written by Teresa Palomo Acosta

On June 19 ("Juneteenth"), 1865, Union general Gordon Granger arrived in Galveston and issued General Order Number 3, which read in part, "The people of Texas are informed that, in accordance with a proclamation from the Executive of the United States, all slaves are free. This involves an absolute equality of personal rights and rights of property between former masters and slaves, and the connection heretofore existing between them becomes that between employer and hired labor." The tidings of freedom reached the approximately 250,000 slaves in Texas gradually as individual plantation owners informed their bondsmen over the months following the end of the war. The news elicited an array of personal celebrations, some of which have been described in The Slave Narratives of Texas (1974). The first broader celebrations of Juneteenth were used as political rallies and to teach freed African American about their voting rights. Within a short time, however, Juneteenth was marked by festivities throughout the state, some of which were organized by official Juneteenth committees.



Gen. Gordon Granger

The day has been celebrated through formal thanksgiving ceremonies at which the hymn "Lift Every Voice" furnished the opening. In addition, public entertainment, picnics, and family reunions have often featured dramatic readings, pageants, parades, barbecues, and ball games. Blues festivals have also shaped the Juneteenth remembrance. In Limestone County, celebrants gather for a three-day reunion organized by the Nineteenth of June Organization. Some of the early emancipation festivities were relegated by city authorities to a town's outskirts; in time, however, black groups collected funds to purchase tracts of land for their celebrations, including Juneteenth. A common name for these sites was Emancipation Park. In Houston, for instance, a deed for a ten-acre site was signed in 1872, and in Austin the Travis County Emancipation Celebration Association acquired land for its Emancipation Park in the early 1900s; the Juneteenth event was later moved to Rosewood Park. In Limestone County the Nineteenth of June Association acquired thirty acres, which has since been reduced to twenty acres by the rising of Lake Mexia.

Particular celebrations of Juneteenth have had unique beginnings or aspects. In the state capital Juneteenth was first celebrated in 1867 under the direction of the Freedmen's Bureau and became part of the calendar of public events by 1872. Juneteenth in Limestone County has gathered "thousands" to be with families and friends. At one time 30,000 blacks gathered at Booker T. Washington Park, known more popularly as Comanche Crossing, for the event. One of the most important parts of the Limestone celebration is the recollection of family history, both under slavery and since. Another of the state's memorable celebrations of Juneteenth occurred in Brenham, where large, racially mixed crowds witness the annual promenade through town. In Beeville, black, white, and brown residents have also joined together to commemorate the day with barbecue, picnics, and other festivities.

Juneteenth declined in popularity in the early 1960s, when the civil-rights movement, with its push for integration, diminished interest in the event. In the 1970s African Americans' renewed interest in celebrating their cultural heritage led to the revitalization of the holiday throughout the state. At the end of the decade Representative Al Edwards, a Democrat from Houston, introduced a bill calling for Juneteenth to become a state holiday. The legislature passed the act in 1979, and Governor William P. Clements, Jr., signed it into law. The first state-sponsored Juneteenth celebration took place in 1980.

Juneteenth has also had an impact outside the state. Black Texans who moved to Louisiana and Oklahoma have taken the celebration with them. In 1991 the Anacostia Museum of the Smithsonian Institution sponsored "Juneteenth '91, Freedom Revisited," featuring public speeches, African-American arts and crafts, and other cultural programs. There, as in Texas, the state of its origin, Juneteenth has provided the public the opportunity to recall the milestone in human rights the day represents for African Americans.

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Southwestern Quarterly

Texas and the Riddle of Secession

WALTER L. BUENGER*

SECESSION REMAINS A MYSTIFYING PUZZLE, A PUZZLE WHOSE SOLUTION in 1861 was a bloody civil war and a puzzle whose solution in our time still defies rational explanation. From the end of the American Revolution until the start of the Civil War, the United States survived a series of intensely bitter internal disputes. Yet within the span of a few months in the winter of 1860–1861 the nation split apart, and a civil war soon began that resulted in over one million casualties. In Texas, secession seemed all the more improbable. Texans had continually asked to become part of the Union from 1836 to 1845. Their precarious position on the southwestern frontier reminded them daily of the value of belonging to a large and powerful nation. Prosperity seemed to preclude a political upheaval in 1860. The burgeoning trade in cotton, hides, and sugar flowing out of the commercial centers of Texas gave promise of making it one of the richest states in the Union. Slavery, while a major part of the social and economic life in some regions of Texas, was almost absent in other regions, and, except for Tennessee and Arkansas, Texas slaves made up the smallest percentage of the total population of any state in the Confederacy. Reflecting its position on the border of the South, politics in Texas on the eve of secession was dominated not by militant secessionists or unionists but by more moderate folk, who wanted to preserve the Union and the status quo if the costs of such action were not too high. At no time before 1860 did these moderates, who comprised a clear majority of the electorate, move persistently and urgently away from their comfortable middle ground. Nonetheless, before the firing on Fort Sumter changed the political question to either defending one's home or defecting to the enemy in defense of principle, Texans voted to secede by a three-to-one margin.[1]

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[1]For the election returns in the secession referendum see Joe T. Timmons, "The Referendum in Texas on the Ordinance of Secession, February 23, 1861: The Vote," *East Texas Historical Journal* (*ETHJ*), XI (Fall, 1973), 12–28. On the population of the southern states and Civil War casualty figures see E[verette] B. Long, *The Civil War Day by Day:*

At least four distinct explanations have been offered for the secession of Texas. In 1863 James P. Newcomb, a Texas unionist who had fled north, summed up the opinion of many contemporary observers of secession when he published his *Sketch of Secession Times in Texas*. Newcomb attributed secession to a conspiracy led by a handful of radical and self-serving Texans who duped the public into believing slavery and southern rights could only be preserved by secession. Ever since, the tendency to ascribe secession to a small band of plotters or, depending upon one's point of view, a group of vigilant patriots, has been a persistent theme in secession studies.[2] In the early twentieth century, troubled by secession in Texas, Charles William Ramsdell put forward a second interpretation. In his essay on "The Frontier and Secession," Ramsdell argued that not only did its frontier environment make Texas different from other southern states, but that in some ways the state's peculiar local conditions and pragmatic concerns created an impetus for secession. According to Ramsdell, not just concern for slavery but also bitter resentment of the federal government's failure to provide adequate protection from Indian attack caused frontiersmen to accept secession.[3] In the 1950s, following the lead of Avery O. Craven, interpreters of secession in Texas examined the

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An Almanac, 1861–1865 (New York, 1971), 701, 702, 709–712. For evidence that the vast majority of Texas voters clustered around the political center see Francis Richard Lubbock, *Six Decades in Texas; or, Memoirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, Governor of Texas in War Time, 1861–63. A Personal Experience in Business, War, and Politics,* ed. C[adwell] W. Raines (Austin, 1900), 179–313; *Standard* (Clarksville), Aug. 6, 13, 20, Nov. 5, Dec. 17, 1859, Oct. 13, 20, 27, 1860, Jan. 19, 26, 1861; *True Issue* (La Grange), Aug. 6, 13, 1859, Jan. 10, 17, 24, 1861. On the economic boom in Texas see Lewis Cecil Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860* (2 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1933), II, 905–907; Raymond E. White, "Cotton Ginning in Texas to 1861," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* (*SHQ*), LXI (Oct., 1957), 257–269; Vera Lea Dugus, "Texas Industry, 1860–1880," ibid., LIX (Oct., 1955), 151–157.

[2]James P. Newcomb, *Sketch of Secession Times in Texas and Journal of Travel from Texas through Mexico to California, including a History of the "Box Colony"* (San Francisco, 1863), 1–12. On Newcomb see Dale A. Somers, "James P. Newcomb: The Making of a Radical," *SHQ*, LXXII (Apr., 1969), 449–469; Roy Sylvan Dunn, "The KGC in Texas, 1860–1861," ibid., LXX (Apr., 1967), 543–573. For other contemporaries who believed secession to be the work of conspirators and demagogues see J[ohn] T. Sprague, *The Treachery in Texas, the Secession of Texas, and the Arrest of the United States Officers and Soldiers Serving in Texas* (New York, 1862); Sam Houston, "Speech at Brenham," Mar. 31, 1861, *The Writings of Sam Houston, 1813–1863*, ed. Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker (8 vols.; Austin, 1938–1943), VIII, 295–299. For later studies that also stress the role of heroes and anti-heroes see Edward R. Maher, "Secession in Texas" (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1960); Leonard Bailey, "Unionist Editors in Texas during the Secession Crisis" (M.A. thesis, Texas Southern University, 1973); Oran Lonnie Sinclair, "Crossroads of Conviction: A Study of the Texas Political Mind, 1856–1861" (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, 1975).

[3]Charles William Ramsdell, "The Frontier and Secession," *Studies in Southern History*

growth of southern nationalism, based on common institutions and customs or on a common political ideology.[4] After 1970, when Steven A. Channing's *Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina* was published, a fourth interpretation of secession emerged. Channing called attention to the importance in South Carolina of people's perceptions, "the forebodings of disaster based upon exaggerated racial and political fears." In a dissertation, "Slavery, Fear and Disunion in the Lone Star State: Texans' Attitudes toward Secession and the Union, 1846–1861," Billy D. Ledbetter drew upon Channing's example and refocused on slavery as the cause of secession. Ledbetter argued that not only did Texans desire to maintain the institution of slavery, but that they were powerfully motivated by a fear of slave insurrections resulting from Republican control of the North and the national government.[5]

Each of these interpretations of secession has merit, but none clearly explains either the persistent strength of unionism in Texas or the debate over secession. Well-organized leadership aided the secessionists' cause, but secession was not a conspiracy, nor was it the work of a small cadre of revolutionaries. In December, 1860, Franklin B. Sexton captured the spirit of the secession movement in Texas when he described a local secession meeting by writing, "The sober, reflecting, sterling men of the county were present [and] no division of feeling existed." Secession was both a spontaneous popular movement present in most counties of the state and a process openly led by the pillars of the community.[6]

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and Politics (New York, 1914), 63–79. For a look at the particular features of East Texas and how they affected secession see Allan C. Ashcraft, "East Texas in the Election of 1860 and the Secession Crisis," *ETHJ*, I (July, 1963), 7–16. For the argument that the particular concerns of the commercial classes of Texas could motivate them to support secession see Earl Wesley Fornell, *The Galveston Era: The Texas Crescent on the Eve of Secession* (Austin, 1961), 267–301. For the argument that particular circumstances created unionism on the frontier see Floyd F. Ewing, Jr., "Origins of Unionist Sentiment of the West Texas Frontier," *West Texas Historical Association Year Book*, XXXII (Oct., 1956), 21–29.

[4]Avery O. Craven, *The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848–1861* (Baton Rouge, 1953). For a Texas study which stresses the evolution of southernness see Nancy Ann Head, "State Rights in Texas: The Growth of an Idea, 1850–1860" (M.A. thesis, Rice Institute, 1960). For an early version of the argument that economic differences created a distinct South see Anna Irene Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Movement in Texas," *SHQ*, XVIII (July, 1914), 41–73.

[5]Steven A. Channing, *Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina* (New York, 1970); Billy D. Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the Lone Star State: Texans' Attitudes toward Secession and the Union, 1846–1861" (Ph.D. diss., North Texas State University, 1972); review of *Crisis of Fear* by Richard O. Curry in *Journal of American History*, LIX (Sept., 1972), 421 (quotation).

[6]F. B. Sexton to Dear Judge, Dec. 2, 1860, Oran Milo Roberts Papers (Eugene C. Barker

While Ramsdell quite rightly pointed to the frontier and to local frontier concerns as a cause of secession, Texas in 1860, as he himself realized, was not simply a frontier state. Large portions of the eastern half of the state had a mature agrarian economy based upon slavery and cotton. If local considerations were important, then slavery and the flow of cotton and other commodities out of the state might have been equally important in determining attitudes toward secession. Furthermore, within the frontier local considerations varied sharply from one county to the next.[7]

Although some Texans dreamed of a southern nation before 1861, they were few in number. Nor did the states' rights philosophy totally dominate state politics. Certainly Texans had a cultural heritage that tied them to the South. For that matter they also possessed a heritage that set them apart from the rest of the South. It was also true that the validity of secession as a legal and constitutional remedy for abuses to the rights of southerners went unchallenged except by the most militant of unionists. Nonetheless, their southern culture and their belief in the legality of secession did not prevent the majority of Texans from clinging tenaciously to the Union throughout the 1850s. Texans were still Americans, and for the most part American nationalists, prior to 1860. This was clearly illustrated in the state elections of 1859 when only moderates and unionists won high political office. Even in a man like John H. Reagan, later to be postmaster general of the Confederacy, American nationalism was evident. During his campaign for reelection to the U.S. House of Representatives, Reagan issued a circular in which he said in part, "These constant croakers of evil, these preachers of revolution, now think they have the Democracy of Texas in leading strings, and have set too, covertly at first, and now more boldly, to prescribe me, because I will not sympathize with their sectional, revolutionary, and wicked doctrines." Evidently the voters of

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Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin; cited hereafter as BTHC). Also see John Salmon Ford, "Memoirs of John Salmon Ford," V, 943–966, John S. Ford Papers, ibid.; Ernest William Winkler (ed.), *Journal of the Secession Convention of Texas, 1861* (Austin, 1912), 9–90; Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Movement"; Anna Irene Sandbo, "The First Session of the Secession Convention of Texas," *SHQ*, XVIII (Oct., 1914), 162–194; Oran M. Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas for Its Fifty Years of Statehood, 1845–1895," Dudley G. Wooten (ed.), *A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685 to 1897* (2 vols.; Dallas, 1898), II, 84–89.

[7]Randolph B. Campbell, "Planters and Plain Folk: Harrison County, Texas, as a Test Case, 1850–1860," *Journal of Southern History (JSH)*, XL (Aug., 1974), 369–398; Walter L. Buenger, "Unionism on the Texas Frontier, 1859–1861," *Arizona and the West*, XXII (Autumn, 1980), 237–254.

Right: James P. Newcomb in 1865. Below: John H. Reagan (1818–1905). Photos Courtesy Eugene C. Barker Texas History Center, unless indicated otherwise.



the traditionally two-party First Congressional District did not radically oppose Reagan's unionist pronouncements, because he won a smashing seven-to-one victory at the polls.[8]

Proponents of the Channing school might say that what changed Reagan's mind and the minds of his constituents about the Union was slavery and a fear of slave insurrection. Slavery undoubtedly played a central role in secession and its role needed to be emphasized in the 1970s. Still, to say that there was a steadily growing fear that slavery was threatened and that this alone made secession possible once the Republicans controlled the national government would be as misleading as to say that there was a steadily growing southern nationalism. Moreover, as Ramsdell pointed out long ago, slavery was virtually nonexistent in many portions of Texas. Fear of slave uprisings might unite all white Texans, but even at the height of the Texas Troubles, a near hysterical manifestation of Texans' fear of slave uprisings, many white Texans called the tales of abolitionists' plots exaggerations and the creation of partisan politics.[9] None of these four theories, then,

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[8]"J. H. Reagan to the Voters of the First Congressional District," Apr. 12, 1859, circular, John H. Reagan Papers (BTHC); *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Apr. 29, 1859. Election returns may be found in Walter L. Buenger, Jr., "Stilling the Voice of Reason: Texans and the Union, 1854–1861" (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, 1979), 266–391. For additional evidence of the attachment of Reagan and other Texans to the Union in 1859 see Billy D. Ledbetter, "The Election of Louis T. Wigfall to the United States Senate, 1859: A Reevaluation," *SHQ*, LXXVII (Oct., 1973), 241–254; Reagan to A. H. Latimer, Aug. 26, 1859; Reagan to William Alexander, Oct. 3, 1859, Reagan Papers; *Standard* (Clarksville), June 4, Aug 6, 13, 1869. For an in-depth discussion of the South's cultural nationalism see Emory M. Thomas, *The Confederate Nation, 1861–1865* (New York, 1979), 17–36; John McCardell, *The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists and Southern Nationalism, 1830–1860* (New York, 1979); Frank E. Vandiver, "The Confederacy and the American Tradition," *JSH*, XXVIII (Aug., 1962), 277–286.

[9]On the Texas Troubles see Donald E. Reynolds, *Editors Make War: Southern Newspapers in the Secession Crisis* (Nashville, 1970), 97–117; Ollinger Crenshaw, *The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860* (Baltimore, 1945), 92–108; *Weekly Alamo Express* (San Antonio), Sept. 17, 24, Oct. 1, 8, 1860; *State Gazette* (Austin), Sept. 29, Oct. 20, 1860; *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), Oct. 10, 1860. Even Robert W. Loughery, the editor of the Marshall *Texas Republican*, one of the most radical of southerners, conceded that there was some exaggeration regarding the abolitionist plots. See *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Aug. 11, Sept. 8, 1860; Walter Prescott Webb, H. Bailey Carroll, and Eldon Stephen Branda (eds.), *The Handbook of Texas* (3 vols.; Austin, 1952, 1976), II, 84–85. On differences in the use of slaves among various regions of Texas see Ramsdell, "The Frontier and Secession," 63–67; Terry G. Jordan, "The Imprint of the Upper and Lower South on Mid-Nineteenth-Century Texas," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, LVII (Dec., 1967), 667–690. In regard to slavery and secession it is interesting to note that both Kentucky and Tennessee had more slaves and slaveholders than Texas, and Tennessee had nearly as high a percentage of its total population made up of slaves as did Texas. Yet Kentucky did not secede at all; and Tennessee seceded only after the firing on Ft. Sumter and Lincoln's call-up of troops to put down insurrection in the South. See Long, *The Civil War Day by Day*, 701–702; E. Merton Coulter, *The Civil War and Readjust-*

fully explains the course and content of the debate over secession and the Union, or why Texans turned from unionists in 1859 to secessionists in 1861.

One problem with all previous studies of secession in Texas has been that they were narrowly focused. Slicing up society and individuals, scholars looked at just one facet, and consequently examined only one cause of secession. Conspirators caused secession. Pragmatic concerns encouraged secession. Southern nationalism made secession possible. Defense of slavery either as a constitutional prerogative or as a means of controlling a subordinate race drove southerners to secede. To some degree each of these was a cause of secession. Human beings and their institutions provided leadership and direction for the secession movement. Pragmatic considerations must have played a role in many men's minds as they opted for secession. The existence of cultural diversity within the United States made secession easier. Slavery was at the heart of the secession crisis. The problem for modern students of secession is deciding what united these and other divergent causes and focused them clearly enough to prompt the lethargic mass of southerners to abandon their traditional government. What is needed is a new conceptual framework that moves beyond a monocausal approach and takes into consideration not only multiple causes but also the diversity and complexity of southern society.

Secession in Texas was part of the central conflict of the nineteenth century, a conflict between forces that encouraged the splintering of the United States into smaller social, political, and economic units and forces that bound the nation more tightly together. Secession, however, was not simply the triumph of localism over nationalism. Nor did it reflect some Hegelian dialectic in which the thesis of localism and the antithesis of nationalism were resolved in the synthesis of secession. Localism and nationalism were the reflex of each other. Factors that nourished localism could also stimulate nationalism. Moreover, a factor that encouraged localism or nationalism could often strengthen both a commitment to the Union and a belief in the necessity of secession. Slavery, for example, was the most prominent feature separating the South from the rest of the nation. Yet its slave/cotton economy tied the South to northern merchants and northern mills. The need to

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ment in Kentucky (Chapel Hill, 1926), 1–144; Mary Emily Robertson Campbell, *The Attitude of Tennesseans toward the Union, 1847–1861* (New York, 1961), 211–212, 261. For a comparison of slaveholding patterns in the southern states see J[ames] G. Randall and David Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Lexington, Mass., 1969), 68.

defend slavery was one argument for secession. As late as 1861, however, some Texans insisted that in the long run slavery was safer inside the Union than in a smaller more vulnerable southern Confederacy. Thus slavery was both localistic and nationalistic in its implications and could create an impetus toward either secession or preservation of the Union. In a conceptual sense, the secession crisis in Texas involved a struggle among all those elements within Texas society that, like slavery, strengthened unionism or strengthened secession sentiment. What was curious about this struggle was that the two opposing concepts were surprisingly alike. In fact, it was the similarities between the forces behind unionism and secession as much as their differences that accounts for the success of the secession movement in Texas.[10]

If indeed the secession crisis in Texas had two interdependent dimensions, then understanding the cause of secession and the Civil War requires more than understanding the role of individuals, ideology, parochial interests, or instinctual fears. Understanding secession requires envisioning the nature of unionist and secessionist sentiment, and how in the end the imbalance between these two made secession possible.[11]

Though opposite in intent, sentiments for secession and unionism never existed without each other. This dualism grew out of the interlaced nature of localism and nationalism in antebellum Texas. Localism and nationalism coexisted in individual Texans as well as in the collective value system of the state. Texans accomplished this sleight of hand by either compartmentalizing nationalism and localism within nonconflicting spheres of thought and action, or by temporarily sub-

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[10]For a definition of terms and an in-depth explanation of unionism, secession, and nationalism, see David M. Potter, *The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861* (New York, 1976); Paul C. Nagel, *One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American Thought, 1776–1861* (New York, 1964); Major L. Wilson, *Space, Time and Freedom: The Quest for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815–1861* (Westport, Conn., 1974).

[11]Assumptions about similarities between unionist and secessionist sentiments are largely based upon what secessionists and unionists were saying and writing in the fall and winter of 1860–1861. For secessionists' arguments see "A Declaration of the Causes Which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union," Winkler (ed.), *Journal of the Secession Convention*, 61–66; Reagan to Joseph Tyler, Dec. 23, 1860, *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Jan. 12, 1861; Peter W. Gray to the meeting of the citizens of Harris County, *State Gazette* (Austin), Nov. 24, 1860; "Speech of Judge Roberts," ibid., Dec. 8, 1860; Dallas *Herald*, Jan. 16, Feb. 20, 1861. For the unionists' reply see "Address to the People of Texas," in scrapbook, 31–34, John L. Haynes Papers (BTHC); *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), Sept. 5, Oct. 10, 1860; *Union* (Galveston), Jan. 8, 12, 1861; Andrew J. Hamilton, *Speech of Hon. Andrew J. Hamilton, of Texas on the State of the Union, Delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, February 1, 1861* (Washington, D.C., 1861); *Harrison Flag* (Marshall), Jan. 12, 1861.

ordinating one set of values to the other. Local values related to slavery offer the clearest example of compartmentalization. Texans voted for a unionist ticket in 1859 and at the same time adamantly defended slavery. As long as local notions about slavery or any other divergent point of view were confined within a framework that did not impinge directly upon nationalism, both nationalism and localism existed together. This explains how the La Grange *True Issue* in the midst of the secession crisis ran on its masthead: "Our Country, Our State, the South and the Union."[12]

Texans, however, seldom achieved an exact equilibrium between localism and nationalism. From 1846 to 1848, spurred on by the euphoria of annexation and the Mexican War, Texans were more nationalistic. From 1849 through mid-1850, because of antipathy for President Zachary Taylor and the dispute over the Texas claim to eastern New Mexico, Texans were more localistic. From the closing months of 1850 up until 1854, encouraged by economic growth and stable borders, Texans elevated the Union above their sectional concerns. Then from 1854 through 1857, aroused by the controversy over slavery in Kansas and influenced by a steady influx of people from the plantation South, Texans became more localistic. Worried by the excesses of southern militants, from 1858 until mid-1860 the bulk of the Texas population moved once again toward the Union. About mid-1860 the move toward sectionalism began once more and continued until Texas seceded. In every case, except for the secession crisis, the development of either nationalism or localism was balanced by the resurgence of its countervailing force. This did not happen in the winter of 1860–1861 because of the conflicting and also surprisingly complementary appeal of the Union and secession.[13]

In Texas, unionism drew strength from cultural bias, ideology, party allegiance, the leadership of forceful personalities, and self-interest. Texas was a place of at least four distinct subcultures. These four groups were Lower South, Upper South, western European, and Mexican. Among the people who made up these groups those whose culture and point of origin derived from the Upper South or western

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12*True Issue* (La Grange), Jan. 24, 1861.

13A good overview of politics in the early statehood period may be found in Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the Lone Star State," 36–224; Sinclair, "Crossroads of Conviction," 2–62. On the swings from nationalism to localism see Head, "State Rights in Texas"; William Campbell Binkley, *The Expansionist Movement in Texas, 1836–1850* (Berkeley, 1925).

Europe were by habit the staunchest advocates of the Union. This was all the more true when Tennesseans and Germans lived in cultural enclaves largely outside the day-to-day influence of other subcultures.[14]

Ideological props of the Union fell into two categories. The first category derived from a set of internalized values. One reason that Texans from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Germany were unionists was that to a greater degree they accepted—indeed no longer even had to ponder the question—that the Union was of great value in and of itself. The Union and the Constitution were the mythic creations of the revered founding fathers. Nationalism grew from the blood and sacrifice of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War. For romantic nationalists, the Union satisfied a longing for a strong nation of like people with common aims and goals—a nation undivided by petty jealousies and peculiar political structures.[15]

The second ideological category sprang from the functional purposes of the Union. One function of the Union was to fulfill the sense of mission many Americans shared: a mission to spread Anglo-American civilization across the wilderness, to act as an example for the rest of the world, to preserve individual liberty, and, in the course of these virtuous deeds, to become increasingly prosperous. Another function of the Union was to provide stability and law. Stability was necessary to prevent the disintegration of the nation into a mass of violently competing individuals or anarchistic groups. In its roles as arbiter of internal disputes and as protector from foreign powers, the

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[14]Terry Jordan argues that Tennesseans and others from the Upper South preserved their distinct culture in Texas, and that one of the traits of this culture was a more persistent unionism. See "The Imprint of the Upper and Lower South," 685–688. On the high level of emotional commitment to the Union in Kentucky and Tennessee see Coulter, *Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky*, 1–110; Campbell, *The Attitude of Tennesseans towards the Union*, 64–212. For further evidence that significant portions of Texas were geographically and culturally unlike the Lower South, and that one of the ways that the people of these regions differed from other Texans was a more persistent commitment to the Union, see Claude Elliott, *Leathercoat: The Life History of a Texas Patriot* (San Antonio, 1938), 41–67; J[acob] de Cordova, *Texas: Her Resources and Her Public Men: A Companion for J. de Cordova's New and Correct Map of the State of Texas* (Philadelphia, 1858), 189–190; J. W. Latimer, "The Wheat Region and Wheat Culture in Texas," *Texas Almanac for 1859* (Galveston, 1858), 65–69; E. L. Dohoney, *An Average American* (Paris, Tex., [1911]), 71–88; Terry G. Jordan, *German Seed in Texas Soil: Immigrant Farmers in Nineteenth-Century Texas* (Austin, 1966), 60–117; Walter L. Buenger, "Secession and the Texas German Community: Editor Lindheimer vs. Editor Flake," *SHQ*, LXXXII (Apr., 1979), 379–402.

[15]*Standard* (Clarksville), June 28, 1859; James W. Throckmorton to Ben H. Epperson, Aug. 18, Sept. 13, 1859, Ben H. Epperson Papers (BTHC); *Weekly Alamo Express* (San Antonio), Nov. 5, 1860.

Union provided this stability. The Constitution, which unionists almost always linked with the Union, gave Texans and all Americans a rational and knowable legal framework that regulated the place of individuals and communities within the larger society. For a people with a sense of mission and conditioned to abhor social discord as the greatest of political evils, the Union, before 1860, seemed the best vehicle to achieve their goals and prevent their fears from being realized.[16]

Party affiliation reinforced this ideological unionism. Whigs, Know-Nothings, Democrats, and members of the Opposition all harbored shades of unionism, as did their particular philosophies. Whigs and Know-Nothings, however, emphasized the reverential nature of the Union, while Democrats stressed its ability to achieve other ideological goals. The Opposition, since it was composed of former Democrats, Whigs, and Know-Nothings, expressed unionism in all of its ideological forms. All of these parties gave legitimacy and reinforcement to individual points of view.[17]

Individuals, though, not institutions, proved to be the most visible and important props of nationalism in Texas. Sam Houston, Andrew Jackson Hamilton, and other unionists reminded Texans of the worth of the nation. They spoke or wrote clearly of the often blurred feelings, sentiments, hopes, interests, and attitudes that caused people to identify with their nation. Because they were so highly individualistic, however, many of these personalities were not prone to united and concerted action with fellow unionists. Sam Houston, for example, was always uncomfortable with the notion of political parties, and his efforts to prevent secession often seemed erratic and out of step with those of other unionists. Still, before 1861 individual unionists helped to shift men's attention from ordinary pursuits to the nation.[18]

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[16]For a general statement of what the Union meant to Americans see Nagel, *One Nation Indivisible*. For Texas examples see the *Standard* (Clarksville), Aug. 13, 20, 1859, Mar. 10, Apr. 14, 18, June 23, Oct. 13, 20, 27, Dec. 22, 1860; Dallas *Herald*, Oct. 31, 1860; *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), Oct. 10, 1860.

[17]On the Opposition parties in the South see John V. Mering, "The Slave-State Constitutional Unionists and the Politics of Consensus," *JSH*, XLIII (Aug., 1977), 395–410. On Whig nationalism see Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" *American Historical Review*, LIX (Jan., 1954), 335–346. For examples of Texas Whigs' unionism, see *Weekly Journal* (Galveston), Jan. 7, 1853. On Know-Nothings' unionism see *Texas State Times* (Austin), Aug. 11, 1855; *Harrison Flag* (Marshall), July 10, 1858. On the Democrats see *State Gazette* (Austin), May 14, 1859. On the Opposition, see *Harrison Flag* (Marshall), Sept. 22, 1860; *Union* (Galveston), Nov. 6, 1860; *Weekly Alamo Express* (San Antonio), Sept. 10, 17, 1860; *True Issue* (La Grange), Jan. 24, 1861.

[18]For examples of unionist rhetoric see George W. Paschal to Ashbel Smith, May 27,

Sam Houston in 1860.

Ordinary pursuits, however, could also cause Texans to appreciate being a part of the United States. Perhaps more than any other Americans in the 1850s, Texans knew the real and practical value of membership in the United States. Not only could many remember what it was like to be citizens of a weak independent republic, but some had special interests which caused them to look beyond the borders of their state. Men of commerce still realized the advantages of access to large national markets. Men of means still considered desirable the financially sound government of the United States.[19]

This realization that the nation aided them directly was especially noticeable among Texas frontiersmen. Texas was not to be completely settled until the twentieth century, and in 1860 its frontier had reached scarcely more than 100 miles west of Austin. Up and down the frontier, from the Red River to the Rio Grande, frontiersmen depended upon the army for protection from the Comanches and other marauding tribes of Plains Indians. The army was notably inept in dealing with these Indians in the 1850s, but it was still an important means of defense—particularly in areas close to the scattered military posts. In these areas army purchases and salaries also supplied the cash that raised the frontier economy above the subsistence level. Because of the army's dual importance as defender from the Indian and economic stimulant, the Texas frontiersmen and the numerous citizens in the interior counties who identified with the frontiersmen keenly appreciated its presence. As long as the U.S. army stood in high repute, self-interest encouraged unionism.[20]

Self-interest, the influence of powerful personalities, ideological conceptions and beliefs, party politics, and certain cultural and regional

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1859, Ashbel Smith Papers (BTHC); Throckmorton to Epperson, Aug. 18, Sept. 13, 1859, Epperson Papers; *Harrison Flag* (Marshall), Sept. 1, 1860; *Daily Herald* (San Antonio), July 15, 20, 1859; *Standard* (Clarksville), Mar. 9, 1861; Houston to H. M. Watkins and Others, Nov. 20, 1860, *Writings of Sam Houston*, ed. Williams and Barker, VIII, 192–197. On the individualism of unionists and the greater institutional strength of the Democrats see James Alex Baggett, "The Constitutional Union Party in Texas," *SHQ*, LXXXII (Jan., 1979), 233–264.

[19]*Union* (Galveston), Jan. 24, 29, 1861; *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), Sept 5, Oct. 10, 1860, Jan. 20, 23, Feb. 6, 13, 1861; *Weekly Alamo Express* (San Antonio), Feb. 9, 16, 23, 1861. Thomas McKinney, who had been an important businessman in Texas since the 1830s, also opposed secession. See Webb, Carroll, and Branda (eds.), *Handbook of Texas*, II, 117; Thomas F. McKinney to Thomas Jack, William P. Ballinger, and Guy M. Bryan, Nov. 22, 1860, Guy M. Bryan Papers (BTHC).

[20]Latimer, "The Wheat Region," 69; *Zeitung* (New Braunfels), Oct. 10, 1856; *State Gazette* (Austin), Mar. 10, Nov. 17, 1860, Jan. 5, 1861; *White Man* (Weatherford), Sept. 13, 1860; Dallas *Herald*, May 18, 1859, Dec. 5, 1860; *Standard* (Clarksville), May 19, Oct. 20, 27, 1860.

biases within Texas all combined in 1858 and 1859 to produce a stunning revival of unionism. The force that tended to break the Union into smaller component parts, however, did not disappear from the body politic. Localism was instead only temporarily submerged. It, too, fed upon cultural biases, party politics, ideology, articulate spokesmen, and self-interest. Connecting and intertwining all of these facets of localism was slavery.[21]

Just as Texans from the Upper South seemed to have a cultural bias in favor of the Union, Texans from the Lower South more easily accepted secession. Until 1850, the largest percentage of Anglo immigrants came from the Upper South—primarily from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri. Beginning in 1836, however, people from the Lower South—primarily from Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi—came to Texas in increasing numbers. By 1860 Texans from the Lower South comprised the largest cultural group in the state. Moreover, these Texans were not equally dispersed among all regions of Texas but were concentrated in specific areas. Not only was the total number of people from the Lower South growing in Texas, but, because their numbers were relatively undiluted by peoples from other groups, their cultural voice remained clear. It would be a voice that would speak ardently for secession in 1860 and 1861.

Slavery and the plantation system were the most distinct features of the Lower South. Texans from the Upper South certainly owned slaves, as did a few Germans. Still, taken as a whole, farm size, crop selection, and lack of capital limited the impact of slavery on both these non–Lower South groups. Germans, while they might raise cotton, farmed less land more intensively, and they usually lacked the capital to buy slaves, or else preferred to invest their limited capital in other things considered more necessary for the efficient operation of their farms. Texans from the Upper South owned cotton plantations. This was especially true if they lived in East Texas, which was ideal for cotton and contained many former residents of the Lower South. If they lived in regions not dominated by lower southerners, however, they typically concentrated on corn, wheat, or livestock. They therefore needed fewer slaves and by habit, and perhaps by preference, were less inclined to acquire more slaves and expand heavily into the production of cotton. A Texas farmer from Alabama, on the other hand,

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[21]Head, "State Rights in Texas," 1–100; Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear and Disunion in the Lone Star State," 274–276; Sinclair, "Crossroads of Conviction," 124–204.

grew cotton by habit and often aspired to the ownership of large numbers of slaves. It was not surprising that Texans from the Lower South who had the most to lose both at the time and in the future by any challenge from the North to slavery increasingly viewed the world from a local and not a national perspective.[22]

Significantly, this local perspective surfaced most clearly in lower southerners, the most dynamic of the four primary cultural groups in Texas. Texas in 1860 was not yet like Alabama, but the future seemed to hold promise that one day it would be so. Counties between Lower South–dominated East Texas, Upper South– or German-dominated North and West Texas, and Mexican-dominated South Texas—counties with a population drawn not only from the Lower South but the other primary source areas as well—seemed to be undergoing a process by which the fecund Lower South culture dominated the entire county. Over a period of years the agricultural and slaveholding habits that distinguished cultures in Texas began to merge into a culture much like that of the Lower South. Perceiving this ascendancy, visionaries talked of a better life tied to slavery, the plantation system, and Lower South culture. Not only the present reality of this culture but also its dynamic characteristic gave secession a strong cultural base.[23]

By 1857 the cultural transformation occurring in Texas society was reflected in the state Democratic party's increasing alliance with the Democratic parties of the Lower South. By 1858 ardent southerners

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[22]On the rate of population growth and its source in antebellum Texas see Barnes F. Lathrop, *Migration into East Texas, 1835–1860: A Study from the United States Census* (Austin, 1949), 34–65; Terry G. Jordan, "Population Origins in Texas, 1850," *Geographical Review*, LIX (Jan., 1969), 86–87; Jordan, "The Imprint of the Upper and Lower South," 667–672. On the habitual economic activity of cultural groups in Texas see ibid., 672–685; Jordan, *German Seed in Texas Soil*, 60–117.

[23]For examples of those assimilated into a Lower South culture see John P. Osterhout to Brother Orlando, Feb 1, 1860, John Patterson Osterhout Papers (Fondren Library, Rice University); Osterhout to Mother, Mar. 12, 1856, ibid.; C. Alwyn Barr, "The Making of a Secessionist: The Antebellum Career of Roger Q. Mills," *SHQ*, LXXIX (Oct., 1975), 129–144. For a look at one of the older Texas counties that matured over the course of the 1850s into a model Lower South plantation-dominated county see Campbell, "Planters and Plain Folk: Harrison County," 369–392. For examples of visionaries see *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Mar. 29, 1856; *State Gazette* (Austin), July 29, 1854, Nov. 17, 1860; *Weekly Telegraph* (Houston), Mar. 21, 1859. While the process of assimilation toward a Lower South model is difficult to gauge for the state as a whole, some indication of change over time in eastern Texas can be gained from studying the tables in Lathrop, *Migration into East Texas*, 84–100. One should remember that assimilation would not occur where other cultural role models were abundant or where the environment or economic conditions did not foster a Lower South culture. See Jordan, "Imprint of the Upper and Lower South," 667–685.

who would be quick to resort to secession at any provocation controlled the apex of the state structure. By 1859 almost all moderate Democrats who had served as party functionaries and who had helped defeat and destroy the Know-Nothings from 1855 to 1858 had left the party and joined the newly formed Opposition party. As an institution the Democratic party was much stronger than the Opposition. Texans supported it out of loyalty and habit. Germans and Mexicans supported the party because it had defended them against the nativist Know-Nothings. Democrats like John H. Reagan still supported the party in 1859 because they hoped to reform its sectional character and revitalize its national heritage. Nor were the Democrats decimated by their losses in August of 1859. The party rapidly bounced back with the election of party war horse Louis T. Wigfall to the U.S. Senate by the Democratic-controlled legislature. Democratic editors continued to dominate the newspapers of the state and to place sectional writings into the hands of the public. All in all, the Democratic party was a powerful force—a force that was harnessed in 1860 and 1861 by its state and local leaders to the cause of secession.[24]

One reason that the Democratic party became an important force in the secession movement was that to a slight but noticeable degree its ideology always stressed the functional nature of the Union and emphasized that local customs and personal liberty must be defended. That is, the Union was a means to an end and not wholly a valuable thing in itself. For Democrats the Union was a means of fulfilling the American destiny. Thus it was that Democrats tended to be moderate secessionists and Whigs moderate unionists. Whigs certainly viewed the Union as necessary for social stability, law and order, and economic prosperity. Yet Whigs, in whatever group they later belonged, stressed more heavily the sacred nature of the Union and spoke in reverential terms of their devotion to the nation. Such sentiments were not absent among Democrats, but they were not as dominant. Thus when Democrats became convinced that the Union threatened the very functions it was meant to achieve, they were more willing to

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[24]On the Democrats see Head, "State Rights in Texas," 1–100; Lubbock, *Six Decades*, 267–294; Ledbetter, "The Election of Louis T. Wigfall," 241–254; Paschal to Smith, May 27, 1859, Smith Papers; *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), May 25, 1859. On the Know-Nothings and their effect on politics in Texas see Sister Paul of the Cross McGrath, *Political Nativism in Texas, 1825–1860* (Washington, D.C., 1930), 84–181; Waymon L. McClellan, "The Know-Nothing Party and the Growth of Sectionalism in East Texas," *ETHJ*, XIV (Fall, 1976), 26–36; Buenger, "Secession and the Texas German Community," 385–402.

Louis T. Wigfall (1816–1874).

leave behind the old church and seek a new vehicle to achieve salvation.[25]

Here, then, was a perfect example of goals that had once made men unionists converting them to secessionists. Secessionists wanted to change the form of their nation in 1860, but they did not want to change what they interpreted to be the meaning and purpose of a nation of Americans. Indeed, secessionist ideology gained power after November of 1860 because it stressed the dangers that remaining in the United States posed to the traditional purposes of that Union. For secessionists the Republican party symbolized the corruption and decay of their nation. As the presidential elections of 1856 and 1860 proved, it was purely sectional and not a national party. For Texans this sectionalism meant the poisoning of the governmental system whenever Republicans gained control of any branch of government. Texas secessionists had only to point to the chaos generated by the race for Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1859 or to the failure of the House to allocate money for the defense of the Texas frontier as proof of their arguments.[26] Republicans were also depicted

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[25]On party affiliations and secession in Texas see Dohoney, *An Average American*, 71–88; Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," 51–115; Lubbock, *Six Decades*, 267–294; Peyton McCrary, Clark Miller, and Dale Baum, "Class and Party in the Secession Crisis: Voting Behavior in the Deep South, 1856–1869," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (*JIH*), VIII (Winter, 1978), 446–447. For another point of view see Mering, "The Slave-State Constitutional Unionists," 395–410. For examples of the Whig heritage in action see *Harrison Flag* (Marshall), Sept. 15, 1860; *Alamo Express* (San Antonio), Nov. 5, 1860; Throckmorton to Epperson, Aug. 18, Sept. 13, 1859, Epperson Papers. For good examples of a Democrat's unionism see *Standard* (Clarksville), June 25, 1859, Dec. 22, 1860.

[26]In 1859 the House of Representatives convened on December 5 and was unable to select a Speaker until February 1, 1860, because neither Democrats nor Republicans had a clear majority and both sides viewed the other party's candidates as dangerously sectional and biased. Finally, approximately twenty members of the American party, which held the balance of power in the Thirty-sixth Congress, cast their votes for the Republican, William Pennington. This controversy was closely tied to John Brown's raid into Virginia and the uproar over Republican endorsement of Hinton R. Helper's *Impending Crisis*, which southerners interpreted as incendiary propaganda. In Texas, Brown's raid, Helper's book, and the near breakdown of the governing process typified by the Speaker's controversy were used to demonstrate the malevolent effect of the Republicans on the nation. One result of the speakership controversy was that even after Pennington was elected it was difficult to pass legislation through the House that clearly favored either a Democratic or a Republican state. For Texans this meant that they were denied funds for frontier defense. Secessionists in Texas naturally cited this as another example of the evilness of Republicans. For more information on the Speakership controversy and the frontier see Ollinger Crenshaw, "The Speakership Contest of 1859–1860," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIX (Dec., 1942), 323–338; Buenger, "Unionism on the Texas Frontier," 241–249; Ben H. Procter, *Not Without Honor: The Life of John H. Reagan* (Austin, 1962), 113–119.

as threats to the nation's role as preserver of law and order and guarantor of social stability. Time and time again secessionists shouted that Republican state governments broke statute law and the dictates of the Constitution when they passed personal-liberty laws that prevented the return of fugitive slaves. They argued persistently that the Republicans' reliance upon some higher moral or divine code was a threat to the very nature of law because it could be interpreted capriciously with no regard for minority rights. Secessionists insisted as well that Republican control of the federal government would eventually destroy slavery in the states where it already existed or would seriously impair the ability of white southerners to control their black slaves. The result of this would be anarchy and chaos. As John Reagan saw it, Texans faced a difficult choice: "The sad alternative is now submitted to us of the unconditional submission to Black Republican principles, and ultimately to free negro equality, and a government of mongrels or war of races on the one hand, or secession and the formation of a Southern Confederacy and a bloody war on the other."[27]

Conceptions of the meaning and purpose of an American nation, which shaped secessionist ideology, also shaped Texans' perceptions of self-interest. Leaders of Texas's legal and business communities often realized that secession, and with it the potential for war, would hurt their area's economy and create social instability. William Pitt Ballinger, a Galveston lawyer, recorded this gloomy note in his diary on December 30, 1860: "This [year] closes I fear most ominously—This Govt. will be overthrown & the Union destroyed. I hope for the best and it may be that public order & prosperity will not be weakened and that security will be given to the institution of slavery—But I have strong fears to the contrary, and my best judgement is that we are doing an unwise & may be a fatal thing."[28] In San Antonio and Austin,

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[27]Reagan to "a friend," Nacogdoches *Chronicle*, reprinted in *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Feb. 9, 1861 (quotation). Also see "Secession Broadsides," William H. Hamman Papers (Fondren Library, Rice University); Reynolds, *Editors Make War*, 76–117; *State Gazette* (Austin), Aug. 25, Sept. 22, Oct. 20, 1860; *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Sept. 29, 1860; *Countryman* (Bellville), Dec. 12, 19, 1860; Reagan to Roberts, Nov. 1, 20, Dec. 7, 1860, Roberts Papers.

[28]William Pitt Ballinger, "Ballinger Diary," Dec. 30, 1860 (typescript, Rosenberg Library). For more information on Ballinger, whose social and business ties knit him into the commercial elite of Galveston, see Maxwell Bloomfield, "William Pitt Ballinger, Confederate Lawyer," *American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776–1876* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), 270–301. For further evidence that this commercial elite had good reason to oppose secession see *Union* (Galveston), Dec. 6, 1860; *Civilian* (Galveston), Dec. 3, 1860; Fornell,

where the army greatly benefitted the local economy and where the Lower South culture was weak, the leaders of the anti-secessionist movement were usually also successful businessmen. In most cases, however, and this was certainly true of such East Texas commercial centers as Marshall, the culture and ideology of the commercial classes overrode their immediate self-interest. Moreover, secessionists seemed to convince businessmen, wealthy planters, and their lawyers—those people most involved in commerce—that the security of the slave system and the stable race relations and labor source that it provided were essential to their long-term prosperity and safety.[29]

Along the frontier, perceptions of what Republican control of the presidency would mean again aided the secessionists. Beginning about 1858 in the northern half of the frontier, the army and the federal government increasingly seemed more of a hindrance than a help. The army protected reservation Indians whom the Texans considered thieves and murderers, and it moved agonizingly slowly to counter the stepped-up raids of the Comanches and Kiowas in the three years prior to secession. Taking matters in its own hands, the Texas government organized Ranger companies and then sent the U.S. government a bill for their services. The U.S. House of Representatives, in which Republicans had a plurality, agreed to pay these bills at a snail's pace and was equally slow to allocate funds for badly needed cavalry units along the frontier. Since the army's prestige had been severely damaged along the northern frontier, and since past history gave proof that the army would be even more unresponsive to the needs of Texans if Republicans expanded their power within the federal government, many frontiersmen came to favor secession after the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency.[30]

The Galveston Era, 278–293. On other Texas businessmen or lawyers tied to commerce who viewed secession with reluctance, see McKinney to Jack, Ballinger, and Bryan, Nov. 22, 1860, Bryan Papers; Ralph A. Wooster, "Ben H. Epperson: East Texas Lawyer, Legislator, and Civic Leader," *ETHJ*, V (Mar., 1967), 29–42; Jane Lynn Scarborough, "George W. Paschal, Texas Unionist and Scalawag Jurisprudent" (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, 1972); Sinclair, "Crossroads of Conviction," 129–204; Ernest Wallace, *Charles DeMorse: Pioneer Editor and Statesman* (Lubbock, Tex., 1943), 1–142; Elliott, *Leathercoat*, 15–67.

[29]McKinney to Jack, Ballinger, and Bryan, Nov. 22, 1860; Bryan Papers; *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Nov. 24, Dec. 1, 15, 1860; *Weekly Alamo Express* (San Antonio), Oct. 1, 8, 1860; *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), Sept. 5, Oct. 10, 1860. For a typical example of secessionist rhetoric, see *State Gazette* (Austin), Nov. 17, 1860.

[30]*White Man* (Weatherford), Sept. 13, 1860; Dallas *Herald*, May 18, 1859; *Standard* (Clarksville), May 19, Oct. 20, 27, 1860. On the frontier and its use by secessionists see Buenger, "Unionism on the Texas Frontier," 243–254; *State Gazette* (Austin), Aug. 11,

These inchoate factors that nourished secession among Texans as a whole in 1860 also drove certain gifted individuals to take a leading role in the public debate. Men of talent and position clarified the issues and organized the campaigns that made secession a reality. John Marshall, chairman of the state's Democratic party and editor of the influential *Texas State Gazette*, seemed to work toward secession throughout the 1850s. Most Texans, like John Reagan, however, were slower to accept disunion. Reagan, originally from Tennessee, shared an affection for the Union common to other Tennesseans like Sam Houston. Unlike Houston, however, Reagan seemed by late 1859 to be one of those Texans from the Upper South who was becoming assimilated into a Lower South culture. Perhaps it was his new experiences and new friends in Congress that caused the change. At any rate, avowedly frightened by the now ominous nature of the Union, Reagan realized by October, 1860, that the election of Lincoln could not be avoided and moved to join the secessionists. Like him, many talented and respected men accelerated the secession movement by lending it the force of their personalities, their reputations, their followings, and their abilities to articulate the issues.[31]

Unlike earlier times, this accelerating movement toward dissolution was not braked by a reawakened awareness of the pragmatic value of the Union, by the influence of Unionist leaders, by the resurgence of nationalist ideology, by the expression of this ideology in a political party, and by the inherent unionist tendencies of some Texas subcultures. Lincoln's election and the ascendancy of the Republican party made Texans question as nothing had before the ability of the United States to function as an American nation should function. After November of 1860 the Union seemed both unbeneficial and an unfit carrier of nationalist dreams. This perception was reinforced and the balance between attachment to the Union and to region was further endangered when a consensus in favor of secession virtually ended all

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Nov. 17, Dec. 1, 1860; Procter, *Not Without Honor*, 117–119; "An Ordinance to Dissolve the Union between the State of Texas and the Other States . . . ," Winkler (ed.), *Journal of the Secession Convention*, 35–36; "A Declaration of the Causes Which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union," ibid., 61–66.

[31]Procter, *Not Without Honor*, 97–126; Reagan to Roberts, Nov. 1, 1860, Roberts Papers; *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Jan. 12, 1861; Larry Jay Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and War: John Marshall and the Texas State Gazette, 1860–1861," *SHQ*, LXII (Oct., 1958), 191–226. Charles R. Pryor, editor of the Dallas *Herald*, is another example of a moderate who threw his influence behind secession. See Dallas *Herald*, Jan. 9, 16, 1861; Webb, Carroll, and Branda (eds.), *Handbook of Texas*, II, 418.

Right: John Marshall in 1862. Below: William Pitt Ballinger (1825–1888).



debate on the matter in many parts of Texas. Still, even so powerful a force as consensus in a democracy could not submerge nationalism. Instead this nationalism caused Texans to focus on the Confederacy as the new hope for the fulfillment of old dreams and needs.

By late 1860 many Texans had come to perceive Republican power in the national government and in the North as eroding both the ideological and pragmatic functions of the Union. Secessionists portrayed the Union as now incapable of providing stabilizing law, social harmony, military protection, and a guarantee of individual rights to its southern citizens. The question of secession became not simply a choice between defending slavery or defending the sanctity of the nation. The point of the secession debate in Texas was what Lincoln's election that November told and foretold about the nature of the Union. The argument that the Union had decayed, backed up by the specific examples of northern attitudes toward slavery, Republican neglect of the frontier, Republican disregard for the law, and Republican fomenting of social discord, weakened attachments to the nation based upon its role as a preserver of order, a promoter of future prosperity, and a keeper of such traditional values as a respect for the law. Thus the impact of parties and people moved by unionist ideology or a rational assessment of the Union's benefits was undercut.[32]

Unionism, however, did not cease to exist either within individuals or within groups, and habit, together with the emotional side of unionist ideology, would have created stronger opposition to secession in 1861 if it had not been for the force of consensus. Human societies, when threatened by an external enemy, have a tendency to require conformity of their members. In the winter of 1860–1861, in regions of Texas with substantial slave populations, a closing off of debate occurred. In that part of Texas most like the Lower South, which was roughly everything east of the Brazos River below a line running from Waco to Texarkana, secessionists, using the apparatus of the Democratic party and the Democratic press, spread their arguments into every hamlet. Meanwhile unionists were disorganized and silent. They lacked the strength of an institutional framework like the Democratic party. The unionists' silence sprang as well from a tactical decision to boycott all discussions of secession and hope that nearsighted visions of the Union would soon be replaced with a healthy nationalism. To an immeasurable degree, however, the silence of unionists arose from

[32]Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the Lone Star State," 180–276.

various forms of intimidation. Many times this intimidation was direct and overt. Newspaper editors who stridently opposed secession, like Ferdinand Flake of the German- and English-language *Union*, had their presses smashed. In other areas paramilitary groups, such as the minutemen of Harrison County or the Knights of the Golden Circle to which Newcomb took such exception, might have taken part in organized repression of unionist spokesmen and influenced voting. It is a fact, in any case, that secessionists used force to seize the federal government's property in Texas before the statewide referendum on secession, and that they occasionally tried to overtly intimidate or disrupt unionist spokesmen. Unionists also contended that fair election procedures in both the selection of Secession Convention delegates in January, 1861, and in the secession referendum of February 23, 1861, were not used. In such an atmosphere, physical intimidation might have forced some voters to favor secession despite reservations or to simply stay home.[33]

It seems probable, however, that more subtle forms of intimidation and persuasion were primarily responsible for the growing consensus in favor of secession in January and February of 1861. Since even most unionists agreed that secession was legal, the question before the public was whether it was justified. The answer came back a sure and emotion-packed "YES" from the secessionists and a rather timid "perhaps not" from the unionists. The secessionists were aided by their assured and direct approach, and the offering of a simple solution to a universally perceived problem. As the editor of the Bellville *Countryman* put it: "The so called cooperation men, most of whom among

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[33]For an understanding of events in the winter and spring of 1860–1861 see *State Gazette* (Austin), Nov. 24, Dec. 8, 1860, Feb. 9, 23, 1861; Dallas *Herald*, Jan. 2, 9, 23, 1861; *Harrison Flag* (Marshall), Jan. 5, 12, 1861; *Union* (Galveston), Jan. 8, 12, 1861; *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Feb. 2, Mar. 2, 1861; Frank H. Smyrl, "Unionism in Texas, 1856–1861," *SHQ*, LXVIII (Oct., 1964), 187; C. A. Bridges, "The Knights of the Golden Circle: A Filibustering Fantasy," ibid., XLIV (Jan., 1941), 287–302; Dunn, "The KGC in Texas," 543–573. On the existence of paramilitary groups and the possible use of force during the secession crisis see *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Dec. 22, 1860, Jan. 5, Feb. 23, 1861; Newcomb, *Secession Times in Texas*, 6–12. On the tactics, actions, and opinions of unionists from December, 1860, to March, 1861, see Elliott, *Leathercoat*, 45–60; Dohoney, *An Average American*, 71–88; Friend, *Sam Houston*, 331–338; Sandbo, "The First Session of the Secession Convention," 181; *State Gazette* (Austin), Dec. 29, 1860. For a statement by unionists in February, 1861, see "Address to the People of Texas," scrapbook, 31–34, Haynes Papers. Timmons, "The Referendum in Texas," 14–22, makes several interesting observations about intimidation and voter manipulation by secessionists. On the use of force also see Maher, "Secession in Texas," 172–185; *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), Mar. 6, 1861; Thomas North, *Five Years in Texas; or, What You Did Not Hear during the War* . . . (Cincinnati, 1871), 89–91.

us seem to be equally as strongly opposed to any further aggression by the abolitionists, and who talk learnedly about maintaining our rights in the Union, have not presented a solitary plan of operation for doing so. The Secessionists do propose a remedy, and are striving to carry that into effect." Citizens were swayed by the force of such secessionist rhetoric and listened attentively to calls for unity in the face of northern aggression and declarations that the North would let the South leave the Union in peace. Men like William Pitt Ballinger expressed their concerns about secession in their private diaries, but seldom voiced them out loud where their friends would be offended and their business possibly damaged. In the end, either overtly or covertly, unionists were induced to stay home during public discussions and on election day, or they were convinced to quietly support secession.[34]

Each time the secessionists won a victory, either at the polls or in the propaganda campaign that accompanied the formation of consensus, the momentum of the secession movement increased. The silencing of one unionist or the decision or another simply not to speak out built a facade of unity that discouraged others from speaking out. The secession of six other states prior to the referendum in Texas made secession seem legitimate. Victories at the polls in the election of Secession Convention delegates in January of 1861, regardless of the margin of victory or whether unionists participated, produced an overwhelming majority in favor of the secessionists when the convention convened at the end of that month. The prompt and easy passage of a secession ordinance in turn encouraged Texans to endorse in the secession referendum of February 23, 1861, what was in many ways an accomplished fact. This was especially true because secessionists had secured the surrender of federal troops and property and begun moves to attach Texas to the Confederacy prior to that election. Through overt and covert intimidation, through control of the press and the speakers' platform, through better organization, through the advantages of a plan of action, and finally by taking advantage of momentum generated by a series of election victories, secessionists translated fears about the nature of the Union and the resultant decay of traditional props of the nation into a crushing consensus in favor of secession.[35]

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[34]*Countryman* (Bellville), Jan. 16, 1861. Also see Ballinger, "Diary," Dec. 21, 31, 1860; *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Feb. 23, 1861.

[35]*Texas Republican* (Marshall), Jan. 5, 12, 19, 26, 1861; *State Gazette* (Austin), Dec. 29,

Such a consensus was not predestined and there were some notable exceptions in Texas to its development. In Lamar County, on the fringe of the Lower South cultural region of Texas, E. L. Dohoney took part in a successful struggle to convince the county's voters to oppose secession. Looking back on these events later Dohoney declared: "This could have been done in nearly every county in Texas if the Union men had had leaders; but the leaders in the Democratic party, consisting of the principal planters and lawyers were all in the Secession movement, with a well organized revolution; which was precipitated on the people so suddenly that men naturally competent to lead, but untrained in politics, were so surprised, confused and morally bulldozed, that in only a few localities was any opposition attempted." In those numerous counties east of the Brazos River where a Lower South culture was either evolving or already present, secessionists "bulldozed" their way, superficially at least, to a near total acceptance of secession.[36]

Such acceptance was not universal, and unionism and nationalism persisted noticeably in the debates over secession that occurred in counties in the western and northern settled portions of the state. Here, as elsewhere, the component parts of unionism were undermined. Secessionist ideology and allegiance to the Democratic party swayed opinion in favor of secession. Powerful personalities and exponents of the cotton/slave culture argued persuasively that the Union was no longer a safe refuge. Self-interest, particularly on the northwestern frontier, convinced many that secession was advisable. In these areas of Texas, though, the force of consensus, while strong and following the same course as in other regions of Texas, was never as omnipotent as it was to the south or east. Here existed either great cultural diversity or else upper southern, western European, or Mexican cultural dominance. Here the Democratic party was either less

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1860, Jan. 5, 12, 19, Feb. 16, 23, 1861; "A Declaration of Causes Which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union," Winkler (ed.), *Journal of the Secession Convention*, 65; Lubbock, *Six Decades*, 305–306. O. M. Roberts is particularly revealing concerning the momentum of the secession movement. See Roberts, "Political, Legislative, and Judicial History," Wooten (ed.), *Comprehensive History of Texas*, II, 88–114; "Memoirs of John Salmon Ford," V, 942–984. One unionist who did not regard secession as legal was George W. Paschal. On his long attempt to fight secession see Scarborough, "George W. Paschal," 39–136. Most other unionists resembled James Throckmorton. See Elliott, *Leathercoat*, 50–51.

[36]Dohoney, *An Average American*, 74 (quotation). Also see *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Dec. 22, 29, 1860.

institutionally sound or continued to face strong opposition from unionist groups. And here prominent citizens argued forcefully for the Union. Self-interest encouraged those whose wealth or safety depended upon the army or upon access to markets in the North to remain unionists. As a result, unionist ideology was undermined but never destroyed. Pioneer residents of slaveless Parker County, to the west of Ft. Worth, were just as concerned about the threat of the Republican party to law and social order as were the slaveholding citizens of plantation-dominated Harrison County, and they would express this concern by voting overwhelmingly for secession. Still, this fear of a Union corrupted by Republicans could not always overcome the mystical attachment to the nation found across Texas. In the winter of 1860–1861 Texans in the north and west echoed the words and sentiments penned by James Newcomb in November, when he was trying to drum up votes for a fusion ticket in opposition to John C. Breckinridge. In an editorial dated November 5, 1860, Newcomb wrote: "In the name of Washington, who exhorted us to cherish the Union, we call upon every American citizen to vote for the Union ticket. In the name of Jefferson, of Jackson, of Webster, of Clay, we call upon you to rebuke the fell spirit of disunion." Responding to such ecumenical calls in the names of men who were not only the patron saints of Democrats and Whigs, but above all heroes of the nation, many Texans in the north and west did indeed openly "rebuke the fell spirit of disunion."[37]

Lest the imagination run too wild, though, and invoke an image of a Texas split into two warring geographic and cultural regions by the issue of secession, a simple look at the facts reveals that a goodly number of Texans in the northern and western counties of the state voted in favor of secession, and that the vast majority of those who opposed secession eventually supported the Confederacy. As James W. Throck-

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[37]*Weekly Alamo Express* (San Antonio), Nov. 5, 1860 (quotation). Political parties matured more slowly on the frontier because the population was sparse and the difficulty of survival great. Once competition began between political groups, however, competition itself forced greater party organization. This process had just begun on the frontier in 1860. See *Texas State Times* (Austin), June 30, 1855; Lubbock, *Six Decades*, 179–313; Sinclair, "Crossroads of Conviction." On the continued existence of a two-party system and a strong unionist voice see the *Standard* (Clarksville), Feb. 2, 9, 23, Mar. 2, 9, 1861; Dallas *Herald*, Jan. 16, 23, Feb. 13, 20, 27, 1861; New Braunfels *Zeitung*, Feb. 22, Mar. 1, 1861. For information on Parker County and the rest of the frontier see *White Man* (Weatherford), Sept. 13, 1860; Buenger, "Unionism on the Texas Frontier," 250–254. Voting returns and an analysis of their validity can be found in Timmons, "The Referendum in Texas," 15–19.

morton, soon to be a Confederate general, put it in March of 1861: "While my judgment dictates to me that we are not justified by the surroundings or the occasion, a majority of the people of Texas have declared in favor of secession; the die is cast; the step has been taken, and regardless of consequences I expect and intend to share the fortunes of my friends and neighbors. . . . I have no doubt that the time will soon be upon us when the clash of arms will be heard and the blood of my countrymen will be shed in a great civil war. When it comes I will be in its midst. . . ." Once the war that Throckmorton had predicted began, Texans became all the more united and gathered together with their "friends and neighbors" to fight the enemy.[38]

In some sense the triumph of the secessionists and the existence of a bellicose Confederate States of America for five years was a victory for localism. Texans first began to accept the idea of secession because their local institution of slavery was challenged by the North and by the Republican party. When they came to believe that the Union's proper character would be subverted by the hegemony of the Republican party, Texans moved toward secession. Secessionist propagandizing by the regular Democratic party, the emergence of pragmatic local reasons for supporting secession, the identification of traditional local leaders with secession, the forced consensus in some cultural regions of the state, and the particular ideology of Texas secessionists all had a parochial nature. Even the decision made by many unionists to support the Confederacy was in large measure the result of their realization that their community, their county, their state, or their region was more their physical, emotional, and psychological home than the nation as a whole.

To describe the force of localism in creating secession and sustaining the Confederacy in its early days, however, does not negate the existence of nationalism at any time after 1860. Secessionists displayed a widely held assumption that it was only as part of a large and stable nation that Americans could achieve their individual and corporate goals. Almost from the beginning Texas secessionists were

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[38]Elliott, *Leathercoat*, 59 (quotations). For a map showing the percentage vote against secession, see Jordan, "The Imprint of the Upper and Lower South," 687. On support of the Confederacy by former unionists see *Standard* (Clarksville), Mar. 2, 9, 16, 23, 1861; *State Gazette* (Austin), Mar. 16, 1861; *Southern Intelligencer* (Austin), May 8, 1861; Houston, "Speech at Independence," May 10, 1861, *Writings of Sam Houston*, ed. Williams and Barker, VIII, 301–305; Baggett, "The Constitutional Union Party in Texas," 263–264; Wooster, "Ben Epperson," 32–35. For additional information and a different point of view see Claude Elliott, "Union Sentiment in Texas, 1861–1865," *SHQ*, L (Apr., 1947), 449–477.

James W. Throckmorton (1825–1894). Courtesy Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma.

nation builders as well as destroyers of the Union. Texans toyed with the notion of restoring the Republic of Texas, but when they made their decision to secede it was clear that Texas would be part of the Confederacy. Six states had left the Union by February, 1861. While some of these states hesitated to leave the Union without a guarantee of cooperation from other southern states, Texans knew they would not be alone. As early as January, 1861, propagandists of secession in Texas began to argue that separate state secession, since it would be the fastest means of removing their state from the Union and uniting it with the other states of the cotton-growing South, was in effect the most efficient form of cooperating in the building of a new nation. In essence, the secession movement did not kill nationalism in Texas, but redirected it toward the Confederate States of America.[39]

Texans hoped that they were entering a new nation that would become all the things the old Union had once been. Quickly most of the old props of the Union were marshaled to support the Confederacy. The homogeneous culture of the southern states received constant mention. The Confederacy was to be the inheritor of the American mission forfeited by the Union. It would prevent anarchy and protect its citizens from foreign powers. Significantly, beginning with early discussions of secession, Texans insisted that the constitution of their new nation be as much like that of the United States as possible. Secessionists argued that both Whigs and Democrats would be at home in a southern confederacy. The interests of frontiersmen and cotton growers, in their opinion, would be aided by entry into this new nation. Finally, it soon became clear that the personalities who would lead Texas and the Confederacy in the first years of nationhood would not be anarchists, but would, like John Reagan, be nation builders who had clung tenaciously to the Union throughout most of the 1850s. Secession and subsequent attachment to the Con-

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[39]On the possible restoration of Texas as an independent nation see Jimmie Hicks, "Texas and Separate Independence, 1860–1961," *ETHJ*, IV (Oct., 1966), 85–106. For examples of emerging Confederate nationalism and its similarity to unionism see Winkler (ed.), *Journal of the Secession Convention*, 64–65; *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Jan. 5, 12, 19, 26, 1861; Lubbock, *Six Decades*, 304–306. Also see Stephen B. Oates, "Texas under the Secessionists," *SHQ*, LXVII (Oct., 1963), 167–212. For a look at secession in some of the other six states of the original Confederacy see Channing, *Crisis of Fear*; William L. Barney, *The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860* (Princeton, 1974); Charles B. Dew, "Who Won the Election in Louisiana?" *JSH*, XXXVI (Feb., 1970), 18–32; McCrary, Miller, and Baum, "Class and Party in the Secession Crisis," 429–457; Ralph A. Wooster, "The Secession of the Lower South: An Examination of Changing Interpretations," *Civil War History*, VII (June, 1961), 117–127.

federacy did not spring simply from localism, but came as well from the potent although at times weakly focused force of nationalism.[40]

Texans did not move toward secession in a straight and simple line. Perhaps only through imagery, then, can secession be reduced to the understandable. If so, the image of Texas and Texans that emerged in 1860–1861 was like the Roman god Janus. Two almost identical faces looking in opposite directions on the same head, secession and the Union, drew sustenance from the same body. Within their common brain secessionists and unionists were localists and nationalists at the same time. Janus, though, evokes an image of balance and inertia—an image that was untrue of Texas in 1861. Commitment to the United States began to evaporate when Abraham Lincoln and the Republican party achieved hegemony within the North and the national government. This event signalled to Texans, as none had done before, the irreparable decay of the Union. All the things that the nation had once done or Texans hoped the nation would do—preventing anarchy, protecting the frontier, insuring the protection of constitutional and legal rights—a Republican-dominated nation promised not to do. In fact, Republicans were perceived as anarchists, as attackers of the frontier as well as all other portions of Texas, and as law breakers. Even so, the pull of the Union was strong, and most Texans might have been willing to give the Republicans a chance to prove themselves worthy of their trust if the momentum of the secession movement had not been constantly accelerated by a growing consensus in favor of secession which ended all debate over its wisdom in many parts of Texas. A greater attachment to one's state and region rather than the nation prompted even secession's critics to accept the dismembering of the Union. In a way that is difficult to measure, however, what made secession acceptable was the realization by most Texans that secessionists were nation builders as well as destroyers. Here again secession was intertwined with notions about the Union. Secession was a continuation of the past, not a radical departure from the past. Its purpose was not simply to tear apart the Union, but to dismantle it in order to construct a purer type of union which would achieve all the goals and purposes of a nation of Americans. Texans

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[40]Lubbock, *Six Decades*, 304–313; *State Gazette* (Austin), Feb. 9, 16, Mar. 2, 16, 1861; *Standard* (Clarksville), Feb. 23, Mar. 9, 1861. McCardell, *Southern Nation*, 251, 271, 336–338, uses Reagan as an example of a typical southerner who did not become a southern nationalist until 1860. He also uses Reagan to prove his point that moderates with a tradition of nationalism led the Confederacy.

did not lose their nationalism in 1861, nor did they cease to define that nationalism in an American fashion. They refocused that nationalism on the Confederacy instead of the United States.

When Texas joined an earlier nation of Americans in 1845–1846 they acted with near unanimity and much joy. Far less joy and unanimity could be found in 1860–1861 when Texans left the United States for the Confederacy.[41] These two instances, however, were more alike than they seem. They were essentially two faces on the same head on the same body. For Texas the key to the riddle of secession lay in the interdependence of secession with all the ideas, values, interests, and habits connected with the Union.

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[41]From the notes O. M. Roberts made during the secession crisis to the present day the oddity of Texans crying for admission to the Union in 1845 and rejecting that same Union in 1861 has captured the imagination. See "Memoirs of John Salmon Ford," V, 949; Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion," 1–3. A convenient comparison of the two events can be found in Friend, *Sam Houston*, 157–161, 330–341.

"Rarin' for a Fight": Texans in the Confederate Army

RALPH A. WOOSTER and ROBERT WOOSTER*†

THE FIRING ON FT. SUMTER IN APRIL, 1861, RELEASED STRONG EMOtional feeling throughout the South. From the Potomac to the Rio Grande, thousands of young men volunteered for military service. In his study of the Confederate soldier in the Civil War, Bell I. Wiley notes that the man who was to become Johnny Reb was "rarin' for a fight." He cites a young volunteer from Arkansas who, feeling "like ten thousand pins were pricking me in every part of the body," left his community for the war front "a week in advance of his brothers."[1]

Many young Texans were also "rarin' for a fight" in the spring of 1861. William A. Fletcher, of Beaumont, was working on the roof of a two-story house when informed of the firing on Ft. Sumter. The news made Fletcher "very nervous thinking the delay of completing the roof might cause me to miss a chance to enlist. . . ." Finding no local military units being formed, he boarded a flatcar heading toward Houston to find a way of enlisting. Once in Houston he again found no companies being organized. So impatient was he to enlist he went to Galveston the following day, but found conditions there similar to Houston. He took a steamboat to Liberty, and finally persuaded the commander of a company being formed there to allow him to enlist.[2]

Most Texans experienced less difficulty than Fletcher in joining military units. By late spring companies were being formed in almost every community. Often these units were organized by local political leaders or by professional men with little military knowledge or background. The lack of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment often bewildered even those with previous military experience.[3]

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1Bell Irvin Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (1943; reprint ed., New York, 1962), 15.

2William A. Fletcher, *Rebel Private, Front and Rear* (1908; reprint ed., Austin, 1954), 6 (quotation), 7.

3Allen C. Ashcraft, "Texas, 1860–1866: The Lone Star State in the Civil War" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1960), 74–77.

It should be noted that most Texans were initially recruited or enrolled in a company

During the first few weeks, the companies drilled, received new members, and attended an endless round of public ceremonies featuring patriotic addresses by local dignitaries and veterans of the Texas Revolution and Mexican War. Ordinarily the speakers praised the South's determination to resist northern aggression and predicted quick victory for southern arms, but occasionally a more somber note was sounded. Ralph J. Smith, a private in Company K of the Second Texas Infantry, reported that deposed governor Sam Houston, a foe of secession, warned members of his company that they did not know what they were doing. Smith reported Houston's caution that "the resources of the north were almost exhaustless." He concluded, however, that the words of the old hero of San Jacinto had no effect: "He might as well had been giving advice to the inmates of a lunatic asylum. We knew no such words as fail."[4]

Many of the recruits received their military instruction, such as it was, in their local communities. Others were trained in one of the military camps created by Governor Edward Clark. Many of these, such as Camp Berlin, located near Brenham; Camp Honey Springs, on the west bank of Honey Creek near Dallas; and Camp Roberts, in Smith County, were primarily mustering or rendezvous stations. Others, such as Camp Bosque, seven miles from Waco; Camp Clark, on the San Marcos River; and Camp Van Dorn, on Buffalo Bayou near

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of infantry, a troop of cavalry, or a battery of artillery. These units, consisting of approximately one hundred men, and commanded by a captain, were later formed into regiments commanded by a colonel. The authorized strength of a Civil War regiment was ten companies, or approximately one thousand men, but some regiments, such as the First Texas, had twelve companies. A varying number of regiments formed a brigade, usually commanded by a brigadier general. Two to five brigades formed a division, normally commanded in Confederate service by a major general. Two or more divisions were combined to form an army corps, commanded by a lieutenant general. Two or more corps made up an army, usually commanded by a full general.

Some artillery batteries and cavalry troops were also organized into battalions. Composed of three or four batteries or troops, battalions were usually commanded by lieutenant colonels.

Most larger military units in Confederate service were known by the name of their commanding officer; e.g., Hood's Brigade was named for John Bell Hood, one of its early commanders. Most, but not all, regiments were designated by a number, e.g., Second Texas Infantry. In this paper, reference to such names as the Second Texas Infantry implies a regimental designation. For more on Civil War military organization, see Mark Mayo Boatner, III, *The Civil War Dictionary* (New York, 1959), 610–613.

For organizational histories of various Texas units, see Harry McCory Henderson, *Texas in the Confederacy* (San Antonio, 1955), and Lester N. Fitzhugh, *Texas Batteries, Battalions, Regiments, Commanders and Field Officers, Confederate States Army, 1861–1865* (Midlothian, Tex., 1959).

[4]Ralph J. Smith, *Reminiscences of the Civil War and Other Sketches* (reprint ed., Waco, Tex., 1962), 2.



Private John T. Mings (Upshur County), Company C, 10th Texas Cavalry Regiment (Upshur Guards). Courtesy John Mings and Laura Mings Williams.

Harrisburg, were larger camps where military instruction was received.[5]

One of the highlights of early military life for most Texas volunteers was the presentation of either the Confederate or the unit flag by local townspeople. This ceremony, which usually occurred when the company left for training camp or for the eastern theater of military operations, was "the last act of the farewell drama" and often was "a solemn affair." Albert B. Blocker, youthful bugler of the Third Texas Cavalry, recalled that his company, known as the Texas Hunters, received its flag at Jonesville on May 1, 1861. Miss Eudora Perry presented the handsome flag, made by the ladies of Harrison County, to the company before hundreds of citizens who had come to view the festivities. Patriotic speeches, parades, and a barbecue made the day one that young Blocker would not forget.[6]

An equally enthusiastic flag presentation and send-off was given the Henderson Guards of the Fourth Texas Infantry. Before leaving for Camp Van Dorn, the Guards assembled at the town of Fincastle, in southern Henderson County. Here, before hundreds of onlookers, the company commander, Captain William K. ("Howdy") Martin, received a beautiful homemade Confederate flag presented by Miss Ann Tindel. The flag was hoisted to the top of a 120-foot pine pole while Martin, a noted stump speaker, delivered a powerful oration with a "voice like thunder" and with a look like "he was mad enough to eat a Yankee raw."[7]

The Texas soldiers who marched off to war in 1861 wore a wide variety of uniforms. Val C. Giles, of the Fourth Texas Infantry, noted that no two companies had uniforms alike when his regiment was organized in the spring of that year. "We were a motley-looking set, but as a rule comfortably dressed," he later wrote. "In my company we had

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[5]Bill Winsor, *Texas in the Confederacy: Military Installations, Economy and People* (Hillsboro, Tex., 1978), 8–38; Harold B. Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: Lee's Grenadier Guard* (Waco, Tex., 1970), 20–21, 34–35.

[6]Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: Lee's Grenadier Guard*, 27 (quotations); Max S. Lale, "The Boy-Bugler of the Third Texas Cavalry: The A. B. Blocker Narrative," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, XIV (No. 2), 73.

[7]J. J. Faulk, *History of Henderson County, Texas* (Athens, Tex., 1929), 129. For other descriptions of flag ceremonies see Charles Spurlin (ed.), *West of the Mississippi with Waller's 13th Texas Cavalry Battalion, CSA* (Hillsboro, 1971), 28; *Texas Republican* (Marshall), Apr. 27, June 1, 1861; O. T. Hanks, "History of B. F. Benton's Company, or Account of Civil War Experiences," 2–3, O. T. Hanks, Reminiscences, 1861–1862 (Ar-

about four different shades of gray, but the trimmings were all of black braid." Jim Turner, of the Sixth Texas Infantry, pointed out that in his regiment the uniforms were of "a dark pepper and salt grey color, and were trimmed with green." The First Texas Infantry wore dark uniforms with bright red stripes, while the men of Company E, Fourth Texas Infantry, sported uniforms of imported gray cloth trimmed in blue.[8]

A wide assortment of colors and materials was found among cavalry units recruited in Texas. Stephen B. Oates notes that trousers of the typical cavalryman were either gray woolen jeans or plaid woolen jeans, but that Captain Sam Richardson of the Walter P. Lane Rangers wore exotic leopard-skin pants. Coats were both single- and double-breasted, with a variety of color and style. The hats of Texas soldiers, both infantry and cavalry, were generally wide-brimmed felt, or gray caps with visors. Many Texans, especially those from South Texas, preferred the Mexican sombrero.[9]

The weapons carried by Texas Confederates varied even more than their uniforms. Although regulations called for sabers and carbines, most cavalry units were equipped with shotguns, rifles, Bowie knives, and Colt revolvers. Theophilus Noel noted that when Henry H. Sibley's Brigade left San Antonio in 1861, the men were "armed with squirrel-guns, bear guns, sportman's-guns, shot-guns, both single and double barrels, in fact, guns of all sorts. . . ." The double-barreled shotgun was a weapon particularly favored by the Eighth Cavalry, a unit better known as Terry's Texas Rangers.[10]

Texas soldiers were given much freedom in choosing their weapons. O. T. Hanks, of the Fourth Infantry, recalled that:

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chives, University of Texas Library, Austin); Jim Turner, "Jim Turner, Co. G, 6th Texas Infantry, C.S.A., From 1861 to 1865," *Texana*, XII (No. 2, 1974), 150.

[8]Mary Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope: The Recollections of Val C. Giles, Four Years with Hood's Brigade, Fourth Texas Infantry* (New York, 1961), 23; Turner, "Co. G, 6th Texas Infantry," 150; Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: Lee's Grenadier Guard*, 16–18.

[9]Stephen B. Oates, *Confederate Cavalry West of the River* (Austin, 1961), 60–61; Bruce Marshall, "Night Sentinel: Texas Confederate Cavalry," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, X (No. 3, 1972), 157–158; Bruce Marshall, "Border Confederate," ibid., X (No. 4, 1972), 223–224.

[10]Oates, *Confederate Cavalry*, 62–65; Marshall, "Confederate Cavalry," 157; Marshall, "Border Confederate," 223–224; Theo. Noel, *A Campaign from Santa Fe to the Mississippi* (Shreveport, 1865), 8; Leonidas B. Giles, *Terry's Texas Rangers* (Austin, 1911), 12–13; C. C. Jeffries, *Terry's Rangers* (New York, 1961), 19–20.

evry fellow [was] equiped as he considered with the best Accounterments of war. There Arms Consisting of Almost evry Conceivable Kind of Gun that Could be Colected in the Country. . . . Our Bayonets were Butcher Knives Made by our Black Smiths out of Old files[.] Some were about 12 Inches long [and] 1½ Inches wide[.] Others were 16 or 18 Inches long [and] abut 3 Inches wide. . . . Some Nice Jobs, others not, all owing to the taste of the person[.][11]

When the Third Texas Cavalry was sent to Arkansas, one company was armed with rifles, two companies with shotguns, and one company with Minie carbines, while 110 men were supplied with Mississippi rifles and 150 with Sharps' rifles.[12]

Frequently Texans overburdened themselves with equipment and clothing as they rode or marched off to war. C. C. Cox took two saddle horses, two wagon horses, a wagon, side arms, medicines, bedding, camp utensils, and a black boy when he left his ranch near Indianola heading for the army.[13] William W. Heartsill, of the Lane Rangers, recalled that when he embarked for war in April, 1861, his horse "Pet" was carrying the following:

myself, saddle, bridle, saddle-blanket, curry comb, horse brush, coffee pot, tin cup, 20 lbs ham, 200 biscuit, 5 lbs ground coffee, 5 lbs sugar, one large pound cake presented to me by Mrs C E Talley, 6 shirts, 6 prs socks, 3 prs drawers, 2 prs pants, 2 jackets, 1 pr heavy mud boots, one Colt's revolver, one small dirk, four blankets, sixty feet of rope, with a twelve inch iron pin attached; with all these, and divers and sundry little mementoes from friends.[14]

By the end of 1861 approximately 25,000 Texans were enrolled in the Confederate army. Fully two-thirds of these were in the cavalry, as Texans showed a decided preference for mounted service.[15] Sixteen

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[11]Hanks, "History of B. F. Benton's Company," 4–5.

[12]Galveston *Weekly News*, Sept. 3, 1861. Julius Giesecke noted that his unit, Company G, Fourth Texas Cavalry, was originally equipped with spears, which they exchanged for guns in December, 1861. See Oscar Haas (trans.), "The Diary of Julius Giesecke, 1861–1862," *Texas Military History*, III (Winter, 1963), 233.

[13]"Reminiscences of C. C. Cox, II," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, VI (Jan., 1903), 217.

[14]William W. Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army; or, Camp Life, Day by Day, of the W. P. Lane Rangers from April 19, 1861, to May 20, 1865*, ed. Bell I. Wiley (1876; reprint ed., Jackson, Tenn., 1954), 5.

[15]The British traveler Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards noted this affinity of Texans for the cavalry. "At the outbreak of the war," he observed, "it was found very difficult to raise infantry in Texas, as no Texan walks a yard if he can help it." Arthur James L. Fremantle, *The Fremantle Diary: Being the Journal of Lieutenant Colonel James Arthur Lyon Fremantle, Coldstream Guards, on His Three Months in the Southern States*, ed. Walter Lord (1863; reprint ed., Boston, 1954), 58. See also

Private John P. Offield (Washington County), Company A, 12th Texas Cavalry Regiment (Parson's Texas Cavalry). Courtesy Alice Fagg.

regiments, three battalions, and three independent companies of cavalry were raised in Texas the first year of the war. Four of the regiments recruited that year, the Second Mounted Rifles, the Fourth Cavalry, the Fifth Cavalry, and the Seventh Cavalry, took part in Henry H. Sibley's ill-fated invasion of New Mexico Territory in late 1861 and early 1862. Wealthy sugar planter Benjamin F. Terry raised the most famous of all the mounted Texas units, the Eighth Cavalry, or Terry's Texas Rangers. The Rangers were originally scheduled for service in Virginia, but the need for additional troops in Kentucky resulted in the regiment being assigned to join Albert Sidney Johnston's command in that state.[16]

Even though Texans preferred cavalry service, seven regiments and four battalions of infantry were recruited in the Lone Star State in 1861. Three of these regiments, the First, Fourth, and Fifth, were ordered to Virginia in the fall of the year and there became part of the Texas Infantry Brigade, commanded first by Louis T. Wigfall and later by John Bell Hood. As Hood's Texas Brigade, the unit distinguished itself at Gaines' Mill, Second Manassas, Sharpsburg, and Gettysburg.[17]

The majority of Texans who enrolled in the Confederate army were in their early twenties. The median age of privates in Sibley's Brigade, for example, was 22 years at the time of enlistment. The three young-

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"Message of Edward Clark to the Texas Senate and House of Representatives," Nov. 1, 1861, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), Series IV, Vol I, 716. (This work is cited hereafter as *Official Records*.)

[16]Oates, *Confederate Cavalry*, 5–29; J. K. P. Blackburn, "Reminiscences of the Terry Rangers," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXII (July, 1918), 41–42; Oates, "Recruiting Confederate Cavalry in Texas," ibid., LXIV (Apr., 1961), 463–477. For the story of Sibley's Brigade, see the following works by Martin Hardwick Hall: "The Formation of Sibley's Brigade and the March to New Mexico," ibid., LXI (Jan., 1958), 383–405; *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign* (Austin, 1960); and *The Confederate Army of New Mexico* (Austin, 1978). An independent company was one that did not form part of an organized battalion.

[17]The Eighteenth Georgia Infantry Regiment joined the three Texas regiments to form the brigade. J. B. Polley, *Hood's Texas Brigade: Its Marches, Its Battles, Its Achievements* (New York, 1910), 13. Polley, *Hood's Texas Brigade*, Mrs. A. V. Winkler, *The Confederate Capital and Hood's Texas Brigade* (Austin, 1894), and Donald E. Everett (ed.), *Chaplain Davis and Hood's Texas Brigade* (San Antonio, 1962), are the standard older accounts of the Texas brigade. The definitive modern work is the multivolume series by Colonel Harold B. Simpson: *Hood's Texas Brigade: Lee's Grenadier Guard; Hood's Texas Brigade in Poetry and Song* (Waco, Tex., 1968); *Hood's Texas Brigade in Reunion and Memory* (Waco, Tex., 1974); and *Hood's Texas Brigade: A Compendium* (Waco, Tex., 1977).

est privates of the brigade were J. D. Adams, B. F. Edens, and R. H. Horn, all age 16. R. J. Hill, age 59 years, was the oldest private in the brigade.[18]

Noncommissioned and commissioned officers were slightly older. The median age for 240 noncommissioned officers in Sibley's Brigade was 26 years, while that for the commissioned officers was 27 years. The brigade's youngest noncommissioned officer was First Corporal Edward A. Leach, age 17, a member of K Company, Fifth Cavalry. Oldest noncommissioned officers were sergeants E. S. R. Patton and Charles Pate, both age 57. Joseph D. Sayers, age 19 years, staff officer in the Fifth Cavalry and future governor of Texas, was the youngest commissioned officer in the brigade. G. W. Eaton, second lieutenant, Seventh Texas Cavalry, age 56 years, was the oldest commissioned officer.[19]

Muster rolls indicate the majority of soldiers in other units were similar in age, if slightly older, to those in Sibley's Brigade. Median age for the 304 privates in Hood's Brigade whose ages were listed on muster rolls was 24 years. For 396 privates in Edward Waller's Thirteenth Texas Cavalry Battalion it was 25 years. Again, officers were generally older than privates.[20]

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[18]This information is based upon a study of ages in muster rolls of First, Fourth, and Fifth regiments as given in Hall, *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign*, 236–317.

The age breakdown for privates in the brigade was as follows:

Age	Number
Under 20	483
20–24	828
25–29	325
30–35	171
Over 35	77
	1,884

[19]Ibid.

[20]These figures and conclusions are based upon muster rolls given in Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: A Compendium*, 10–250; Spurlin (ed.), *West of the Mississippi*, 66–92. The median enlistment ages here are similar to the 23-year median enlistment age for the post-Civil War army. See Don Rickey, Jr., *Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars* (Norman, 1963), 17. Median ages of 23–25 years were found for Texas Confederates in Captain J. Duff Brown's Company of Thomas N. Waul's Legion, Captain Augustus C. Allen's Company of Richard Waterhouse's Regiment, Captain Edward M. Alexander's Company of Henry E. McCulloch's Regiment, Captain William H. Christian's Company of Oran M. Roberts' Regiment, and Captain Hiram S. Childress's Company of Nicholas H. Darnell's Regiment. See the muster rolls for these companies in the Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin. Jerry Don Thompson, *Vaqueros in Blue & Gray* (Austin, 1976), 7, reports that the average age for Mexican American soldiers in the Civil War was 28 years.

In the early days of the war the army discharged many soldiers for being under or over the regulation age limits of eighteen and thirty-five. A. B. Blocker, who enlisted as a bugler in the Third Cavalry at the age of sixteen, reported that the army discharged him and two others in 1862 for being too young. A fourth man was discharged at the same time for being over thirty-five. Harold B. Simpson notes that the First Texas Infantry released sixty-three men, including fifteen men in K Company alone, in the summer and fall of 1862 for being under or over age.[21]

Probably 80 percent of the Confederate soldiers from Texas were of English, Welsh, and Scottish stock, the majority being born in the southern United States. Even so, many other nationalities were represented in the ranks of Texas regiments. Harold Simpson estimates that 5.0 percent of the troops in Hood's Brigade were Germans, 4.4 percent were Irish, and 1.6 percent were French. He also notes that Jews, Mexicans, Dutch, Indians, and one Indian, Ike Batisse, served in Hood's regiments. Company F, First Texas Heavy Artillery Regiment, the unit that successfully defended Sabine Pass in 1863, was made up of Irishmen recruited in Houston. The Third Texas Infantry, mustered in South Texas, contained many Mexicans and Germans; its executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Augustus Buchel, was a native of the Rhineland. A career soldier, Buchel had also served in the Mexican and Crimean wars. He was commanding the First Texas Cavalry when killed at Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, in April, 1864.[22]

Although many Texas Germans opposed secession, large numbers of Germans served in Confederate units from Texas. Company G of the Fourth Texas Cavalry, Company B of the Seventh Texas Cavalry, and Company E of the First Texas Cavalry were almost entirely German. Waul's Legion, organized near Brenham in the summer of 1863 and commanded by Colonel Thomas N. Waul, had a sizeable number of Germans, as did also companies B and F of Terry's Rangers.[23]

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[21]Lale, "A. B. Blocker Narrative," Part III, *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, XV (No. 1), 22; Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: A Compendium*, 549. As the war continued, the age limits were expanded by Confederate conscription acts to cover men age seventeen through fifty.

[22]Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: A Compendium*, 547; Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, 1940), 193–194, 500–501; Andrew Forest Muir, "Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass," *Civil War History*, IV (Dec., 1958), 405–406, 417, 421–422.

[23]Hall, *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign*, 240–243, 249–251, 285–287; Lonn, *Foreigners in the Confederacy*, 124–126, 500–501.

Many of the Silesians who formed the tiny Polish colony in Texas preferred not to become involved in America's civil conflict. None of them owned slaves, and many had left Europe to avoid military conscription. Even so, a company commanded by Captain Joseph Kyrisk and known as the Panna Maria Grays was mustered for Confederate service in Karnes County. Other Silesians served with the Sixth Texas Infantry and the Twenty-fourth Texas Cavalry in the unsuccessful defense of Arkansas Post in 1863.[24]

Over 2,500 Mexican-Americans from Texas served in the Confederate army. Santos Benavides, former mayor of Laredo, was the best known of these Mexican Texans, or Tejanos, who wore the gray. Most of the men who served under Benavides, including his brothers Refugio and Christoval, were Tejanos recruited along the Rio Grande. The Third and Eighth Texas Infantry had large numbers of Tejanos.[25]

As noted above, at least one Indian, Ike Battise, was in Hood's Texas Brigade. Chief John Scott and nineteen Alabama braves served with the Twenty-fourth Texas Cavalry in Arkansas during 1862. Later in the war over one hundred Alabama Indians were organized into an unattached cavalry company; they operated flat-bottom boats transporting farm products on the Trinity River to Confederate forces stationed along the Gulf Coast.[26]

Although most of the Texans who marched off to war were farmers or the sons of farmers, almost every occupation was represented in the ranks, which comprised laborers, planters, merchants, mechanics, students, clerks, carpenters, blacksmiths, teachers, brickmasons, painters, shoemakers, tailors, overseers, and shopkeepers. Numerous physicians enlisted, oftentimes as private soldiers.[27] One Civil War veteran was struck by the number of lawyers in his regiment, particularly by the number who were officers:

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[24]Lonn, *Foreigners in the Confederacy*, 128; T. Lindsay Baker, *The First Polish Americans: Silesian Settlements in Texas* (College Station, Tex., 1979), 64–77. Baker notes that information on the Silesian participation in the Civil War is limited and scattered. He points out that the muster rolls for the Panna Maria Grays list only four Silesians.

[25]Thompson, *Vaqueros in Blue & Gray*, 5–6, 8, 17–23, 26–28, 45–49, 81; Thompson, "Mexican-Americans in the Civil War: The Battle of Valverde," *Texana*, X (No. 1, 1972), 1–19.

[26]Howard N. Martin, "Texas Redskins in Confederate Gray," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, LXX (Apr., 1967), 586–592.

[27]There were eleven physicians serving as privates in Hood's Brigade alone. Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: A Compendium*, 552.

Private (later Sergeant) Aaron Seymour (Williamson County), Company D, 30th Texas Cavalry Regiment. Courtesy Frank W. Latham.

Of the ten original captains who went to Virginia with the Fourth Texas Regiment in 1861, six of them were lawyers. . . . Of the thirty lieutenants, nearly one-third were lawyers. . . . Lawyers in war are like lawyers in peace, they go for all that's in sight. They held the best places in the army and they hold the best places in civil life. It's a mighty cold day when a lawyer gets left if chicken pie is on the bill of fare.[28]

With the passage of time, recruitment of soldiers became more difficult as the early enthusiasm for military service waned. Governor Edward Clark found meeting the repeated calls by Richmond authorities for additional troops to be a more serious problem each month. Passage of the first of several conscription laws by the Confederate Congress in April, 1862, momentarily gave impetus to volunteering, but, according to Bell Wiley, "it was of a spiritless sort, occasioned primarily by the desire of men subject to conscription to escape the odium attached to forced service." Clark's successors as governor, Francis R. Lubbock and Pendleton Murrah, found the task of enrolling soldiers even more difficult. Distaste for any form of military discipline and routine, the desire to remain at home with friends and loved ones, the possibility of obtaining occupational exemption or hiring a substitute, and a growing dissatisfaction with policies of the Confederate government were all factors that contributed to the problem of enrolling troops.[29]

Governor Francis R. Lubbock reported to the legislature in November, 1863, that the number of Texans who had shouldered arms for the Confederacy then numbered about ninety thousand. Because of duplications and errors in reporting, the exact number of Texans who served in the Confederate army is not likely to be ascertained. The 1860 federal census lists 92,145 white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years living in the state. In view of the fact that many Texans both younger and older than these ages served, and assuming a normal population growth during the next four years, Texas had a potential force of between 100,000 and 110,000 men to send to war.[30]

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[28]Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 48.

[29]Wiley, *Johnny Reb*, 124–125 (quotation); Fredericka Ann Meiners, "The Texas Governorship, 1861–1865: Biography of an Office" (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, 1975), 32–38, 45–47, 59–65, 104–105, 124–132, 135–138, 197–198, 226–230, 289–301.

[30]Clement A. Evans (ed.), *Confederate Military History* (12 vols.; Atlanta, 1899), XI, 141; Stephen B. Oates, "Texas Under the Secessionists," *Southwestern Historical Quarter-*

Soldiers recruited early in the war anxiously awaited combat and became impatient with the delays in getting into action. Captain James P. Douglas, of the Third Cavalry, wrote to his girl friend in October, 1861, "we will in all probability have a fight soon. The boys are manifesting great joy at the prospect of an engagement, as I write (8 o'clock P.M.) they are talking and laughing merrily, and singing war songs around me." Another Texan, Ralph J. Smith of the Second Infantry, reported in March, 1862, that "after months of impatient waiting we were ordered to the front. At last a thousand hearts beat happily."[31]

Texans reacted to their first taste of battle in a variety of ways. George Lee Robertson, a corporal in Hood's Brigade, who participated in the Seven Days Battles around Richmond in the summer of 1862, was pleased that the fighting had not frightened him. "Well Ma," he wrote on July 12, "this is the third battle I have been in and have not yet been scared, which has surprised *me* very much." William A. Fletcher admitted that when he first went into battle he was suffering from diarrhea and "had quite a great fear that something disgraceful might happen . . . but to my surprise the excitement, or something else, had effected a cure." Ralph Smith remembered his first combat at Shiloh as being very confusing. "In great battles with thousands on each side, especially privates, are like little screws in the wheel of a giant machine," he wrote. "All I remember for the first few minutes after was a terrible noise[,] great smoke, incessant rattling of small arms, infernal confusion and then I realized that the whole line of the enemy was in disorderly retreat."[32]

The brutalities of war drew comment from some Texans. After the battle of Wilson's Creek in Missouri in August, 1861, John J. Good wrote his wife, "men ride over the Battlefield and laugh at what would once shock them. . . ." W. W. Heartsill, of the Lane Rangers, remembered that during maneuvers on the night following the first day of

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ly, LXVII (Oct., 1963), 187. Robert P. Felgar, "Texas in the War for Southern Independence, 1861–1865" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1935), 106, estimates that only fifty to sixty thousand Texans served in the Confederate army.

[31]Lucia Rutherford Douglas (comp. and ed.), *Douglas's Texas Battery, CSA* (Tyler, Tex., 1966), 12 (first quotation); Smith, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, 2 (second quotation).

[32]Robertson to mother, July 12, 1862, George Lee Robertson Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin); Fletcher, *Rebel Private, Front and Rear*, 16; Smith, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, 3.

fighting at Chickamauga, the Confederates "literally walked on dead men all night," and that, while the camp fires flickered rays over the battlefield, "the scene [looked] horrible, hundreds of ghastly corpse[s] mangled and torn. . . ."[33]

Val C. Giles of the Fourth Infantry confessed that he was frightened when called upon to perform picket duty following the battle of Gaines' Mill in 1862. The thought of the dead bodies of comrades who had fallen in the swamp that afternoon haunted Giles:

> As I stood in the gloomy solitude of the Chickahominy swamp that night I spied the biggest ghost I had ever seen before. I saw it rise up slowly out of the sluggish marsh not larger than a two-months-old calf at first, but the thing gradually grew broader, taller and whiter, until it looked to me as big as a box-car and high as a telegraph pole.[34]

Only later did he learn that the "ghost" that rose from the Chickahominy was the soft, pale light of phosphoric gases rising from the swamp.[35]

Troops from Texas played major roles in all of the great battles in Virginia and Maryland during 1862. The Fourth Texas Infantry of Hood's Texas Brigade led the assault at Gaines' Mill in the Seven Days fighting around Richmond in June and July; the Fifth Texas Infantry overran the enemy flank at Second Manassas and forced John Pope's army to retreat toward Washington in late August; and the First Texas Infantry drove Union forces back through the cornfield at Sharpsburg on the morning of September 17, thus blunting the main Union assault. In the latter action, the First Texas sustained casualties of 82.3 percent, the highest of any regiment in a single day of the Civil War. The entire Texas Brigade suffered 516 casualties at Sharpsburg, a loss of over 60 percent.[36]

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[33]Lester Newton Fitzhugh (comp. and ed.), *Cannon Smoke: The Letters of Captain John J. Good, Good-Douglas Texas Battery, CSA* (Hillsboro, Tex., 1971), 58; Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days*, 153.

[34]Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 105–106 (quotation). For another Texan's description of the aftermath of Gaines' Mill see Andrew N. Erskine to his wife, June 26, 1862, Andrew Nelson Erskine Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

[35]Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 106.

[36]Everett (ed.), *Chaplain Davis*, 82–83, 112; J[ohn] Bell Hood, *Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate Armies* (New Orleans, 1880), 25–26, 34–36, 40–44; J. M. Polk, "Memories of a Lost Cause," *Texas Military History*, II (Feb., 1962), 23–27; "Report of Brig. Gen. John B. Hood. . . ," *Official Records*, Series I, Vol. XI, Pt. 2, pp. 568–569; reports nos. 152–155, ibid., Vol. XII, Pt. 2, pp. 611–622; "Report of Brig. Gen. John B. Hood . . . ," ibid., Vol. XIX, Pt. 1, pp. 922–925; reports nos.

For some Texas soldiers taken as prisoners of war, grim conditions made the months of imprisonment a nightmare. Captured soldiers complained of disease, cold, poor food, malnutrition, inadequate clothing, and harsh prison guards. Decimus et Ultimus Barziza, a captain in the Fourth Texas Infantry captured at Gettysburg, was confined on Johnson's Island in Sandusky Bay of Lake Erie. In his account of his experiences, Barziza described bad food at the camp:

> Our rations were very scanty, and those who were so unfortunate as not to have friends and acquaintances in the North, often went to bed hungry. They pretended to issue us meat, sugar, coffee, rice, hominy, or peas, and candles; but this long array was only for appearance sake. . . . The hominy or rice they occasionally gave us was almost invariably musty and half-spoilt, while the apology for coffee was very unwholesome.[37]

Captain Samuel T. Foster of the Twenty-fourth Texas Cavalry, while admitting that "we get plenty to eat," complained that prisoners at Camp Chase, at Columbus, Ohio, were "treated just like so many beasts—we are never spoken to except when a guard hollows out after 8 Oclock 'Lights Out'." Val Giles, captured near the Tennessee River in October, 1863, spent twelve months confinement at Camp Morton, Indiana. Giles remembered that prisoners who tried to escape or bribe a guard were either "bucked and gagged" or swung up by the thumbs. Failure to obey prison rules resulted in a ride on "Morgan's Mule," a narrow piece of oak lumber placed on a twelve-foot-high pole, or a forced march up and down in front of the guard house while carrying forty pounds of wood on one's shoulders.[38]

Not all the memories that Texans had of prison camp were bad. Barziza noted that prisoners at Johnson's Island had debating societies, a band, daily religious exercises, and a "good" hospital. Writing, card-playing, and gambling were all favorite pastimes for the Johnson's

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249–255, ibid., 925–937. The casualty figure of 516 is from the casualty report of the Army of Northern Virginia, ibid., 811.

[37]Decimus et Ultimus Barziza, *The Adventures of a Prisoner of War, 1863–1864*, ed. R. Henderson Shuffler (Austin, 1964), 77. Newton Keen complained that prisoners at Camp Douglas "were hardly half fed." Billingsley (ed.), "Confederate Memoirs of Newton Asbury Keen," 180.

[38]Norman D. Brown (ed.), *One of Cleburne's Command: The Civil War Reminiscences and Diary of Capt. Samuel T. Foster, Granbury's Texas Brigade, CSA* (Austin, 1980), 30. Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 224–229. For another description of prison conditions and "Morgan's Mule," see William Clyde Billingsley (ed.), "Such is War: The Confederate Memoirs of Newton Asbury Keen," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, VII (Fall, 1968), 176–186.

Private James J. Smith (Leon County), Company E, "Dixie Blues," 5th Texas Infantry Regiment, Hood's Texas Brigade, Army of Northern Virginia. Courtesy L. E. Smith.

Island prisoners. Lieutenant Robert J. Brailsford and his prison messmates of the Twenty-seventh Texas Cavalry organized a club at Camp Chase in which they had some "enlivening debates." Julius Giesecke, a Texas German taken prisoner in Louisiana, "met a really nice Yankee Doctor who fed us almost all night with crackers, butter, whiskey and his political views." Benjamin M. Seaton, one of the men imprisoned at Camp Douglas, noted that members of his regiment suffered a good deal but "wer treated tolerable well[;] about as well as we cold exspect prisners of war to be treated." Henry C. Wright, taken during Sibley's retreat in New Mexico, was given almost total freedom and plentiful supplies, including coffee and sugar.[39]

Many regiments from Texas lacked discipline. Officers frequently could do little to control the fierce individualism of their troops, especially those in the cavalry. Leonidas B. Giles admitted that discipline in Terry's Rangers was lax: "if there was any serious attempt to discipline [the regiment,] the effort was soon abandoned." "Volunteers we began," he noted, "volunteers we remained to the end. If any wished to evade duty, they found a way, and the punishment for evasion was light." On one occasion, Colonel John A. Wharton, who became regimental commander after the deaths of Colonel Terry and Colonel Thomas S. Lubbock, ordered an enlisted man to drive a team of mules. Even though the soldier had been chosen for the assignment by drawing lots, he refused to do so and informed Wharton, "you may punish me as much as you want to, but I am not going to drive that wagon." To resolve the impasse a volunteer was hired to do the work for fifty dollars a month.[40] On another occasion, Private Isaac Dunbar Affleck, son of wealthy Washington County planter and agricultural reformer Thomas Affleck, was assigned by his captain to chop wood but refused to do so, allowing his slave, Alex, to perform the task in his stead.[41]

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[39]Barziza, *The Adventures of a Prisoner of War*, 82–83, 98 (first quotation); Edna White, "Mess at Camp Chase," *East Texas Historical Journal*, VI (Oct., 1968), 126 (second quotation); Oscar Haas (trans.), "Diary of Julius Giesecke, 1863–1865," *Texas Military History*, IV (Spring, 1964), 29; Harold B. Simpson (ed.), *The Bugle Softly Blows: The Confederate Diary of Benjamin M. Seaton* (Waco, Tex., 1965), 32; H. C. Wright Reminiscences, 22–23 (Archives, University of Texas, Austin).

[40]Giles, *Terry's Texas Rangers*, 100; Jeffries, *Terry's Rangers*, 56–57.

[41]Affleck to Mrs. Thomas Affleck, Oct. 18, 1864, I. D. Affleck Papers, in possession of Mr. Thomas D. Affleck, Jr., of Galveston. Like a number of southern aristocrats, Affleck had the services of a slave throughout the war. Alex, mentioned here, was the successor to a slave named Henry, who had replaced an older slave named Perry. For other examples of Texas soldiers who had slave servants see Robert W. Glover (ed.), *"Tyler to*

Commanders could, however, mete out punishment if they believed the occasion demanded it. For striking an officer, a private in Sibley's Brigade was forced to walk behind the baggage train tied with heavy irons for a month. A soldier in the Third Texas Cavalry was punished by having his head shaved, the word "thief" posted on his back, and being marched through camp to the tune of the "Rogue's March."[42]

Deserters received the most severe form of punishment, death by a firing squad. Although enthusiasm for the war had been high among Texans in the early part of the war, various factors, including dissatisfaction with military discipline, inadequate pay and rations, concern for families at home, increasing disillusionment over military failures, and sometimes cowardice, led to a steady increase in the number of soldiers who left the army. By the end of the war, 4,664 Texans were listed as deserters, many of them living in the woods and brush of North Texas.[43]

Military authorities believed the execution of captured deserters before their comrades in arms served as a warning to soldiers who might be inclined to leave their units. The soldiers themselves had mixed feelings, some believing the executions necessary, others considering them cruel and unjust. Benjamin Seaton, of the Tenth Infantry, described such a "sad occurance [*sic*]" in August, 1862, when four men were executed before the entire brigade near Little Rock. Seaton believed that "it has to be done," but lamented that "it is hard fer a man to be marched out in an old field and [be] shot." Private Jim Turner, of the Sixth Infantry, found such an execution of a deserter near Dalton, Georgia, to be "a horrible sight and seemed to us like a terrible butchery." Newton A. Keen of the Sixth Cavalry refused to watch the execution of three deserters from his regiment and argued

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Sharpsburg": The War Letters of Robert H. and William H. Gaston (Waco, Tex., 1960), 5; Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: A Compendium*, 548; David B. Gracy, II, "With Danger and Honor," *Texana*, I (Spring, 1963), 124; and Bob Hill to sister, Dec. 8, 1862, John W. Hill Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

42W. Randolph Howell diary, Nov. 18, 1861, W. Randolph Howell Papers (Archives, University of Texas, Austin); William A. Faulkner, "With Sibley in New Mexico: The Journal of William Henry Smith," *West Texas Historical Association Year Book*, XXVII (Oct., 1951), 116; Douglas (comp. and ed.), *Douglas's Texas Battery*, 10; Fitzhugh (ed.), *Cannon Smoke*, 84.

43Ella Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War* (1928; reprint ed., Gloucester, Mass., 1966), 71, 89, 231; Robert S. Weddle, *Plow-Horse Cavalry: The Caney Creek Boys of the Thirty-fourth Texas* (Austin, 1974), 97–100; Sam Farrow to wife Josephine, July 30, 1863, Sam W. Farrow Papers (Archives, University of Texas, Austin).

that there would be fewer desertions if the officers performed their duties better.[44]

The desertions, however, embarrassed some Texans. George L. Griscom, adjutant in the Ninth Texas Cavalry, wrote in his diary on September 5, 1863, that there was "a general depression of feeling in the reg't in regard to the late disgraceful doings of the boys that left us." In writing to his father, James Monroe Watson declared, "I never want you to feed a deserter nor a playout. . . . I think the citizens ought to drive all of the sulkers and playouts to the front."[45]

Many of the soldiers criticized their officers. Robert H. Gaston, a member of the First Texas Infantry, wrote to his sister early in the war to report that the brigade commander, Louis T. Wigfall, "has one great fault. He loves whiskey too well. He has been drunk several times since we came here." Similarly, William Henry Smith, a private in Sibley's Brigade, complained that the field officers of the brigade were "drunk all the time, unfit for duty—incompetent to attend to their duty." Another member of the brigade, James Franklin Starr, noted that "among the soldiers I hear ridicule and curses heaped upon the head of our genl. They call him a coward, which appears very plausible too. . . ."[46]

Newton Keen was critical of most of the officers in the Sixth Texas Cavalry. Of Captain J. S. Porter, Keen wrote, "He was an ignorant old goose not having sense enough to command pigs, much less soldiers." Robert Hodges, Jr., a sergeant in the Eighth Texas Cavalry, criticized his officers: "I think that Col. Terry is pursuing a very unwise course," Hodges reported, "in fact I think he has acted the saphead ever since he left home." When Terry was killed two weeks later at Woodson-

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[44]Simpson (ed.), *Bugle Softly Blows*, 18–19 (second, third, and fourth quotations); Turner, "Co. G, 6th Texas Infantry," 169; Billingsley (ed.), "Confederate Memoirs of Newton Asbury Keen," 50.

[45]Homer L. Kerr (ed.), *Fighting with Ross' Texas Cavalry Brigade, C.S.A.: The Diary of George L. Griscom, Adjutant, 9th Texas Cavalry Regiment* (Hillsboro, Tex., 1976), 81; Judy Watson McClure, *Confederate from East Texas: The Civil War Letters of James Monroe Watson* (Quanah, Tex., 1976), 31. Similarly, A. Lafayette Orr of the Twelfth Texas Cavalry complained in a letter to his brothers about girls at home showing favors to cowards and deserters. John Q. Anderson (ed.), *Campaigning with Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade, CSA: The War Journals and Letters of the Four Orr Brothers, 12th Texas Cavalry Regiment* (Hillsboro, Tex., 1967), 136.

[46]Glover (ed.), "*Tyler to Sharpsburg*," 6 (first quotation); Faulkner, "With Sibley in New Mexico," 137 (second quotation); David B. Gracy, II (ed.), "New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr, 1861–1862," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, IV (Fall, 1964), 182.

ville, Kentucky, however, Hodges referred to him as "our gallant and beloved leader Col. Terry."[47]

Some officers were popular with their men. John Bell Hood, who commanded the Texas Brigade in its early days, was generally well regarded by the Texans who served with him in Virginia, although they often chided him. When Hood ordered one soldier, Bill Calhoun, to leave a warm fire and rejoin his unit, he told Calhoun, "I don't know why you are loitering here, so far behind your command." Calhoun replied: "Yes, and what you don't know, General Hood, would make a mighty damned big book."[48]

Hood was not so well liked by Texans serving in the western armies. When he was appointed to replace the popular Joseph E. Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee, most Texans in that army were highly critical. Samuel Alonza Cooke declared that the appointment of Hood "threw a damper on our army and most of us felt it was a death stroke to our entire army." Another Texan, Newton Keen, believed that as long as Johnston was in command things went well, but "when the army was put under hood [*sic*] all things went wrong." Samuel T. Foster, of Hiram B. Granbury's Brigade, argued that "Genl Joe Johnson [*sic*] has more military sense in one day than Hood ever did or ever will have."[49]

All Texas soldiers seemed to dislike Braxton Bragg. W. W. Heartsill believed, "if Genl [Joseph E.] Johnston (as reported) is in command; then we have no fears, if however Bragg is maneuvering; then we will not be surprised to wake up one of these September mornings and find the entire Army at or near Atlanta instead of Nashville as we all so much desired." Another Texan, Robert F. Bunting, claimed that Bragg was "universally cursed" and "out-generaled in every sense of the word."[50]

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[47]Billingsley (ed.), "Confederate Memoirs of Newton Asbury Keen," 112; Maury Darst, "Robert Hodges, Jr.: Confederate Soldier," *East Texas Historical Journal*, IX (Mar., 1971), 26 (second and third quotations), 28 (fourth quotation).

[48]Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 119, 120 (quotations).

[49]Bill O'Neal (ed.), "The Civil War Memoirs of Samuel Alonza Cooke," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, LXXIV (Apr., 1971), 543; Billingsley (ed.), "Confederate Memoirs of Newton Asbury Keen," 104, 105 (second quotation), 112; Brown (ed.), *One of Cleburne's Command*, 159 (third quotation).

[50]Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days*, 147; Bunting to "Editor Telegraph," July 7, 1863, Robert Franklin Bunting Papers (typed transcript; Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin. This letter was published in the Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph* on Aug. 19, 1863.)



Private William R. Smith (Leon County), Company D, 4th Texas Infantry Regiment, Hood's Texas Brigade, Army of Northern Virginia. Courtesy L.E. Smith.

Soldiers who spent the war in Texas had mixed reactions to their officers. Earl Van Dorn, who commanded the district of Texas in the early months of the war, was first viewed with suspicion but soon won his men's support. Texans regarded his replacement as district commander, Paul Octave Hébert, "as a man of no military force or practical genius. . . ." The loss of Galveston to a Union naval force in early October, 1862, assured his unpopularity with Confederate Texans, who demanded that he be replaced with a more aggressive commander. Hébert's successor, John Bankhead Magruder, was a Virginian with a better reputation. Most soldiers agreed with Colonel John S. ("Rip") Ford, himself a highly respected officer, that "the advent of General Magruder was equal to the addition of 50,000 men to the forces of Texas."[51]

On occasion Texans admitted that their first impression of an officer was incorrect. When Camille Armand Jules Marie, Prince de Polignac, a French aristocrat, was appointed commander of a consolidated brigade of Texas infantry and dismounted cavalry in Louisiana, the Texans were furious. They protested to the district commander, General Richard Taylor, and threatened not to serve under Polignac. Taylor reminded the officers and men of their duty and promised that he would remove the Frenchman if the Texans remained dissatisfied after their first military action under his command. The troops were skeptical but agreed to give Polignac a try. In subsequent battles at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill he won their respect and admiration as a courageous soldier, whom they came to regard affectionately as their "Polecat."[52]

While Texans might be divided in their attitudes toward commanding officers, their diaries and letters reflect close agreement in their contempt for the enemy. Decimus et Ultimus Barziza, who spent many months in a federal prison camp, characterized northerners as "a peculiar people," who "are extremely bigoted, and actually bloated with

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[51]Thomas North, *Five Years in Texas; or, What You Did Not Hear during the War from January, 1861, to January, 1866* (Cincinnati, 1871), 105 (first quotation), 106; Oates "Texas Under the Secessionists," 194–195; John Salmon Ford, *Rip Ford's Texas*, ed. Stephen B. Oates (Austin, 1963), 343 (third quotation).

[52]Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War*, ed. Richard B. Harwell (1879; reprint ed., New York, 1955), 150–151; Alwyn Barr, *Polignac's Texas Brigade* (Houston, 1964), 29 (quotation), 30–54; "Incidents of Banks's Campaign: Mansfield and Pleasant Hill (April, 1864)," Augustus M. Hill Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

self-love." He considered them to be "agitators and schemers, braggarts and deceivers, swindlers and extortioners," who yet pretended to "godliness, truth, purity, and humanity." Nicholas A. Davis, a chaplain in Hood's Brigade, believed northerners to be "meddlesome, impudent, insolent, pompous, boastful, unkind, ungrateful, unjust, knavish, false, deceitful, cowardly, swindling, thieving, robbing, brutal and murderous." John Truss, a young soldier from Bastrop who served with the Twelfth Texas Cavalry, complained that Union soldiers in Arkansas "cannot stand up and fight us with even numbers like men of honor," but preferred to "lay in the bushes five times our number," and "if they by accident get the upperhand of one of our men . . . will then shoot him, murder him in cold blood." Truss concluded that enemy soldiers were "the lowest down men in the world. There is nothing to [*sic*] mean for them to do."[53]

Some men were convinced that the enemy would go to any length to defeat the South. Samuel A. Cooke, captured at Arkansas Post, believed that Union authorities deliberately put together on the same transport boats captured Confederates and northern troops who had smallpox, in order to infect as many southerners as possible. Captain James Douglas, of the Third Cavalry, reported that three patients died in the Van Buren, Arkansas, hospital from poison quinine, which "was brought from Memphis, and I understand, smuggled in there from the North, which shows the cannibal spirit of our enemies who are willing to resort to savage means of destroying us with poison."[54]

Texans resented the use of black troops by the Union government. Sergeant D. H. Hamilton, of the First Texas Infantry, reported that an attack by a black regiment determined the Texans to hold their position. In repulsing the enemy assault, the Texans, according to Hamilton, "killed in [their] front about a million dollars worth of niggers, at current prices." Many Texas soldiers believed that blacks should not be taken as prisoners of war. Dunbar Affleck declared that

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[53]Barziza, *The Adventures of a Prisoner of War*, 59 (first and second quotations), 60 (third and fourth quotations); Everett (ed.), *Chaplain Davis*, 147; Johnette Highsmith Ray (ed.), "Civil War Letters from Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, LXIX (Oct., 1965), 218 (sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth quotations).

[54]O'Neal (ed.), "Civil War Memoirs of Samuel Alonza Cooke," 538; Douglas (comp. and ed.), *Douglas's Texas Battery*, 30. Northern soldiers apparently had a more ambivalent view of their southern foe. While some expressed hatred for the enemy, others admired the character of Confederate soldiers. See Bell Irvin Wiley, *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union* (Indianapolis, 1952), 346–353.

if Terry's Rangers came into contact with such troops, they intended "to hoist the black flag and give no quarter."[55] George W. Littlefield, also with the Rangers, stated that when he and his comrades learned they might be fighting black soldiers, "all of our command determined if we were put to a fight there to kill all we captured."[56]

Texans who served in New Mexico or along the Rio Grande were often critical of the Mexican and Indian populations. James Franklin Starr, a member of the Fourth Texas Cavalry, believed the inhabitants of New Mexico were "universally a low, ignorant, degraded race." James H. Kuykendall, who served along the Rio Grande, considered the Indians "simple, yet, barbarious, children of nature," but regarded the Mexican Texans as lazy, stupid, and ignorant. A classic example of nineteenth-century Texas racial prejudice was penned by George L. Robertson. Stationed in South Texas, Robertson complained to his sister that of "all the contemptable, despicable people on earth the greasers in my estimation are the lowest, meaner even than the Commanche [*sic*]." The Mexican Texans, he believed, "are ugly, thieving, rascally, in every way and to be educated only makes a greaser the grander rascal."[57]

Food, clothing, and shelter were subjects of concern to all Civil War soldiers. Here again, Texan recollections and comments varied greatly. Andrew J. Fogle, a member of the Ninth Texas Infantry, complained bitterly about the lack of variety in his diet. "[W]e hafto live li[k]e dogs," he wrote in the fall of 1863. "[W]e get nothing but a litle beefe and corn [m]eal and that is [a] very unp[l]esent dish to me[.] I have [h]erd it sed that a man can get usto any thing but I never will get usto living on beef and corn bred." Another Texan, Private William M. Oden, expressed the age-old grievance of enlisted men that the officers

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55D. H. Hamilton, *History of Company M, First Texas Volunteer Infantry, Hood's Brigade, Longstreet's Corps, Army of the Confederate States of America* (Waco, Tex., 1962), 61, 62 (quotation); Affleck to Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Affleck, Mar. 25, 1863, Affleck Letters.

56Gracy, "With Danger and Honor," 139–140. Tacitus T. Clay, on the other hand, pitied the blacks who were serving in the Union army. Judy Winfield and Nath Winfield, *War Letters of Captain Tacitus T. Clay, C.S.A.* (Chappell Hill, Tex., 1968), 8. Another Texan, Major Maurice K. Simons, captured at Vicksburg, was shocked at the sight of white Union soldiers saluting black guards at Vicksburg. Walter H. Mays, "The Vicksburg Diary of M. K. Simons, 1863," *Texas Military History*, V (Spring, 1965), 36.

57Gracy (ed.), "New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr," 184; James Kuykendall journal, 1862 (Book XII), 12–16, 92 (quotation), James H. Kuykendall Collection (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin); Robertson to sister, Mar. 26, 1864, Robertson Papers.

were fed well while the troops received nothing. "I wish to god that evry officer in all the confederate states had to starve about five or six days then they would know how to fed the soldiers and I think they would know how we feal on the subject," Oden wrote his wife. James Melville Foster, a trooper in the Thirty-second Texas Cavalry, reported that his regiment was frequently near starvation while on patrol in Louisiana.[58]

Other soldiers found food more plentiful. Harvey C. Medford, a private in Lane's Rangers, serving in Texas and Louisiana in 1864, listed beefsteak, bacon, pork, bread, molasses, coffee, cornbread, biscuits, corn fritters, and oysters as part of his camp fare, which he supplemented by eating in restaurants, hotels, and private homes. Dunbar Affleck, stationed in East Texas late in the war, reported that "we live high here, we are feasting all the time."[59]

Many Texas soldiers supplemented their camp fare by dining with citizens who were willing to open their homes to boys in gray. During his two years' duty in Louisiana, H. C. Wright, a young soldier from Polk County, always found a welcome even though local residents frequently had little to spare. George W. O'Brien, of Beaumont, apparently intended to take half-a-dozen chickens from residents of Ville Platte, Louisiana, but, "having had paraded before our eyes the ghosts of poverty and dead husbands," settled for a dinner of eggs and yams, followed by a smoke, rum, and a game of billiards.[60]

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[58]Andrew J. Fogle to Miss Lou Harris, Oct. 18, 1863, Andrew J. Fogle Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin. The quotation is taken from the original letter rather than from the typed transcript, which contains some errors.); William M. Oden to wife, Oct. 6, 1862, William M. Oden Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin); Carl Duaine, *The Dead Men Wore Boots: An Account of the 32nd Texas Volunteer Cavalry, CSA, 1862–1865* (Austin, 1966), 90.

[59]Rebecca W. Smith and Marion Mullins (eds.), "Diary of H. C. Medford, Confederate Soldier, 1864," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, XXXIV (Oct., 1930), 114–117, 119, 121–122, 129, 136–137; Affleck to Mrs. Thomas Affleck, Feb. 5, 1865, Affleck Letters. For other examples of the abundance of food see W. B. Hunter to sister Mary, Oct. 11, 1863, Mary J. Minor Letters (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin); John Thomas Duncan (ed.), "Some Civil War Letters of D. Port Smythe," *West Texas Historical Association Year Book*, XXXVII (Oct., 1961), 157; and Elvis E. Fleming (ed.), "A Young Confederate Stationed in Texas: The Letters of Joseph David Wilson, 1864–1865," *Texana*, VIII (No. 4, 1970), 353–354.

[60]H. C. Wright Reminiscences, 55–56; Cooper K. Ragan (ed.), "The Diary of Captain George W. O'Brien, 1863," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, LXVII (Jan., 1964), 414. Other examples of local hospitality are found in Duncan C. Carothers diary, May 30, 1863, pp. 23–24, Carothers Family Papers (Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin); [Ephraim Shelby Dodd], *Diary of Ephraim Shelby Dodd, Member of Company D, Terry's Texas Rangers, December 4, 1862–January 1, 1864* (Austin, 1914), 6.



Five members of the 8th Texas Cavalry Regiment (Terry's Texas Rangers). Courtesy Panhandle-Plains Historical Museum.

Most Texas Confederates proved better foragers than Captain O'Brien. Hogs and chickens were items particularly vulnerable to theft. Virgil S. Rabb explained the feeling of the soldiers: "the government tries to feed us Texians on Poor Beef, but there is too Dam many hogs here *for that,* these Arkansaw hoosiers ask from 25 to 30 cents a pound for there Pork, but the Boys generally get it a little *cheaper than that*[.] I reckon you understand how they get it."[61]

Members of Hood's Brigade had a special reputation as foragers. Even General Robert E. Lee recognized these talents, remarking to the brigade commander that "when you Texans come about the chickens have to roost mighty high." Chicken houses, pigpens, corncribs, and beehives were all targets. In the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863 these were supplemented by loaves of bread, chunks of corned beef, hams, bacon, jellies, pickles, jams, fresh butter, and milk "appropriated" from local farms.[62]

In their letters home, men frequently asked that some item of clothing be sent to them by whatever means available. Wiley F. Donathan wrote in October, 1863, that he needed socks, overshirts, pants, and a vest. Henry G. Orr, a member of the Twelfth Cavalry, wrote to his mother requesting heavy jeans, a well-lined overcoat, linsey or cotton overshirt, pants, slippers, and a pair of socks. The following year he requested the following items, to be divided between himself and his brother: two coats, two pairs of pants, four cotton shirts, two pairs of drawers, two woolen overcoats, and four pairs of socks.[63]

As the war continued, lack of suitable footwear became an increasingly serious concern for Texans, especially those serving in Tennessee and Virginia, where heavy snows and ice made conditions for men without adequate footwear nearly intolerable. The problem became especially acute for Texans in Hood's Brigade during the 1863–1864 winter campaign in East Tennessee. Many of the men, with no shoes at all, left bloody prints in the snow wherever they marched. Others were shod in "Longstreet moccasins," named for James Longstreet, the

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[61]Rabb to brother, Jan. 4, 1863, Mary Rabb Family Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

[62]Hood, *Advance and Retreat,* 51 (first quotation); Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: Lee's Grenadier Guard,* 209, 210, 253–256, 259–261; Polley, *Hood's Texas Brigade,* 148; Hamilton, *History of Company M,* 45, 47–48, 51–52.

[63]Donathan to "My Dear Sir," Oct. 30, 1863, Wiley F. Donathan Family Correspondence (Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin); Anderson (ed.), *Campaigning with Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade,* 71, 118.

corps commander. Longstreet encouraged the men to make footwear by cutting green rawhide into the shape of a shoe and then tying it to the foot with a rawhide string. The moccasins were not comfortable because the rawhide shrunk when it dried, thus pinching the foot.[64]

Some Texans took shoes and other items from dead Union soldiers. John Good reported that the troops in his command deliberately aimed at an enemy with the thought of securing his shoes or other clothes. William A. Fletcher frequently took needed supplies from dead Union soldiers. On one occasion he found several letters to the dead man from a sweetheart. Fletcher did not feel "one pang of regret for being a party to breaking up that match." She wanted me whipped," he noted, "she got that; I wanted dead Yankees—I got that."[65]

Soldiers stripping the dead of shoes and clothing sometimes received rude shocks. Jim Ferris, a soldier in the Fifth Texas Infantry, was attempting to remove the leggings from a fallen Union foe he assumed was dead. Suddenly the "dead man" said, "Great God alive, man! Don't rob me before I am dead, if you please!" Ferris stammered an apology, gave the wounded Yankee his canteen of water to keep, and proceeded to find another body—this time dead—from which he removed the desired leggings.[66]

Texans registered fewer complaints about their living quarters than about food and clothing. In the field, soldiers slept under their blankets out in the open, or, if the weather was severe, in ditches or low places to avoid the cold winds. In more permanent camps, squad tents and wooden huts provided shelter. One Texas soldier described his winter abode in Virginia to his mother:

> It is made [of] pickets chinked and dubbed with a tent fly for a roof. We have the best fire place and chimney in the company. The fire place is made of brick to above the Jam[b] and from there up *mud and sticks*. Our

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[64]All Confederates were affected by shortages of boots and shoes, but, as the Confederate troops most distant from their homes, Texans received fewer shoes and less clothing from their own state than did other Confederates. Simpson, *Hood's Texas Brigade: Lee's Grenadier Guard*, 184–185, 371–377; "Reports of Col. John C. Moore, Second Texas Infantry," Apr. 19, 1862, *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. X, Part 1, 560–563; Muster Roll, Capt. C. N. Alexander, Co. A, 7th Texas Infantry (Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin); Hamilton, *History of Company M*, 40–41.

[65]Fitzhugh (ed.), Cannon Smoke, 58; Fletcher, *Rebel Private, Front and Rear*, 75.

[66]J. B. Polley, *A Soldier's Letters to Charming Nellie* (New York, 1908), 78 (quotation), 79.

house is about 12 feet square . . . our guns are in racks on the walls; our utensils consist of one skillet[,] a stew kettle[,] a bread pan[,] a frying pan & a large kettle[.][67]

Many soldiers found the long hours of camp life quite dull. Robert Hodges believed camp life in Kentucky to be most unsatisfactory. "I myself am tired of lazing in camps and doing nothing," he wrote to a friend. "I'll tell you what's a fact. This soldiring [*sic*] is a poor business." A fellow Texan stationed near Galveston agreed. Noting the boredom, endless drills, and sickness in camp, he concluded he was "tired of the dull monotony of camp life."[68]

In an effort to overcome their burden, the troops turned to various forms of entertainment. Men from Hood's Brigade built a log theater in which they could see plays and listen to concerts. Some of the performers were amateurs recruited for Hood's Minstrels, others were professional entertainers. Similar theatrical performances were staged in other areas where large groups of soldiers were encamped.[69]

Sports flourished among the Texas troops. Townball (a form of baseball played with two rather than four bases), horse racing, footracing, wrestling, and jumping were all popular diversions. Snowball fighting was a new experience for many Texans. The first large encounter of this type for them occurred in Virginia shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg. A snowball battle began between two companies, then spread to the regimental, brigade, and division level. Soon, nearly ten thousand troops, including the Texans in Hood's Brigade, were involved. Similar snowball engagements occurred in the Army of Tennessee in the winter of 1863–1864.[70]

Reading was a source of relaxation for some Texas Confederates,

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[67]G. L. Robertson to his mother, Jan. 4, 1862, quoted in Wiley, *Johnny Reb*, 60–61. See also John Wesley Rabb to his mother, Jan. 11, 1865, Rabb Family Papers.

[68]Darst, "Robert Hodges, Jr.," 23; Letter from "Amicus," Bellville *Countryman*, Dec. 18, 1861 (third quotation). A similar view was expressed by J. D. Garland, a courier with the Second Texas Brigade, who wrote "I am perfectly disgusted with army life. It is so monotonous, nothing animating about it at all." Garland to sister, Feb. 25, 1864, J. D. Garland Letters (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

[69]Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 53; Polley, *Hood's Texas Brigade*, 139–140; Virgil S. Rabb to sister, Mar. 18, 1863, Rabb Family Papers.

[70]Desmond Pulaski Hopkins diary, Mar. 15, Apr. 1, 1862, Desmond Pulaski Hopkins Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin); Anderson (ed.), *Campaigning with Parsons' Cavalry Brigade*, 15; Fletcher, *Rebel Private, Front and Rear*, 52, 53; Polk, "Memories of a Lost Cause," 29; Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 167–172; Turner, "Co. G, 6th Texas Infantry," 170.

Private James A. Johnson (Van Zandt County), Company C, 20th Texas Cavalry Regiment. Courtesy James E. Johnson.

although reading matter was sometimes difficult to obtain. James P. Douglas, an artillery captain in the Third Texas Cavalry, expressed a keen literary interest in his letters. While serving in the trenches around Atlanta during 1864, Douglas read works of Shakespeare and Sir Walter Scott. Douglas particularly enjoyed Scott's poetry, and, in a letter written to his wife while Sherman battered at the gates of Atlanta, suggested that she would "fall in love with Ellen Douglas of 'The Lady of the Lake' and Lucy of 'The Bridal of Triermain'."[71]

While some men like Douglas dabbled in Shakespeare, most Texans found newspapers more suitable. Early in the war the W. P. Lane Rangers even printed their own newspaper, first the *Camp Hudson Times* and later, when they moved to Fort Lancaster, *The Western Pioneer*.[72] The vicissitudes of war and the lack of adequate facilities prevented most Texas units from duplicating this journalistic feat, however.

Many soldiers succumbed to the twin evils of gambling and excessive drinking. Diaries and letters of Civil War participants give numerous illustrations of Texas soldiers submitting to both temptations. Card playing was the most common form of gambling, but dice throwing and horse racing also proved popular. One Texas soldier, William ("Buck") Walton, related that Confederates even bet money on fights between lice which they had taken from their clothes and bodies.[73]

A notorious gambler's den flourished near Fredericksburg, Virginia, during the winter of 1862–1863, where thousands of dollars changed hands. A similar gambler's "paradise" was located at the foot of Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga in the fall of 1863. Here, in an area covering several acres, stood dozens of tents and brush arbors where soldiers congregated to engage in every imaginable form of chance.

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[71]Douglas (comp. and ed.), *Douglas's Texas Battery*, 101. For other comments on reading habits see William H. Neblett to Lizzie, Apr. 9, 1863, and Jan. 17, 1864, Lizzie Scott Neblett Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

[72]Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days*, 56–74. Camp Hudson was located near Del Rio, Texas, on San Pedro Creek, near Devil's River. Fort Lancaster, built by the United States government in the 1850s, was located on the Pecos River. Winsor, *Texas in the Confederacy*, 21, 23.

[73]Buck Walton, *An Epitome of My Life: Civil War Reminiscences* (Austin, 1965), 73–74. For a description of "louse fighting," see Wiley, *Johnny Reb*, 38–39. Wiley also describes "races" between lice, but we have found no mention of this in diaries and letters of Texas soldiers. Texas Confederates did have many comments on the lice themselves, or "gray backs" as they called them. See Fletcher, *Rebel Private, Front and Rear*, 9–10, 12–18; Hamilton, *History of Company M*, 39–40, 75.

Texans assigned to Bragg's army enjoyed the pleasures of this gamblers' haven until Grant's army overran the area in November of that year.[74]

Excessive consumption of alcohol was often a more serious problem than gambling. In gambling the individual soldier was the victim, but the consequences of heavy drinking could sometimes be far-reaching. Some of Terry's Rangers were involved in an altercation in Nashville in 1861 when, under the influence of alcohol, they fired off their pistols, causing a riot. Two policemen were killed and another wounded before the disturbance could be brought under control.[75]

Other Texans refused to be tempted by vice. Indeed, some men found the war a time of finding or renewing their spiritual faith. Religious revivals swept through the western Confederate armies in 1863 and 1864. R. F. Bunting, a minister in Terry's Rangers, noted that the revival movement was very strong in the camps of northern Georgia in 1863. Thirty-six men publicly professed their faith in Jesus, he reported, while many others renewed their religious vows. George W. Littlefield, serving in the western armies, at first remained skeptical of the revival movement, but by the end of summer, 1863, was himself involved and informed his wife that he intended to become a "changed man." Wiley Donathan, another Texan, reported that a great revival swept Joe Johnston's army in the spring of 1864. "I then solemnly resolved to seek the pardon of my sins and be a Christian," Donathan wrote.[76]

For many Texans the war provided the first opportunity to see something of the world outside of their own localities. Many were overwhelmed by what they saw. Robert Gaston from Tyler found that

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[74]Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 156–163; William Carothers to Mrs. S. C. Carothers, Mar. 6, 1863, Duncan C. Carothers Papers (Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin); A. E. Rentfrow to sister, Feb. 11, 1862, A. Henry Moss Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

[75]J[ames] K. P. Blackburn, *Reminiscences of the Terry Rangers* ([Austin], 1919), 10–11; Wiley, *Johnny Reb*, 50, notes that the "evil of illicit sexual indulgence, though admittedly common to every large army that history has known, is scantily treated in Confederate records." Although prostitution flourished in the larger cities of the Confederacy, especially Richmond, the authors have found no mention of the subject in diaries and letters of Texas Confederates.

[76]Bunting to "Editor Telegraph," June 3, Aug. 23, 1863, Bunting Papers. (These letters were published in the Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph* on July 15 and Sept. 30, 1863, respectively.); Gracy, "With Danger and Honor," 134; Kerr (ed.), *Ross' Texas Cavalry Brigade*, 80; W. F. Donathan to brother and sister, Apr. 2, June 4, 1864, Donathan Family Correspondence. For another expression of faith see Colonel William P. Rogers to wife, June 5, 1862, William P. Rogers Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

the city of New Orleans "presents many strange and curious sights to me. . . . The fine buildings, hundreds of drays, carriages etc. continually running the streets & the eternal hum of busy hundreds strike the stranger with astonishment."[77]

The beautiful mountains of Virginia and Tennessee deeply impressed most Texans who saw them. O. T. Hanks believed the view of the Blue Ridge and Cumberland mountains was "worth a good part of a Mans Life." Benjamin Seaton found the view from Lookout Mountain in Tennessee to surpass "in sublimity and grandeur anything we ever beheld."[78]

Not all Texas Confederates were impressed with the areas they saw, however. Lieutenant Flavius W. Perry, serving with the Seventeenth Cavalry near Arkansas Post, believed "this country was never made . . . for white people to live in, nothing but frogs and craw fish can live here long. . . ." Perry concluded, "I don't think the Yankeys would have it if they could get it."[79]

Many Texas soldiers were more interested in the local girls and women than in the scenery. Private Henry Smith of Sibley's Brigade was quite taken with the daughters of a local resident. "I have got to loving one of them, she is so pretty," he wrote. "I believe I will marry her & take her back home with me and show her to the homefolks."[80] While recovering from an injury, Stephen A. Bryan, member of a pioneer Texas family, was so impressed with the "beautiful & rich, accomplished & refined" young ladies of Rapides Parish, Louisiana, that he thought he might "return to this Parish to look for a fortune."[81] George W. Littlefield, in Tennessee, wrote to his fiancée back in Texas that he had found "the prettyest little woman here that is anywhere I know." While promising his fiancée that he would not forget her, Littlefield admitted that if she were to marry someone else, the

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[77]Glover (ed.), "*Tyler to Sharpsburg*," 4.

[78]Hanks, "History of B. F. Benton's Company," 12; Simpson (ed.), *Bugle Softly Blows*, 43 (second quotation).

[79]Joe R. Wise (ed.), "Letters of Lt. Flavius W. Perry, 17th Texas Cavalry, 1862–1863," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, XIII (No. 2), 27.

[80]Faulkner, "With Sibley in New Mexico," 140. Smith was not totally honest with his sweetheart back home, to whom he wrote at almost the same time: "Sweet girl I often think of you in these wild woods of New Mexico, where no friend is near, no kind female is near our camps to watch over us so tenderly as our girls did at Home." Ibid., 141.

[81]Bryan to James P. Bryan, Mar. 5, 1863, James Perry Bryan Papers (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

Private Henry D. Hart, Bate's Battalion, Texas Volunteers (also known as Bate's 4th Regiment and Brazoria Coast Regiment). Courtesy Museum of the Big Bend.

Tennessee belle would be his next choice, for "I am allmost tempted to love her."[82]

Confederate soldiers from Texas frequently complained that they were not receiving letters from loved ones at home. William T. Gibbons, serving with the Fourteenth Cavalry, wrote to his wife that "sometimes I almost conclude that you have forgotten that there is such a being on earth as myself[,] having writen [*sic*] & received no answers. . . ." In another letter to her he declared that he would pay fifty dollars for a letter from her at any time. Similarly, James M. Watson wrote to his father in August, 1863, that "it is disheartening to me to write for I haven't received but one letter from home since I left and it was dated May 2." "You don't know how bad I want to hear from home and to hear from the neighbors," he wrote.[83]

A letter from home meant more to Texas Confederates than almost anything else. Bluford Alexander Cameron thanked his family for sending him a packet of clothes but lamented that no letter accompanied the clothing. "I opened the Sack and commenced Searching the Pockets of evry article and expected in evry pocket I Searched to find a Letter," he wrote, "but I Searched through and through but alas found no letter. . . ."[84]

The mail service itself was often the reason soldiers did not hear from home as regularly as they wished. Colonel George W. Guess, with the Thirty-first Cavalry Regiment, expressed the soldier's view of the post office when he wrote, "I wish the cursed post office at Dallas with all the infernal meddlers with other peoples' business were sunk into the lowest depths of the bottomless pit, & you could get one that could be carried on properly & honestly."[85]

The unreliability of government mail service caused many soldiers to depend upon couriers riding from army camps back to Texas. These couriers consisted of soldiers on leave, haulers of military supplies,

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[82]Gracy, "With Danger and Honor," 14. In January, 1863, while home on leave, Littlefield married his Texas fiancée, Alice P. Tiller. For other examples of Texans' interest in the opposite sex, see Smith and Mullins (eds.), "Diary of H. C. Medford," 140; Samuel B. Barron, *Lone Star Defenders: A Chronicle of the Third Texas Cavalry, Ross' Brigade* (New York, 1908), 31; and E. J. Oden to sister, May 29, 1863, Oden Papers.

[83]William T. Gibbons to Mrs. A. A. Gibbons, Oct. 23 (first quotation), 30, 1863, W. T. Gibbons Letters (photostatic copies, Archives Division, Texas State Library, Austin); Watson, *Confederate from East Texas*, 17–18.

[84]J. S. Duncan (ed.), "Alexander Cameron in the Louisiana Campaign, 1863–1865," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, XIII (No. 1), 46.

[85]Guess to Sarah Horton Cockrell, Dec. 16, 1862, George W. Guess Letters (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

tradesmen, ministers, and those traveling on government business. From the army posts they carried letters to friends and relatives at home, souvenirs of various kinds, and items that were difficult to secure at home such as writing paper and envelopes. From home they brought letters, food, clothing, and items that relatives and friends believed would be helpful to the men in gray.[86]

The thought of going home was seldom out of the soldier's mind, but furloughs became increasingly difficult to obtain. "I thought I would get to come home before now," one Texas soldier wrote, "but a man has to be sick . . . or a mighty good hand at possum to get furloughs." John E. Brown believed that he "had just as well try to fly to Virginia as to apply for a furlough. . . ."[87]

Sick and wounded soldiers especially thought of home. "It is natural for all of [us] to want to be at Home Sweet Home," wrote one Texan. "A Soldier can put up with many hard things when health[y and] not murmer [*sic*] but let him get sick & then Home [Sweet] Home."[88]

Disease swept through Confederate armies early in the war. A variety of illnesses, including measles, mumps, malaria, diarrhea, colds, pneumonia, and bronchitis, affected the troops from Texas. At one time only 25 of 800 men in the Fifth Texas Infantry, camped near Richmond, were fully fit for duty. About half of the Fourth Texas was also on sick call at the same time. The rate of disease, especially measles and mumps, also ran high among Texas cavalry units stationed in Arkansas. Texas units serving in Louisiana suffered from a high incidence of malaria. Some cases of yellow fever were reported in Texas units stationed on the Gulf Coast.[89]

Medical care was poor in the early days of the Civil War. Most of

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[86]Weddle, *Plow-Horse Cavalry*, 129–137, provides an excellent description of the courier riders in Northeast Texas during this period.

[87]Ray (ed.), "Civil War Letters from Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade," 219–220 (first and second quotations); John E. Brown to father and mother, Feb. 16, 1863, John E. Brown Letters (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin). The men in the Fifth Texas Infantry even petitioned President Davis on the matter of additional furloughs, but to no avail. Elvis E. Fleming, "Some Hard Fighting: Letters of Private Robert T. Wilson, 5th Texas Infantry, Hood's Brigade, 1862–1864," *Texas Military History*, IX (No. 4, 1971), 297–298.

[88]Carothers diary, 42.

[89]Polley, *Hood's Texas Brigade*, 17; Barron, *Lone Star Defenders*, 59–60; John H. Harrison, "Texas Tenth Cavalry, C.S.A.," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, XII (No. 2, 1975), 96; William E. Sawyer and Neal Baker, Jr., "A Texan in the Civil War," *Texas Military History*, II (Nov., 1962), 275–278; Charleen Plumly Pollard (ed.), "Civil War Letters of George W. Allen," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, LXXXIII (July, 1979), 49; "Report of Lieut. Col. A. W. Spaight," *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XV, 145.

Unidentified Texas Infantry Private. Courtesy Herb Peck, Jr.

the officers and men knew little of personal hygiene; camps were located in low, insect-infested areas; food was not properly prepared or handled; and doctors and surgeons were inadequate in numbers and training. "There are about five [doctors] in our regiment," wrote one Texan, "& I am, this day, a better physician than either [*sic*] of them."[90]

Even though the number of Confederate casualties increased markedly in 1863 and 1864, Texans continued to believe that the South would ultimately be victorious. The fall of Vicksburg and Lee's failure at Gettysburg dampened but did not destroy the confidence of Texas Confederates. The defeat of Nathaniel P. Banks's Red River expedition in the spring of 1864 was a source of great encouragement, particularly to those Texans on duty in the Trans-Mississippi West. These same western Confederates predicted that Lee would defeat Ulysses S. Grant in the campaigns in Virginia.[91]

Most Texas Confederates believed that William T. Sherman could not capture Atlanta. Captain James P. Douglas, whose battery was in the thick of the fighting around Atlanta, wrote to his wife in mid-August that "affairs are brightening here. People and army seem to be more sanguine of success." Even when Sherman forced the Confederates to evacuate the city, Douglas remained confident. In a letter he informed his wife that we "had to give up Atlanta," but predicted that "the nomination of McClellan and Pendleton will secure the defeat of Lincoln and possibly close the war." Another Texan in the Army of Tennessee, Wiley Donathan, was pleased when Hood withdrew from Georgia and took the offensive by heading for Tennessee. "Our prospects were never brighter," wrote Donathan, "for a great Change has been wrought within the last two weeks."[92]

Hood's Tennessee campaign proved to be disastrous. After sustaining heavy casualties at Franklin in late November, Hood drove on to Nashville, where in mid-December superior Union forces destroyed

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[90]George W. Guess to Sarah Horton Cockrell, July 29, 1862, Guess Letters. John A. Templeton had an equally strong aversion to hospitals. "There is more danger in a hospital than in the field of battle," he wrote. "I never have been in a hospital, but If I ever do have to go to one on account of sickness I will make my will before starting." John A. Templeton to father, May 16, 1862, John A. Templeton Letters (Archives, University of Texas Library, Austin).

[91]Anderson (ed.), *Campaigning with Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade*, 142–143; Fleming, "Letters of Private Robert T. Wilson," 295–296.

[92]Douglas (comp. and ed.), *Douglas's Texas Battery*, 123 (first quotation), 127 (second quotation), 128 (third quotation); Donathan to sister, Oct. 18, 1864, Donathan Family Correspondence.

most of his army. For the first time, many Texas Confederates expressed despair. Captain Douglas, in a letter he cautioned not to be shown "out of our own family," stated, "our country is in much the worse condition it has ever been. If a great deed is not done this winter, the Yanks will close the war in the spring."[93]

Other Texans remained defiant. Even after Lee's army surrendered in April, 1865, some Texas Confederates wanted to carry on the struggle. Captain Samuel T. Foster, with Granbury's brigade in North Carolina, admitted that Lee's surrender had had "a very demoralizing affect on the army," but still believed "we will whip this fight yet." George Lee Robertson, serving in South Texas, vowed to fight on. "If I can't have a confederacy I don't want anything else," he wrote. Even after he learned of Lee's surrender, W. W. Heartsill believed that if the southern people would unite as one, "the Trans-Mississippi could defy the combined powers of all Yankeedom."[94]

Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi department, also believed the war should continue and urged his soldiers to remain at their posts. Most Texans in the department, however, agreed with Americus L. ("Lee") Nelms that "it would be folly in us to fight on this side of the river now." Thus, regiments and companies melted away in May as men headed home. There was little that Smith could do but sign the terms of surrender at Galveston on June 2.[95]

Texas Confederates made their way to their homes as best as they could. The homeward journey posed few obstacles to Texans in the Trans-Mississippi, but for those Texans in Virginia and the Carolinas the trip sometimes took months. Most of them returned with little more than the clothes on their backs. Many found conditions at home quite changed. Relatives and loved ones had died or been killed in war, slaves were now free, money was scarce, and a Union army of occupation was moving into the state. Most Confederate Texans, however, felt no bitterness at their sacrifice, but pride that they had fought gallantly for a cause in which they deeply believed.[96]

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[93]Douglas (comp. and ed.), *Douglas's Texas Battery*, 153.

[94]Brown (ed.), *One of Cleburne's Command*, 163 (first and second quotations); Robertson to Julia, May 8, 1865, Robertson Papers; Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days*, 239.

[95]Weddle, *Plow-Horse Cavalry*, 158; Oates, "Texas Under the Secessionists," 212.

[96]For accounts of the trip home see Hamilton, *History of Company M*, 69–71; Lasswell (comp. and ed.), *Rags and Hope*, 278–280; Fletcher, *Rebel Private, Front and Rear*, 145–158; Walton, *An Epitome of My Life*, 93–94; Brown (ed.), *One of Cleburne's Command*, 173–187; Weddle, *Plow-Horse Cavalry*, 162–163.

The Battle of Sabine Pass

JO YOUNG

In a low mud fort where the River Sabine
Reaches the sea across a bar,
A boy-like chief, with forty men
And six old guns, sat counting them,
And wondering if such a force could stem
Attack by men of war.

—EUGENE MILLIS.

AFTER the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, and of Port Hudson on July 9, two objectives in the Southwest were considered by Lincoln's government—Mobile and Texas. Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, commander of the Department of the Gulf, was in favor of attacking Mobile first; for he knew that eventually it had to be taken and that each day of delay meant stronger defenses to be overcome. "Considerations of general policy," writes A. T. Mahan, noted American naval historian, "connected with the action of France in Mexico and the apparent unfriendly attitude of the Emperor, Napoleon III, toward the United States decided otherwise."[1]

In Lincoln's cabinet meeting of July 31, Secretary of State William Seward said that Louis Napoleon was "making an effort to get Texas" whereupon Seward urged "the immediate occupation of Galveston also [of] some other point."[2] Later that same day Secretary of Navy Gideon Welles, in company with Secretary of War E. M. Stanton and General-in-Chief W. H. Halleck, asked whether a demonstration was to be made on Texas to protect and guard the western frontier and whether Indianola was a better point than Galveston. "Halleck said he did not know,—had not thought of that. 'Where,' said he, 'is Indianola?' "[3]

Six days after this meeting Halleck notified Banks that there were "important reasons why our flag should be restored in . . . Texas. . . . Do this by land[ing] at Galveston, at Indianola, or at any other point you may deem preferable . . . the movement

[1]A. T. Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters* (New York, 1883), 185.
[2]Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles* (Boston, 1911), I, 390.
[3]*Ibid.*

should be as prompt as possible."[4] On August 10, Halleck sent to Banks more complete orders in which he recommended a campaign up the Red River; however, he again left the choice of action to Banks.

Banks selected for his first objective Sabine City, situated at the mouth of Sabine River some thirty miles southeast of Beaumont. This river was, writes one historian, "a line of great strategic importance to the forces of the United States; as its possession would give to their forces short lines of operations against the interior of Texas."[5] In Banks' instructions to Major General William B. Franklin, in whose hands he placed the tactical command of the expedition, Banks wrote:

> . . . you will proceed to Sabine Pass . . . disembark your whole force as speedily as possible . . . and if you can safely proceed as far as the railroad from Houston to Beaumont, you will seize and hold some point on that line. Beaumont is probably the preferable point. . . . After seizing such [a] point on the railroad, you will make reconnaissances in the direction of Houston.[6]

Thus it is seen that Banks intended to utilize Sabine City as a base for operations in eastern and central Texas or, as one writer puts it, the capture was "doubtless intended as the first step in a campaign the results of which promised to be of the most brilliant and lasting character."[7]

Besides the strategic motive for the capture of Sabine City there was perhaps an economic motive as well. A British Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher writes that near Sabine City there were forty thousand bales of cotton, the capture of which would have been very lucrative to the Federals.[8] As Banks and certain other Federals did on occasions speculate on cotton, Fletcher's words are probably well founded.

To partake in the expedition Banks assigned the entire Nine-

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[4]Halleck to Banks, August 6, 1863, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, Vol. XXVI, Part I, 672. Hereinafter cited *Official Records . . . Armies.*

[5]J. Thompson Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy* (New York, 1887), 521.

[6]Banks to Franklin, August 31, 1863, *Official Records . . . Armies,* Series I, Vol. XXVI, Part I, 287.

[7]Frank Moore (ed.), *The Rebellion Records* (New York, 1864), 426.

[8]Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher, *History of the American War* (London, 1866), 128.

teenth Army Corps, but because of a lack of sufficient transportation at that time only the First Division, commanded by Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel, could be sent. In all, there were about five thousand infantrymen with three field batteries and two heavy Parrott batteries.[9]

From Commodore Henery H. Bell, commander of the Western Gulf Squadron in the absence of Admiral David Farragut, Banks obtained the use of the gunboats *Clifton, Arizona, Sachem,* and later the *Granite City*. These poorly equipped and badly functioning vessels were the only gunboats available which were of shallow enough draft to cross the six-foot bar at the entrance of Sabine Pass. Bell assigned Acting Lieutenant Frederick Crocker to tactical command of the fleet which, besides the gunboats, included seventeen transports.[10]

The expedition left New Orleans on September 5.[11] The fleet was to arrive off the Sabine bar on the night of the sixth, but because of the absence of the signal ship, *Granite City,* which had gone to Galveston to refuel, the fleet passed by the bar during the night.[12] It was not until late on September 7, too late to attack, that the fleet was assembled outside the pass. It was decided that the attack on Fort Griffin, the fort guarding the entrance to the pass and situated about a mile and a half east of Sabine City, should be made on the morning of the eighth.

Fort Griffin at the time of the attack was, writes a Confederate participant, E. P. Alsbury,

> an unfinished earthwork on the Texas side of the pass, destitute of any outer defenses, presenting three bastioned sides on the east, south, and west, the north and rear enclosed by a redout about four feet above the level. The work occupied high ground and commanded both the Texas and Louisiana channels. The former 300 yards; the latter at the distance of three-fourths of a mile.[13]

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[9]Report of Banks, September 5, 1863, *Official Records ... Armies,* Series I, Vol. XXVI, Part I, p. 286.

[10]Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy,* 521.

[11]The city of New Orleans was in a state of great excitement on the morning of September 4, 1863. A large expedition was leaving on some unrevealed, but avowedly very important mission. The levee was crowded with men, women, and children, where troops were embarking and transports were moving away down the Mississippi River among grim and sullen-looking men-of-war.

From an account by Lieutenant Henry C. Dane in the New York *Herald* quoted in Clement Evans (ed.), *Confederate Military History,* (Atlanta, 1879), XI, 106.

[12]The captain of the *Granite City* was later court-martialed for his absence but escaped punishment.

[13]Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy,* 524-525.

Defending the fort were the Davis Guards, forty-two men, for the most part Irish Houstonians, and two lieutenants—N. M. Smith and Richard W. Dowling. The men were part of the command of Captain F. H. Odlam who on September 7 was in Sabine City pressing for reinforcements to withstand the impending invasion.

Richard Dowling, second child of William and Mary Dowling, was born in Tuam, Galway County, Ireland, in the summer of 1838. At the age of ten Dowling, in company with his parents, came to America, settling in Houston. On November 30, 1857, he married Elizabeth Anne Odlum in St. Vincent de Paul's Church in Houston and by her had five children, two of whom reached maturity.

Before the Battle of Sabine Pass, Dowling participated in several other engagements. He was at the recapture of Galveston on January 1, 1863, and three weeks later helped in capturing the Federal sloop of war *Morning Light* and the schooner *Fairy* at Sabine Pass.

After the war, in partnership with his brother, Pat, he owned a "fashionable coffee and amusement house"[14] in Houston. He died of yellow fever on September 24, 1867, and was buried in Houston.

Dowling had known of the presence of an enemy fleet since the morning of September 7 and, though having only limited means, determined to withstand all attacks. The Confederates' armament consisted of only six guns: "two 32 pounder smooth bores, two 24 pounder smooth bores, and two 32 pound howitzers."[15]

On the night of the seventh, Crocker met with Franklin and it was decided that the *Clifton,* with Crocker as captain, would go into the harbor at daylight and reconnoiter, and that further operations would be determined by the report of Crocker. About two o'clock that same night Dowling was informed by a sentinel that the enemy were signaling, and assuming an immediate attack, Dowling ordered all the guns at the fort manned.

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[14]Frances Robertson Sachett, *Dick Dowling* (Houston, 1937), 65.

[15]Report of Dowling, September 9, 1863, *Official Records ... Armies,* Series I, Vol. XXVI, Part I, 311.

At daylight on the eighth the *Clifton* entered the pass, anchored after crossing the bar (see map), and fired twenty-six shells at the fort, none of which did any material damage.[16] The Confederates did not reply.

Crocker signaled for the entire fleet to cross the bar. Four gunboats and seven of the transports then entered the pass but not without some difficulty in crossing the bar.[17]

At eleven o'clock the Confederate steamer *Uncle Ben,* Captain G. Hall commanding, one of the steamers ordered by Commodore Leon Smith to Sabine from Beaumont and vicinity, "came down the bay and advanced towards the fort. . . . One boat [the *Sachem*] fired three shells at her, not doing any damage."[18]

While this engagement was taking place, Franklin in company with Weitzel and Crocker made a reconnaissance of the Texas shore. The small boat they were in did not reach land but "grounded in mud within 125 feet of the shore."

Franklin reasoned that it was impossible to land in the mud as his "soldiers loaded with muskets and rations would [sink] . . . to their middle."[19]

Franklin and his officers concluded that the best landing site would be a sandy stretch 1,000 yards from the fort (see map), and in order to land there, the fort had to be silenced or at least have its fire attracted elsewhere.

At noon, Crocker, Acting Master Amos Johnson, commander of the *Sachem,* and Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Charles W. Lamson, commander of the *Granite City,* met with Franklin on board the transport steamer *Suffolk.* In order to land troops at the site decided upon, they adopted the following plan:

> Three of the gunboats were to move up the channel to the point of separation; there two of them, the *Sachem* and the *Arizona,* were to take the channel to the right, and were to pass the fort by that channel, drawing its fire. The *Clifton* was to take the left-hand channel, moving slowly up, and, when about half a mile distant, was to go at full speed, within grape and canister range, and engage the fort at close quarters. General Weitzel was to keep near the *Clifton* with

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] The seven transports were the *Suffolk, St. Charles, Landis, Exact, Thomas, Laurel Hill,* and *Gen. Banks.*

[18] Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph,* September 16, 1863.

[19] Report of Franklin, *Official Records . . . Armies,* Series I, Vol. XXVI, Part I, 295.



FROM *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, Vol. XXVI, Part I, p. 296.

a boat [*General Banks*] containing 500 infantry, who were to land as soon as the *Clifton* began to go at full speed at the old fort; from there they were to advance upon the fort as skirmishers, endeavoring to drive the enemy from his guns, while the *Clifton* engaged the fort at close quarters. The fourth gunboat, the *Granite City,* was to support this movement.[20]

Operations were set to begin at four o'clock that afternoon.

At three-thirty o'clock the *Clifton* made the signal to up anchor, slowly moved up the Texas channel, and began to shell the fort.[21] As planned, the *Sachem* and the *Arizona* then got underway, started up the Louisiana channel, and also began shelling the small earthwork.[22] By actual count, ninety-two shots were fired.

Dowling held the fort's fire until the ships were within 1,200 yards at which time he "gave the command to stand by the guns, every man jumped to his post, not one flinched and the word 'fire,' was soon given."[23] Dowling concentrated his fire on the *Sachem,* which was about to by-pass the fort, and on the third or fourth round struck the steam dome, killing and wounding thirty-two men.[24] The *Sachem's* commander, Johnson, "ordered the fire from the Parrott gun to be kept up, but the officer in charge informed" him "that nearly the whole gun crew had jumped overboard."[25]

With the *Sachem* harmless and enveloped in steam, the Confederates switched their fire to the *Clifton* which was slowly zigzagging up the Texas channel.

The most picturesque and perhaps the most accurate descrip-

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[20]*Ibid.*

[21]Report of Johnson, March 4, 1865, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies* (Washington, 1914-1922), Series I, Vol. XX, 553. Hereinafter cited *Official Records ... Navies.*

[22]At this moment, Com. Leon Smith, Capt. /F. H./ Odlum, Capt. //Wood and Dr.// Murry dashed into the fort, under a tremendous fire of grape and cannister. The little garrison greeted their arrival with cheers. Com. Smith being the ranking officer, shook hands heartily with Lieut. Dowling, and told him to pitch in and retain command, as a just appreciation of his gallentry. The arrival of the officers created much enthusiasm among the men and they urged them to stand by their guns until reinforcements should arrive, which were momentarily expected on the steamers *Roebuck* and *Florida.*

From the Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph,* September 16, 1863.

[23]Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph,* September 16, 1863.

[24]"All eyes were bent upon her, when suddenly a shot was seen to strike her amidships, crushing in her sides and tearing her iron plating for the protection of her sharpshooters as a piece of paper, and causing her to careen and tremble from stem to stern."—Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy,* 523.

[25]Report of Johnson, March 4, 1865, *Official Records ... Navies,* Series I, Vol. XX, 553.

tion of what then happened to the *Clifton* is found in the report of Acting Lieutenant Crocker, written a few days after the battle.

Crocker writes:

When the *Clifton* was about halfway up to the battery, I noticed with great surprise that the *Granite City* and the *General Banks* were still laying drifting across the tide, making no attempt to follow; at the same time a shot from the enemy struck the *Sachem's* boiler, disabling her instantly and silencing her fire; but depending upon the support of the others, the *Clifton* kept on her course.[26] In a short time, however, her wheel rope was shot away and she grounded [about five hundred yards from the fort] sooner than was expected, and in such a position that only three of her guns could [be brought to] bear on the battery, and with three [guns] we kept up the fight, making every effort to get the vessel afloat, but before we succeeded a shot passed through her boiler and machinery, disabling her completely.

Until this time every man [had] stood to his post, and the fight was progressing favorably, but the steam drove all the sharpshooters off the upper deck. Many thinking the vessel was about to blow up, jumped overboard; at the same time the enemy got our range, and their fire began to tell severely. The vessel twice caught fire and the men were falling fast. My executive officer (Acting Master Robert Rhodes) fell mortally wounded. Two other officers received wounds, and the men noticing that no support was near, many of them became unsteady; enough of them remained, however, to keep up a very effectual fire, which was being done with the faint hope that we might yet be supported, when I was met by two of my officers and informed by one of them that he had hauled down the flag and that we could not fight anymore. With great indignation I ordered it hoisted again and all to stand by their guns; but the example had become contagious, with few exceptions. The men had left their guns and were taking to the water. At the same time a shot from the enemy disabled one of my three guns, and the lock of another broke, the remnant of the crew firing it with a hammer. Under the circumstances and seeing that the *Arizona* failed to push on, the *Granite City* and *General Banks* [failed] to make the slightest attempt to support me, the enemy's fire becoming more and more deadly, deserted by all but a few brilliant exceptions, I deemed it my duty to stop the slaughter by showing the white flag, which was done, and we fell into the hands of the enemy.[27]

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[26]It was at this time that a "shot from the *Clifton* took off a handle of the elevating screw of one of the Confederate guns, hardly a second after Dowling had sighted the piece and moved to one side."—Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy*, 525.

[27]Report of Crocker, September 12, 1863, *Official Records ... Navies*, Series I, Vol. XX, 540-541.

Back on the *Sachem,* Johnson, realizing that his situation was helpless, ordered his thirty-pounder Parrott gun spiked and magazine flooded and as soon as he became aware of the *Clifton's* surrender, he also raised a white flag.

When the Confederates ascertained the *Clifton's* surrender, they ceased fire and Dowling "raised a white handkerchief on his sword and advanced towards the beach," where he was met by Lieutenant Crocker who had come ashore to surrender.[28]

> The gallant Federal, in handsome uniform, could scarce believe the dirty boy was his conqueror, or that the handful of men before him comprised the force which had calmly awaited a hostile fleet, and by their unaided effort had subjected it to defeat, with the loss of its two best gunboats.[29]

As Crocker and party had come ashore without side arms, Dowling "stated that he would accompany him back to the prize and receive his sword."[30]

While this formal surrender progressed on the *Clifton,* Commodore Leon Smith, on board the *Uncle Ben,* took possession of the *Sachem.*[31] This action brought to a close the engagement which had lasted only forty-five minutes.

According to Dowling's captain, F. H. Odlum, the battle had resulted in the capture of

> two steamers, carrying thirteen guns, of which the *Sachem* had five—one a thirty-pounder rifled Parrott, an excellent gun, in fine order, and four thirty-two pounders. . . . The *Clifton,* a regular steamship, carried eight guns. . . all in good order. Besides these we captured a quantity of small arms of different kinds, together with a large lot of ammunition and naval stores of various descriptions, and also a good store of provisions and medicines. . . . Neither of the vessels are materially damaged, and can be easily repaired.
>
> Our loss was, strictly and positively, nobody hurt. Not a single man received even a scratch, and the fort but slightly injured, and the contents entirely uninjured.[32]

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[28]Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph,* September 16, 1863.

[29]Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy,* 526.

[30]*Ibid.*

[31]Other Confederate cotton-clad vessels by this time in the bay included the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company's steamer, the *Florida,* commanded by Captain John Price; the steamer *Roebuck,* commanded by a Captain Richardson; and the gunboat *Bell,* commanded by Captain John W. Payne.

[32]Report of Captain F. H. Odlum, September 9, 1863, *Official Records . . . Navies,* Series I, Vol. XX, 558.

The Federals had lost 19 killed, 9 wounded, 37 missing, and 315 officers and men taken prisoner.[33]

After the surrender of the *Clifton* a small scale panic seized the Federal commanders. The *Arizona,* ignoring the pleas to take the wounded from the *Sachem,* began backing down the channel. She passed over the bar and once over, grounded; it was only during the night that she became free. The *Granite City* also backed out of any danger.

General Franklin, noted for his disastrous meetings earlier in the war with Stonewall Jackson in the Valley of Virginia, suffered from acute and premature defeatism. In his report to Banks, Franklin painted a black picture of his situation. Despite his immediate superiority of almost thirty to one in troops, Franklin said:

> The enemy's battery commanded the whole landing, and he could, with his battery and gunboats, have destroyed us at any time.
>
> The remainder of my force was outside the bar in vessels, all of which had to be lightened, and at least three days would have been required to land it.
>
> The stock of fresh water was nearly exhausted, and the animals were already on short allowance of water; the men were living on uncooked rations, and there was no fuel on shore for cooking.
>
> No fresh water could be obtained unless the fort was in our possession, and the day's experience had taught me that no attack which I could make with the troops which I had been able to get across the bar could possibly succeed. It would have been absurd to have attempted to have passed the fort with troops already inside of the bar, there being but one means of access to Sabine City, and this commanded for 1½ miles by six heavy guns and whatever field artillery the enemy might have. There was no time to send to New Orleans to get instructions, and I therefore concluded to recross the bar and return to the mouth of the Mississippi.[34]

The expedition arrived at the Mississippi, September 11.

Besides being a victory of arms for Texas and the South, Sabine Pass served also as a moral victory. "This victory," writes 'Uncle

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[33]Report of Acting Lieutenant Crocker, November 9, 1863, *ibid.,* Series I, Vol. XX, 542-543.

[34]Two hundred thousand rations and two hundred mules were thrown overboard in an effort to lighten two grounded ships, the *Crescent* and the *Laurel Hill.* Franklin was unable to account for the loss of the mules. See Report of Franklin, September 11, 1863, *Official Records ... Armies,* Series I, Vol. XXVI, Part I, 297.

Ben' in the Houston *Tri-Weekly Telegraph,*[35] "will show to the world what a few determined men can do, when battling for a good and holy cause."

From the North came strikingly different comments on the battle. Horace Greeley, editor of the New York *Tribune,* said that by this battle Franklin achieved "the distinction of being the first American General . . . who managed to lose a fleet in contest with land batteries alone."

Greeley added that, "Decently managed, this movement could not have miscarried."[36] The northern government felt the same way.

Gideon Welles' entries in his diary relating to the battle form an interesting summation and conclusion and shed some light as to the responsibility in conceiving the expedition. He writes,

> *September 22, Tuesday.* . . . We have information of a failure on our part at Sabine Pass, where an attempt was made to capture formidable batteries with frail boats, the army as spectators. The expedition appears to have been badly conceived, planned, and executed. A large military force was sent to take these batteries. Neither General Halleck nor the Secretary of War consulted the Navy in the matter. General Banks appears to have originated it, and made a requisition on Commodore Bell, who readily responded, in the absence of Farragut, with light boats built for transporting passengers in Northern rivers. Admiral Farragut was at the Navy Department when dispatches were received from Commodore Bell, stating that application for co-operation and aid had been made on him, and how he had answered the call. When Farragut read the dispatch, he laid down the paper and said to me: "The expedition will be a failure. The army officers have an impression that naval vessels can do anything; this call is made for boats to accompany an army expedition; it is expected the Navy will capture the batteries, and, the army being there in force with a general in command, they will take the credit. But there will be no credit in the case, and you may expect to hear of disaster. These boats which Bell had given them cannot encounter batteries; they might co-operate with and assist the army, but that is evidently not the object. The soldiers should land and attack in the rear, and the vessels aid them in front. But that is not the army plan. The soldiers are not to land until the Navy had done an impossibility, with such boats. Therefore there will be disaster." The news of today verifies his prediction. This Sabine expedition was

[35]September 16, 1863.
[36]Greeley, *The American Conflict,* II, 339.

substituted, I suppose, for that of Indianola, which I suggested, and we may now have the promised word of General Halleck. He will have heard from Banks.

September 24, Thursday. . . . Last July, on the suggestion of Seward, I was in consultation with him, Stanton, and Halleck in regard to Texas. . . . I proposed a descent on Indianola. . . . [Halleck] would consent to nothing, nor any consideration of the subject, till he heard from Banks; would then immediately notify Seward and myself. This was at least two months ago, and the last I have heard from Major-General Halleck, until we are now told General Banks organized an expedition to Texas. Heigho! the Sabine Pass?

Except for the capture of the U.S.S. *Granite City* and the U.S.S. *Wave* on May 6, 1864, by the defenders of Fort Griffin, Sabine Pass was relatively quiet and free from the disturbing presence of a militant enemy until the end of the war. It was not until May 25, 1865, six weeks after the surrender of Lee's army, that the Union flag was raised over Fort Griffin.

The defense of Sabine Pass in September, 1863, was unique in America's military history. Approximately 45 men and six guns, not only withstood 1,500 men on twenty-one ships, but captured two gunboats and 300 of the men and sent the remainder fleeing back to New Orleans, so discouraging the Union command that no further attempt was made to penetrate Texas by way of Sabine Pass.

The Breakup: The Collapse of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Army in Texas, 1865

Brad R. Clampitt*

In early May 1865, after Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, and that of other Confederate armies commanded by Generals Joseph E. Johnston and Richard Taylor, only Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith's Army of the Trans-Mississippi remained in the field for the Confederacy. Concentrated in Texas, northwestern Louisiana, and southwestern Arkansas, these forces totaled approximately sixty thousand men. Despite the defeat of Confederate forces east of the Mississippi River, Kirby Smith intended to continue the fight, hoping at least to gain more generous terms of capitulation. Explaining to the Federals that his "sense of honor and duty" could not allow him to accept the terms of surrender offered to Lee, on May 9, 1865, he called a conference of the department's state governors at Marshall, Texas. The general urged the governors to devise such a plan to cease hostilities and preserve civil order that would "maintain untarnished the reputation which our soldiers have so nobly won in many fields." The governors proposed wholly unrealistic demands, such as disbanding the army without requiring paroles and restoring full United States citizenship to all. Kirby Smith then forwarded the terms to Maj. Gen. John Pope, commander of the Union Military Division of Missouri.[1]

Nine days later, after hearing of great disaffection among units in Texas, Kirby Smith announced on May 18 the relocation of his headquar-

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[1] Report of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, May 9, 1865, United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate* Armies, 128 vols. (cited hereafter as *O.R.A.*) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 47, pt. 1, p. 32; Brig. Gen. George L. Andrew to Commissary General of Prisoners, Washington, D.C., Aug. 15, 1865, ibid., ser. 2, vol. 8, p. 717; Maj. Gen. John Pope to Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, Apr. 19, 1865, ibid., ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 186–187; Maj. Gen. John Pope to Lt. Col. J. T. Sprague, Apr. 19, 1865, ibid., pp. 187–188;

ters from Shreveport, Louisiana, to Houston, Texas. There he intended to await the arrival of President Jefferson Davis. While its commander traveled to Houston, however, the Confederate Army of the Trans-Mississippi disintegrated. After months of plummeting morale, the department's troops, primarily in Texas, threw down their arms and made their way home, plundering government and private property as they went. Black and white noncombatants, including women and children, joined the disgruntled soldiers in looting Texas cities and towns.[2]

Previous accounts of the breakup of the Confederate army in Texas—by contemporaries and by historians—provided specific details only for certain locales, downplayed or ignored damage to private property, and offered no satisfactory interpretation of the soldiers' actions and motives. For example, Col. Oran M. Roberts, a Confederate officer and chronicler of Texas's role in the Civil War, wrote that throughout the state the people of Texas freely opened their doors to feed and supply the passing soldiers. Perhaps swayed by his despair for the lost cause or concerned about the image of Texas troops as honorable soldiers, Roberts reported, "not an instance of violence or of wrong done by a returning soldier was heard of in all this homeward movement."[3]

Part of one chapter in Charles W. Ramsdell's *Reconstruction in Texas* (1910) provided the earliest treatment by a professional historian. Of the soldiers' actions during the breakup, Ramsdell observed, "private property was generally respected," a statement commonly accepted without scrutiny by later historians. One such scholar, Stephen B. Oates, remarked that, "many troops were glad to be civilians again and were anxious to get home to a real bed, good cooking, and honest work." Kirby Smith's biographer, Joseph Howard Parks, offered a concise summary of this traditional interpretation. When some soldiers began disbanding and pillaging, he asserted, others broke ranks and returned home to protect their families. Of the statewide looting, Parks concluded, "the seizure of [government] property was a part of an understanding between soldiers and citizens." In most instances soldiers did seize government property initially, often with

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Report of Lt. Col. J. T. Sprague, Apr. 19, 1865, ibid., pp. 188–189; Kirby Smith to Pope, May 9, 1865, ibid., p. 189 (1st quotation); Kirby Smith to Governors Henry W. Allen, Pendleton Murrah, H. Flanagin, and Thomas C. Reynolds, May 9, 1865, ibid., pp. 189–190 (2nd quotation); Allen, Flanagin, Reynolds, and Bryan to Kirby Smith, May 13, 1865, ibid., pp. 190–191; Kirby Smith to Sprague, May 15 and 30, 1865, ibid., pp. 191–194; Report of C. S. Bell, May 11, 1865, ibid., pt. 2, pp. 398–403; Kirby Smith to Jefferson Davis, Mar. 7, 1865, ibid., ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 1411–1412; Robert L. Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi South, 1863–1865* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972), 415–420.

[2] General Orders No. 28, Headquarters Trans-Mississippi Department, May 18, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1312.

[3] Oran M. Roberts, "Texas," in *Confederate Military History*, vol. XI, ed. Clement A. Evans (Atlanta: Confederate Publishing, 1899), 140 (quotation). See also John C. Walker, "Reconstruction in Texas," *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 24 (Jan.–Dec. 1896), 41–57.

the support of the public. In communities across the state, however, the men moved on to private possessions when they found no government spoils. Robert L. Kerby's excellent synthesis of the Trans-Mississippi Department briefly addresses this chaos in Texas and Kirby Smith's actions in response to the disorder. None of these studies, however, adequately explains the soldiers' motivations or the significance of their actions.[4]

Civil War Texans found no "lonely chimneys standing . . . amidst the ashes of houses burned in the vandal-like marches of the enemy," as witnessed by residents of other Confederate states. The absence of major battles and campaigns on Texas soil notwithstanding, civilians and soldiers of the Lone Star State experienced their own war weariness. It stemmed not from devastated landscapes and starving families, but from what they considered mismanagement by sometimes corrupt Confederate military officials and from oppressive and imprudent economic policies. Repeated issues of increasingly worthless Confederate currency, onerous taxes, limited communication with authorities in Richmond, Virginia, and especially frequent impressment of crops, cattle, and other items undermined Texans' confidence in Confederate leadership west of the Mississippi River. Kirby Smith admitted that these circumstances "spread discontent and dissatisfaction widely among our producers at home."[5]

Under these conditions, and due to heavy Confederate losses east of the Mississippi River, the morale of the state's defenders declined quickly in the spring of 1865. Civilian spirit initially remained high, however, because the Texas home front remained largely untouched by the war. When presented with the prospect of crossing the Mississippi River to aid thinning Confederate forces in the east, the men of Walter P. Lane's Rangers voted thirty-one to thirty against taking such action. By April 19, 1865, only days before learning of Lee's surrender, one member of Lane's Rangers, W. W. Heartsill, questioned his country's prospects after four long years. "A dark cloud is settling upon our bleeding country; to day our cause is at the lowest depths of despair," he concluded. An Austin newspaper editor wrote that, "now and then a soldier would return home and his quiet predictions [of impending defeat] . . . were circulated."[6]

A decline in discipline accompanied drooping morale. Denied furloughs and the opportunity to fight for their dying cause, soldiers chafed

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[4] Charles W. Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1910), 27–34, 35 (1st quotation), 36–41; Stephen B. Oates, *Confederate Cavalry West of the River* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 160–161 (2nd quotation); Joseph Howard Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith, C.S.A.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 474 (3rd quotation); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy.*

[5] Roberts, "Texas," 138 (1st quotation); Kirby Smith to James A. Seddon, Feb. 11, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 1381–1382 (2nd quotation); Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas,* 27–28.

[6] Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy,* 389; W. W. Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred Ninety-one Days in the Confederate Army,* ed. Bell I. Wiley (1876; reprint, Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, 1954), 233, 238 (1st

under the meticulous regimen of camp life. Scores of soldiers, only miles from home and family and unpaid for sixteen months, submitted to homesickness and deserted. Earlier in the war a Texas combatant grumbled, "I am perfectly disgusted with army life. It is so monotonous, nothing animating about it at all." Their isolation from meaningful action, lack of pay, and feelings of helplessness explain the motivation of many disheartened Texans. Others, however, left the ranks for less honorable reasons. When Kirby Smith ordered certain Trans-Mississippi cavalry regiments dismounted that final spring of 1865, many men deserted "rather than walk."[7]

The discontent with camp life and the chronic lack of pay prompted many soldiers to look elsewhere for what they considered just compensation. As early as the first week of April, disgruntled soldiers preyed on private citizens for money and goods. On April 8 Gen. John Bankhead Magruder, Commander of the District of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, wrote from Houston to department headquarters in Shreveport that, "great outrages are being perpetrated on citizens in McLennan and Williamson Counties [in central Texas] by [Spruce McCoy] Baird's command [4th Cavalry Regiment, Arizona Brigade] and others." Magruder requested a force to patrol central Texas and "bring as prisoners here the whole of Baird's command and all deserters and stragglers." One week later Assist. Adj. Gen. Thomas M. Jack ordered Brig. Gen. Hamilton P. Bee's regiments from Hempstead to Cooke County on the state's northern edge to apprehend Baird's men.[8]

Such was the environment around the department when seemingly unthinkable reports arrived. For many Texans, April 20, 1865, brought confirmation of what they had thought impossible—Lee's surrender to Ulysses S. Grant. One soldier, a member of Gen. Joseph Shelby's cavalry division, explained, "a great horror came first, then unbelief, then fleeting resolutions of hate and defiance, then a great reaction, followed by timidity and despair." Both soldiers and citizens progressed through these emotions, though the combatants reached the final stages much sooner. Initially nearly all citizens defiantly denounced the news as mere "Yankee rumor." At least one newspaper editor declared that the bulk of Lee's

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quotation); Frank Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, p. 11 (2nd quotation) (Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin; cited hereafter as CAH).

[7] William Martin Walton, *An Epitome of My Life: Civil War Reminiscences of Major Buck Walton* (Austin: Waterloo Press, 1965), 90–91; Ralph A. Wooster and Robert Wooster, "'Rarin for a Fight': Texans in the Confederate Army," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 84 (Apr., 1981), 416, n. 68 (1st quotation); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 405–406 (2nd quotation).

[8] Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder to Brig. Gen. W. R. Boggs, Apr. 8, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1271 (quotations); Assist. Adj. Gen. Thomas M. Jack to Brig. Hamilton P. Bee, Apr. 15, 1865, ibid., p. 1281.

forces had escaped and gone south to reinforce Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, then attempting to defend North Carolina against Gen. William T. Sherman. Numerous Texans held out hope for another week. Kate Stone, a Louisiana refugee living in the East Texas community of Tyler, reported that most there refused to believe the news until at least April 28.[9]

Once Texans realized that the invincible Lee had in fact surrendered, some citizens and Confederate leaders called for further resistance. They declared that Johnston would cross the Mississippi River with his army and combine his forces with those of Kirby Smith. When President Jefferson Davis crossed the Mississippi River, the Confederacy could make its stand in Texas. Defiant citizens, officers, and officials held rallies around the department urging their defenders to fight on. Texans in Fort Bend and Washington Counties, in southeast Texas, met to declare their allegiance and to offer food, supplies, and support to the soldiers. Participants in a large meeting at Houston, addressed by General Magruder, declared their devotion to the Confederate cause. Smaller rallies took place in towns and cities around the state. At one such gathering an officer proclaimed that, "he would rather himself and all his relations should go down into one common grave than come under Yankee rule."[10]

In addition to spoken appeals at rallies, officers, government officials, and community leaders issued written entreaties to the soldiers. On Friday, April 21, Kirby Smith implored his troops to fight on "in the name of . . . families so dear to you" and to "show that you are worthy of your position in history." The following day in Galveston, Col. Ashbel Smith reminded soldiers on the island of the resources in the department and insisted that the news of Lee's surrender should simply motivate them further. On Sunday, General Magruder issued a general order assuring citizens and soldiers alike of their ability to defend Texas. Governor Pendleton Murrah published a proclamation to the people on Thursday, April 27. He pointed to the increased burden placed upon the state by "unforeseen calamities." The governor proclaimed that citizens throughout the Confederacy now looked to "the youngest of the Confederate sisters to redeem the cause," and that they "must not look in vain." E. H. Cushing, a newspaper editor in Houston, urged Texans to resort to guerilla warfare if necessary to prolong the struggle. Historian Gary W. Gallagher asserts that a widespread guerilla war as a na-

[9] John N. Edwards, *Shelby and His Men; or, The War in the West* (Cincinnati, Ohio: Miama Printing and Publishing Co., 1867), 516 (quotation); Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas*, 29; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, Apr. 24, 26, May 5, 1865; John Q. Anderson (ed.), *Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861–1868* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955), 331.

[10] *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, Apr. 24 (quotation), 25, 26, May 3, 4, 1865; Francis R. Lubbock, *Six Decades in Texas* (Austin: Ben C. Jones and Co., 1900), 565; Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 413.

John B. Magruder commanded the Confederate District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona at the conlcusion of the Civil War. After the surrender of Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, Magruder attempted to rally soldiers and civilians in Texas to continue the fight. By early May, however, he sought merely to maintain order until the negotiation of a formal surrender. *Photograph courtesy of the Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin. DI-01712.*

tional strategy was never a truly "viable option" and dismisses the idea as "far-fetched."[11]

On Saturday, April 29, in Shreveport, several prominent leaders addressed soldiers and citizens at a large rally organized by Louisiana governor Henry Watkins Allen. The governor, flanked by Kirby Smith and several other prominent officers, urged his audience to persevere. Allen assured his listeners that they could secure "the independence of our country" with "a little patience and perseverance." Of the ceremony one witness reported, "I fear it was all but whistling to keep the courage up."[12]

These demonstrations notwithstanding, reality set in rapidly, and confidence quickly plummeted, even among these leaders. The very day of the Shreveport rally, only days after Magruder issued his general order, he wrote to department headquarters requesting more reliable cavalry. He reported that his men were "deserting by tens and twenties a night." Five days later, after learning of Johnston's surrender to Sherman, Magruder again implored citizens and soldiers to stand by their colors. Obviously mindful of his forces' dwindling esprit de corps, he pleaded with the citizens of Texas to present a patriotic example to the soldiers. By early May the general's

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[11] Kirby Smith to the Soldiers of the Trans-Mississippi Army, Apr. 21, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1284 (1st and 2nd quotations); General Orders No. 20, Headquarters District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, Apr. 23, 1865, ibid., pp. 1284–1285; Ashbel Smith, General Orders No. 28, Apr. 22, 1865, Military Order Book, A. Smith Papers (cited hereafter as A. Smith Papers), (CAH); *Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph*, Apr. 24, 1865; Alan C. Ashcraft, *Civil War Texas: A Resume History* (Austin: Texas Civil War Centennial Commission, 1962), 28 (3rd–5th quotations); Emory M. Thomas, "Rebel Nationalism: E. H. Cushing and the Confederate Experience," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 73 (Jan., 1970), 349; Gary W. Gallagher, *The Confederate War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 126–127, 140–141 (6th and 7th quotations).

[12] Allen quoted in Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 458–459; John D. Winters, *The Civil War in*

emphasis had turned from imploring his men to fight for glorious victory to attempting merely to maintain order until surrender negotiations could be concluded.[13]

Meetings, rallies, and speeches were mostly ignored by enlisted men. In Houston the soldiers listened patiently to Magruder's words but exhibited no enthusiasm. At a rally in Hempstead, approximately fifty miles northwest of Houston, no more than one-third of the soldiers listened to the speeches; others stood by and derided the speakers. Those present at one meeting seized the occasion to pass their own resolutions expressing their contempt for the fervor of "exempts and details." One soldier camped at Hempstead expressed his comrades' sentiments. Referring to a meeting held by citizens of Grimes and Washington Counties and Confederate officers, he quipped, "the meeting was held by a band of those brass buttons from Houston," whose constant message remained "fight on, boys." He asserted that the leaders continued to resist because "they know that their necks are in danger." A young soldier camped southwest of Houston near Richmond, Texas, explained to his family that the officers held these meetings simply to display a bold front to the general public. He termed their resolutions "empty phrases." The fiery orators, he believed, actually would have surrendered themselves if they had had the opportunity.[14]

Confederate soldiers in Texas clearly lost the will to fight, or at least realized the futility of further resistance, sooner than did civilians and their leaders. William Martin (Buck) Walton, a Confederate officer and later a successful politician, reported the preceding winter that despite, perhaps because, they knew General Lee's lines were thinning in the east, none in his brigade "were exceedingly anxious to fight." One soldier in Galveston, disturbed by the execution of a deserter on March 3, considered the cause lost. Although most Texas Confederates held out longer than did this combatant, morale throughout the department diminished notably even before Lee's surrender. On April 3 the report of a Federal informant in central Texas concluded, "demoralization of the rebel army in Texas is very extensive." The writer of the report witnessed significant numbers of Texas

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Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 419 (2nd quotation); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 414.

[13] Magruder to Boggs, Apr. 29, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1291 (quotation); Magruder to the People and Army of Texas, May 4, 1865, ibid., p. 1294; Edward T. Cotham Jr., *Battle on the Bay: The Civil War Struggles for Galveston* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 180; Paul D. Casdorph, *Prince John Magruder: His Life and Campaigns* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996), 295–296.

[14] Robert P. Felgar, "Texas in the War for Southern Independence, 1861–1865" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1935), 503–504 (1st quotation); Walker, "Reconstruction in Texas," 45; Jon Harrison (ed.), "The Confederate Letters of John Simmons," *Chronicles of Smith County, Texas*, 14 (Summer, 1975), 52–53 (2nd–4th quotations); Minetta Altgelt Goyne (ed.), *Lone Star and Double Eagle: Civil War Letters of a German Family* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1982), 169 (5th quotation).

Confederates returning home in counties around San Antonio and Austin. These soldiers apparently considered their terms of service complete because "in two or three places . . . [they] notified the enrolling officer and the provost-marshal that their services were no longer needed."[15]

Lee's surrender extinguished any remaining hopes of success among most Texas troops. A Federal informant who witnessed the reading of Kirby Smith's April 21 address reported that the troops instantly exhibited dejection. Some overtly discussed insurrection and mass desertion. The northerner confidently declared the Confederate Army of the Trans-Mississippi defeated. A member of the 34th Texas Cavalry asserted that Kirby Smith would encounter great difficulty attempting to convince his forces to continue the struggle. He declared most of the men in the department beaten and considered it "folly" to pursue further action west of the Mississippi River. A member of the 21st Texas Cavalry wrote that he found his regiment "broken in spirit and utterly ineffective" after receiving the news. On the final day of April a Confederate seaman sailing into Galveston Harbor noted that he remained one of the few who retained hope. He asserted that the South had earned the "right to be crushed utterly."[16]

The first days of May brought a dramatic collapse of morale and discipline among Texas units, particularly after the confirmation of what one historian called the "crushing news" of Johnston's surrender, followed by that of Gen. Richard Taylor at Citronelle, Alabama. On May 1, in Fannin County, officers placed a man in the guard house because he expressed satisfaction with stories of Lee's defeat. Reports of desertions increased rapidly as men returned home to resume their civilian lives. One soldier contended that those who remained did so only to receive an honorable discharge. Another young private camped in central Texas near Caldwell scoffed at the alleged unanimity of his brigade's belligerent resolutions. "Well, if fifty votes out of our brigade is a unanimous vote then it is certainly correct." The public soon grasped the soldiers' sentiment. Houstonian William A. Craven, an acquaintance of Col. Ashbel Smith, attempted to convince the commander of Galveston's forces of the futility of further resistance. "*Your men will not fight,*" he charged.[17]

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[15] Walton, *Epitome of My Life*, 84 (1st quotation); M. Dolan to Maj. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut, Apr. 3, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, pp. 17–18 (2nd and 3rd quotations); Camilla Davis Trammell (ed.), *Seven Pines: Its Occupants and Their Letters, 1825–1872* (Houston: Distributed by Southern Methodist University Press, 1986), 207–208.

[16] Robert S. Weddle, *Plow-Horse Cavalry: The Caney Creek Boys of the 34th Texas* (Austin: Madrona Press, 1974), 158 (1st quotation); William Physick Zuber, *My Eighty Years in Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 225–226 (2nd quotation); William N. Still (ed.), *Odyssey in Gray: A Diary of Confederate Service, 1863–1865* (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1979), 301 (3rd quotation); X. B. Debray, *A Sketch of the History of Debray's 26th Regiment of Texas Cavalry* (Waco: Waco Village Press, 1961), 25; Report of Bell, May 11, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 400.

[17] Stephen B. Oates, "Texas Under the Secessionists," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 67 (Oct., 1963), 211 (1st quotation); Weddle, *Plow-Horse Cavalry*, 161; Goyne, *Lonestar and Double Eagle*, 171; Bonnie Car-

Craven's assertion accurately reflected the attitude of nearly every soldier in Texas. The decision to give up the fight proved easy for those who refused to see their home state destroyed by an overwhelming adversary. Predictably, many Texas soldiers decided to reunite with their families, who fortunately had not witnessed the horrors of war, rather than face their mortality unnecessarily. John Simmons, a Confederate soldier and long-suffering grumbler from Smith County in East Texas, asserted succinctly, "there is no use in men a-going in and getting killed without any hopes of success." He proclaimed the certainty of Union victory and, under the circumstances, looked forward to it. By the middle of May all but the most die-hard units accepted the fate of the Confederacy. At department headquarters in Shreveport, Louisiana, rumors circulated that the city would be burned and pillaged. Troops had already begun to leave for home "openly and unmolested." Soldiers there discussed the impending surrender with "unbearable" humiliation.[18]

On Sunday, May 14, approximately four hundred Confederates in Galveston attempted to organize a mutiny. Col. Ashbel Smith, apparently forewarned of the insurrection, employed Col. Barnard Timmons's 1st Texas Infantry and Col. Alfred M. Hobby's 8th Texas Infantry to aid in suppressing the uprising. He first ordered guards to both ends of the bridge connecting the island to the mainland. According to Smith's biographer, one group stood ready to turn the draw if the would-be deserters boarded the railroad cars. The colonel himself arrived just before nightfall and convinced the insurrectionists to abort their plan. Smith placed ninety-eight ringleaders under arrest and assigned them to work on fortifications. The others returned to their posts the following morning. Rumors circulated that Ashley W. Spaight's 21st Texas Infantry regiment intended to impress a train and endeavor to flee again the following night. If those men did entertain such intentions, they never acted on them.[19]

The same day as the aborted Galveston mutiny, near Harrisburg in far southeast Texas, enlisted man William Job Hale worried that his Confederate comrades east of the Mississippi River would brand the Trans-Mississippi troops traitors, unworthy of independence for not continuing the fight. Hale's letters to his wife reflect painfully conflicting sentiments doubtless shared by many Texas Confederates. He expressed his inner de-

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penter, *Old Mountain City: An Early Settlement in Hayes County* (San Antonio: Naylor Co., 1970), 92 (2nd quotation); William A. Craven to Ashbel Smith, May 10, 1865, A. Smith Papers (3rd quotation).

[18] Harrison, "Simmons Letters," 53 (1st quotation); Roberts, "Texas," 138–139; Walton, *Epitome of My Life*, 92–93; W. H. Tunnard, *A Southern Record: The History of the Third Regiment Louisiana Infantry* (Baton Rouge: Printed for the author, 1866), 336 (2nd and 3rd quotations).

[19] Magruder to Kirby Smith, May 16, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1308; Elizabeth Silverthorne, *Ashbel Smith of Texas: Pioneer, Patriot, Statesman, 1805–1886* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1982), 167; Ashbel Smith to Capt. E. P. Turner, May 15, 1865, Military Order Book, A. Smith Papers; Cotham, *Battle on the Bay*, 178; John F. Smith to Cousin, May 19, 1865, John F. Smith Letters (CAH).

sire to gain Southern independence but revealed his unwillingness to carry on a prolonged struggle. Despite Hale's fear of Southern scorn, most soldiers and citizens across the Confederacy recognized the hopelessness of a prolonged war effort and never disputed the honor of Texas forces. One Louisiana soldier, however, mocked the legendary Texas bravado. He wondered what had happened to the "three-foot Bowie-knives" and "coiled lassoes." He pondered the whereabouts of the celebrated combatants who defied all Yankees to "pollute the sacred soil of Texas." On Monday, May 15, W. W. Heartsill of Walter P. Lane's Rangers related that his comrades gathered together to discuss news reports and to speculate about their fate. Although saddened by the results, some rejoiced at the prospect of the impending peace.[20]

The day after Heartsill observed his comrades' emotions near Millican, in southern Brazos County, officers there met to determine the state of their forces. Few could promise the services of all their men. The same day, in Galveston, Ashbel Smith received a letter from a disgruntled soldier who assured him of the futility of his efforts to suppress news from the east. The author explained that soldiers in Texas knew that all troops east of the Mississippi River had been surrendered on the same terms as those offered to General Lee. He accused Smith and Magruder of prolonging the war in order to reap further profits from alleged cotton speculation. The anonymous author advised his superior that Texas troops missed their families and held no intentions of dying for the sake of his personal financial gain.[21]

The next several days marked the commencement of the actual breakup of the Texas portion of the Confederate Army of the Trans-Mississippi. Soldiers who had clung to faint hopes of victory now accepted the certainty of looming defeat. How could they accomplish what General Lee could not, especially without Johnston's reinforcement? Officers in Texas, aware of the unrest among their units, began to prepare to disband their regiments peaceably, without damage to property around the countryside. For the soldiers the time to act had arrived; take government property as compensation for their months of unpaid service immediately, or allow it to fall into the hands of their vanquishers.

A communication from General Magruder to Kirby Smith confirmed the sentiment and circumstances described by Heartsill. Magruder, informing his superior of the futility of efforts to revive the troops' spirits,

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[20] William Job Hale to Sue, May 15 [14], 1865, William Job Hale Letters (CAH); Edwin Adams Davis, *Fallen Guidon: The Saga of General Jo Shelby's March to Mexico* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 16 (quotations); Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred Ninety-one Days*, 243.

[21] Anonymous letter to Ashbel Smith, May 16, 1865, A. Smith Papers; Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 420–421; Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred Ninety-one Days*, 243.

supported the idea of dividing the property and sending the men home. Worried about the possible anarchy that loomed ahead, he concluded that the men should be given what they desired and sent home as organized as possible to prevent damage to the community. The missive's final words, "for God's sake act or let me act," revealed Magruder's desperation. Gen. John G. Walker, commander of an infantry division camped near Hempstead, supported Magruder's stance, confirming that his infantry brigades would "lay down their arms at the first appearance of the enemy." Three days later, Gen. James E. Slaughter, commanding Confederate forces at Brownsville, informed Magruder that his men considered it futile for the department to "undertake to accomplish what the Cis-Mississippi Department has failed to do." Slaughter reported that half of his forces, who also had not been paid for months, had already deserted or would soon desert, and that Magruder should not count on those who remained.[22]

The day after Magruder's plea to Kirby Smith, a soldier reported that he and the other members of Charles Welhausen's 7th Artillery battalion "went on a bender" when they mistakenly believed the war to be officially over. The next morning the men received sobering orders to march to Houston. John C. Porter, a soldier in the 18th Texas Infantry, noted that soldiers began to leave individually and in groups until, by May 18, "the camp was very thinly populated." Porter explained that the soldiers planned to break up on May 19. The officers attempted to convince them to wait, promising rations, transportation, and an equal division of the military property.[23]

Around the state, soldiers said goodbye to their comrades and began their journeys home, with or without orders. Heartsill reported that in excess of one hundred men from the 12th and 19th cavalry regiments and approximately ten from the 2nd deserted on the night of May 18. Joseph P. Blessington, member and chronicler of John G. Walker's Texas Division, observed that by the following morning most of the men in his camp had either gone or were preparing to do so. In response to officers' and civilians' last-ditch efforts to convince the men to remain in camp, one soldier noted that the speeches and donations would "last only as long as the people are afraid." Days later another quipped that the people of

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[22] Magruder and Gen. John G. Walker to Kirby Smith, May 16, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, pt. 2, vol. 48, pp. 1308 (1st quotation), 1308–1309 (2nd quotation); Brig. Gen. James E. Slaughter to Magruder, May 19, 1865, ibid., 1313–1314 (3rd quotation); Enrique D'Hamel, *The Adventures of a Tenderfoot; History of the 2nd Regiment Mounted Rifles and Company G, 33 Regiment and Captain Coopwood's Spy Company and 2nd Texas in Texas and New Mexico, by E. B. D'Hamel* (Waco: W. M. Morrison, 1965), 21.

[23] Paul C. Boethal, *The Big Guns of Fayette* (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1965), 68–69 (1st quotation); John C. Porter, "The Life of John C. Porter and a Sketch of His Experiences in the Civil War," typescript, 37 (2nd quotation) (Harold B. Simpson History Complex, Hill College, Hillsboro, Tex.).

Xavier Blanchard Debray commanded the Confederate 26th Texas Cavalry Regiment during the Civil War. His regiment maintained their organization and attempted to preserve order on the streets of Houston during the breakup. *Photograph courtesy of the Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin. DI-01711.*

Houston were "becoming Very patriortick," sending, among other things, tobacco, sugar, and coffee. He wrote that the soldiers received the supplies yet cursed the donors for "having been instrumental in bring the trubel upon us." A cavalryman and a companion who received orders to scout the countryside for deserters reported that they found no deserters—and made no effort to do so.[24]

Over the next several days officers granted official discharges to those regiments who remained in camp. On May 19, remaining members of the 12th, 19th, and 30th Texas Cavalry regiments received their discharges at Sterling, on the banks of the Little Brazos River in eastern Robertson County. The following day, fifty miles northwest of Houston at Hempstead, William Parsons's Texas Brigade secured their discharges. Charles Welhausen's Battery, the group that had enjoyed the premature bender, formally disbanded in Houston on May 22. Two other groups, Company B of the 21st Texas Cavalry and General X. B. Debray's 26th regiment of Texas Cavalry, maintained their organization and attempted to preserve order. The former worked in Austin while the latter patrolled the streets of Houston.[25]

Troops in other areas of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department, southern Arkansas and far western Louisiana, had already gone

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[24] Goyne, *Lone Star and Double Eagle*, 174 (1st quotation); William Job Hale to Sue, May 21, 1865, Hale Letters (2nd and 3rd quotations); Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred Ninety-one Days*, 244; Joseph Palmer Blessington, *The Campaigns of Walker's Texas Division*, introduction by Norman D. Brown and T. Michael Parrish (Austin: State House Press, 1994, reprint of 1875 edition), 307.

[25] Heartsill, *Fourteen Hundred Ninety-one Days*, 244–245; Blessington, *Walker's Texas Division*, 307; John Q. Anderson (ed.), *Campaigning With Parsons' Texas Cavalry Brigade C.S.A.* (Hillsboro, Tex.: Hill Junior College Press, 1967), 159; B. P. Gallaway, *Ragged Rebel: A Common Soldier in Parsons's Texas Cavalry, 1861–1865* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 130; M. Jane Johansson, *Peculiar Honor: A History of the 28th Texas Cavalry, 1862–1865* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1998), 136; Boethal, *Big Guns of Fayette*, 69; Walton, *Epitome of My Life*, 93; Debray, *History of Debray's Regiment*, 25.

home or soon would. Most of the men from Arkansas deserted a full week before the events in Texas began. Within days of the Texas troops' disbanding, Harris Flanagin, governor of Arkansas, reported "not a Confederate soldier in arms" in his state. He announced his intentions to act "as I would if no such thing as a Confederate force existed." Soldiers stationed at Shreveport, Louisiana, disbanded and traveled home on May 21, preceded by the majority of the forces at Alexandria.[26]

Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith initially refused to accept the collapse of his department. Despite knowledge of the disillusionment of his forces, he followed through with his plan to move departmental headquarters. During his trek, half of the troops in the Western Sub District of Texas deserted or saw their regiments formally disbanded. Virtually no organized regiments remained in Arkansas or Louisiana. By the time Kirby Smith reached Houston on May 27, no army remained for him to command.[27]

During the last week of May, Texas communities from Brownsville in far south Texas to Marshall in the northeast corner of the state fell victim to raiding and plundering ex-soldiers. In his account, *Shelby and His Men: or, The War in the West* (1867), Maj. John N. Edwards of Joseph Shelby's Cavalry Division summarized the breakup in disgust:

> The Texas infantry first felt the pressure, met among themselves, resolved to disband and go home, and openly made preparations for a general break-up. . . . The cavalry went next, and entire squadrons left in a night, plundering the country of every thing on the line of march. Anarchy reigned supreme in Texas. Government stores, warehouses, manufactories, and treasury offices were sacked, destroyed, or fired. Quartermaster and commissary trains were charged in regular line of battle . . . . Private dwellings and private stores were rifled remorselessly, and no citizen dared expose his horse or mule to the eyes of the greedy ruffians. . . . Arsenals were entered and their precious contents scattered wantonly over the country or fired off to celebrate drunken and infernal orgies. A mania for plunder and pillage seized upon the minds of all classes, and the women attended in crowds to urge on the robbers and quarrel among themselves about the spoils. Organization, discipline, pride, honor, manhood, dropped speedily away, and the country was filled with innumerable bodies of armed men without leaders and without restraint.[28]

Edwards, perhaps inspired by the militant rhetoric of his irrepressible commander, continued his harangue and denounced the participants. He assessed the impact of the breakup on the place of the Confederate

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[26] Kerby, *Kerby Smith's Confederacy*, 422–423.

[27] General Orders No. 48, Headquarters Trans-Mississippi Department, May 18, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1312; Stephen B. Oates, *Confederate Cavalry West of the River* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 160; Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 423.

[28] Edwards, *Shelby and His Men*, 534–535. Joseph Shelby and his men refused to disband and emigrated to Mexico rather than surrender to Union forces.

Army of the Trans-Mississippi in the history of the War Between the States:

> History must damn to all eternity these last days of the Trans-Mississippi army, when it tells how sixty thousand well-armed, well-appointed, well-fed, healthy and well-officered men, with not an enemy nearer than two hundred miles, spontaneously gave way to a universal desire for desertion, and disgracefully surrendered everything, without the exhibition of a single heroic impulse or the exercise of one manly virtue with which to crown their previous honorable endurance and well-earned reputation.[29]

The actions described by Edwards gripped the coastal area, primarily Galveston and Houston, sites of the largest garrisons in the state. Exactly one week after the attempted mutiny in Galveston, Magruder, through his adjutant general E. P. Turner, ordered Ashbel Smith to evacuate the island. His order on May 21 offered explicit directions for how and where to transport regiments, arms, stores, and slaves. Magruder ordered the stores and artillery sent to Virginia Point, on the mainland north of the island, and to Harrisburg, in far southeast Texas. He reminded Smith to spike all guns that could not be transported. The order further directed Smith to send the "most unmanageable regiment of men," escorted by their officers to Houston and to telegraph him as to which companies took which trains. Magruder proposed that Smith send impressed slaves and their overseers to Harrisburg by steamer and contact the Labor Bureau so that the slaves could be returned to their owners.[30]

Magruder ordered Smith to encourage the soldiers to conduct themselves properly by promising honorable discharges to those who cooperated. He directed Smith to offer additional clothing to men, including citizen volunteers, who would remain to help maintain order. Concerned that soldiers might begin to plunder private property, on Sunday, May 21, Smith decided to break the regiments into small groups and dispatch them out of the city. Despite his efforts to achieve an organized evacuation, the mass of discontented soldiers began pillaging the quartermaster and commissary stores that day.[31]

On the morning of May 23, H. A. Wallace, a captain in the Confederate Navy, learned of the chaos in Galveston from a youth who explained, "the whole thing is busted up." Because only a distant Federal authority existed in place of Confederate authority, Wallace "concluded to take" the Confederate boat *Island City* and "ply her between Houston and Galveston." The boy's reports proved true as soldiers and citizens

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[29] Ibid., 535.

[30] Assist. Adj. Gen. E. P. Turner to Smith, May 21, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, pt. 2, vol. 48, pp. 1316–1317.

[31] Ibid.; Silverthorne, *Ashbel Smith*, 168; A. Smith to Gen. Gordon Granger, June 23, 1865, A. Smith Papers (CAH).

continued to procure whatever they could. An angry mob demanded provisions held in a government warehouse. Meanwhile, a gang of soldiers reportedly seized a train while children exploded ammunition in the streets.[32]

The turmoil in the city spread beyond its streets. On May 24 the blockade-runner *Lark* docked at the Central Wharf. A rabble of several hundred boarded the vessel and began sacking it. When twelve men arrived with instructions to help establish order, they instead sampled the spoils. When the crew moved the ship away from the dock, members of the mob seized small boats and rowed out to continue their pursuits. A report of the incident recalled the thieves, including old women, parading through the streets with their ill-gotten gains.[33]

Some members of the 8th, 20th, 21st, and Bradford's cavalry regiments, the 2nd Texas Infantry, along with the infantrymen of Waul's Texas Legion and members of the 1st Texas Heavy Artillery patrolled the city during the evacuation to little benefit. Circumstances deteriorated to the point that refugees who feared for their lives and possessions looked to the Federal blockading fleet for protection. After the breakup, the city council passed an ordinance prohibiting soldiers inside the city limits. A member of Terry's Texas Rangers, returning home just after the affair, recalled that the mayor met his vessel at the wharf. The city leader demanded that the soldiers on board remain there until the railroad operators prepared the trains to transport them to the mainland. A bystander described the scene as a "city of dogs and desolation."[34]

Similar events gripped Houston, the island city's neighbor and site of General Magruder's headquarters, as Galveston troops arrived there. City officials, forewarned by Magruder, expected approximately three hundred men to pass through the city. Instead, an estimated one thousand men arrived by train on the morning of Tuesday, May 23. City officials charged a committee headed by Capt. C. S. Longcope with issuing rations to all the soldiers entering the city, including rioters and those volunteering for patrol, in hopes that the malcontents would move on. After initial preparations to feed four or five hundred men for a few days, Longcope and his committee arranged to feed several thousand. For obvious rea-

[32] H. A. Wallace, "Reminiscences of the Last Vestiges of a Lost Cause," (quotations), H. A. Wallace Recollections (CAH); Edward T. Cotham, *Battle on the Bay*, 180–181; Joseph E. Chance, *The Second Texas Infantry* (Austin: Eakin Press, 1984), 143–144; *Galveston Daily News*, June 7, 1865; *Flake's Bulletin*, June 4, 1865.

[33] Cotham, *Battle on the Bay*, 179; Smith to Granger, June 23, 1865, A. Smith Papers (CAH).

[34] David G. McComb, *Galveston: A History* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 81 (quotation); Chance, *Second Texas Infantry*, 142–144; Cotham, *Battle on the Bay*, 181; Henry William Graber, *The Life Record of H. W. Graber, a Terry Texas Ranger, 1861–1865: Sixty-two Years in Texas* (Austin: Statehouse Press, 1987), 258–259.

sons officials ordered all saloons closed and all liquor out of the city limits. Officers destroyed the liquor of those who chose not to obey the orders. Among the masses, a member of the 16th Texas Cavalry on a furlough to Houston reported receiving his official discharge the previous day from a "depressed" Magruder. He recalled, "both soldiers and citizens had already begun to help themselves to government property." Although another soldier recalled rumors that Magruder had placed cannon in the streets to prevent looting, disorder swept the city.[35]

At eight o'clock on the morning of May 23, a throng numbering approximately two thousand people, including women, slaves, children, and other noncombatants, stormed the ordnance building and the clothing bureau. Men rode through the streets "trailing bolts of gray cloth behind them," and others commandeered trains to transport their plunder. Soldiers stole horses from private citizens to facilitate their journeys home. Not to be outdone, citizens reversed the process and robbed the soldiers. A distraught observer noted the public's involvement "to the utter disgrace of the town!" Many soldiers deemed the affair disgraceful even as they carried off their share. While some soldiers watched but refused to participate, others gloried in their loot. Those who procured more than their portion immediately began to sell the excess swag. The size of the looters' haul prompted J. P. Osterhaus, editor of the *Bellville Countryman*, to observe that throughout the war the officers had been more successful in "preserving supplies than in issuing them."[36]

The sacking of the ordnance building and clothing bureau concluded by noon, before the arrival of another wave of soldiers from Galveston. The late arrivals, angered by the dearth of remaining rewards, threatened to ravage the city further and invade private homes before other thieves agreed to share their loot. Men from X. B. Debray's 26th, Clayton C. Gillespie's 25th, and Walter L. Mann's Texas Cavalry regiments patrolled the streets before disbanding for want of money and supplies. After the loss of this initially effective patrol of approximately one thousand men, another group of soldiers and volunteers, headed by Maj. Otto Nathusius, replaced it. With this force in place, and with little remaining to pilfer, peace returned to the streets of Houston by May 24. To ensure the safety of their private residences, a committee followed Debray's suggestion to establish a citizen patrol made up of residents from each ward of the city.

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[35] *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, May 24, 31, 1865; Mamie Yeary (ed.), *Reminiscences of the Boys in Gray, 1861–1865* (Dallas: Smith and Lamar, M.E. Church, South, 1912), 595 (quotations); Goyne, *Lone Star and Double Eagle*, 174.

[36] Wallace, "Reminiscences" (1st quotation); Craven to A. Smith, May 24, 1865 (2nd quotation), A. Smith Papers (CAH); *Bellville Countryman*, June 6, 1865 (3rd quotation); Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas*, 33–34; Ronald B. Jager, "Houston, Texas, Fights the Civil War," *Texana*, 11, no. 1 (1973), 47; Debray, *History of Debray's 26th Regiment*, 25; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, May 24, 1865.

According to W. D. Douglas, captain of the 4th ward, however, certain citizens refused to participate in the patrol and declared "most positively that they will not be compelled."[37]

On Friday, May 26, an entry in the *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph* described a placid city. No businesses opened, except that of the newspaper's editor, who proudly toiled, "whether school keeps or not." In the same issue a "voice from the pulpit" urged Houstonians and soldiers to accept the end of the war and to resume their place in the Union. Five days later Mayor William Andrews proclaimed an end to the danger in Houston and observed that the city had "almost resumed her usual appearance."[38]

Elsewhere, soldiers encamped in the countryside between Houston and Austin, along with the general public, wrought havoc on several communities. Four soldiers who left the 18th Texas Infantry on May 18, days before the chaos began in Houston, decided to travel by train from Hempstead to their homes in northeast Texas. Upon reaching the depot in Hempstead they witnessed a town "full of soldiers, breaking down doors and ransacking [private] houses." Those able to "find" horses then stole saddles and bridles. Men who could not procure a mount boarded the train. It traveled through central Texas to Navasota and on to Millican, soldiers leaping from the cars along the way to secure horses. From the latter town the four Texans continued their journey afoot. During their trek, according to the memoirs of one, they decided not to steal "after the fashion of soldiers," but to "act honestly" and solicit help from civilians.[39]

Back at Hempstead, Douglas French Forrest, a veteran of the Confederate Navy and aide of Maj. Gen. John G. Walker, described May 20 as "disgraceful . . . the darkest chapter in the gloomy history of the War." Soldiers at Hempstead sacked the ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster stores and destroyed what was of no use to them. Forrest noted that "the little town of Hempstead was utterly sacked, not only public stores carried away but shops & private houses entered and robbed." After convincing a group of thieves not to abscond with his team, Forrest lost the horses to a larger band. The looters reasoned that they merely needed a way home

[37] *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, May 31, 1865 (quotation); Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas*, 33–34; William W. White, "The Disintegration of an Army: Confederate Forces in Texas, April–June, 1865," *East Texas Historical Journal*, 26, no. 2 (1988), 44–45; Jager, "Houston Fights the Civil War," 47; Debray, *History of Debray's Regiment*, 25. According to historian Edwin Adams Davis, the men of Debray's regiment actively participated in the looting, though other sources indicate that Debray's men worked to restore order. Davis also maintains that men from Shelby's division stopped the looting of "a warehouse near the railroad depot." According to Davis, the city he described as a "Sodom and Gomorrah" was "as quiet and peaceful as the cattle on the prairies" when Shelby's men finished their business. Davis, *Fallen Guidon*, 36.

[38] *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, May 26, 31, 1865.

[39] John C. Porter, "The Life of John C. Porter," 37 (quotations).

and asked why General Walker, "who was now no better than any other man [should] have four wagons & an ambulance & they return afoot."[40]

Many of the remaining men of Walker's Division, camped in the countryside around Hempstead, left camp the following day, Sunday, May 21. Forrest reported that morning that very little remained to steal and that only the cavalry continued steadfast. He soon concluded, however, that no one appeared trustworthy. Those still in camp concluded to guard their remaining horses overnight against the "rife & suspicious looking men" who had stalked the camp that day. During his watch Forrest and two officers prevented a squad of cavalry from stealing their only remaining team.[41]

After hearing of the chaos in Houston, Forrest penned another gloomy entry in his journal. He feared that liquor and the cover of night would lead the soldiers to destroy private property in this "most disagreeable back down of the people of Texas." His mood lightened somewhat in the following day's entry. The diarist appeared to delight in telling the tale of a black man from a nearby plantation who entered his camp in search of loot. While the man rummaged, other bandits from outside the camp stole the would-be thief's horse.[42]

Other communities throughout the region experienced tumult resembling that at Hempstead. In Huntsville soldiers assailed the state penitentiary for its cloth. The robbers absconded with more than 16,880 yards of the material. The looters in Huntsville initially worked unopposed as the helpless community watched. Gen. Kirby Smith himself spent thirty-six hours there, unable to continue his journey to the new site of his headquarters because soldiers crowded the roads. The city's residents later regrouped, created a formidable defensive force financed in part by the state, and warded off a subsequent attack.[43]

Southwest of Huntsville, the small town of Navasota suffered a massive explosion resulting from the actions of a "vicious soldier." On May 23 the soldier ignited some loose powder near a warehouse that stored a great quantity of the same. The blast reportedly took the lives of at least eight citizens and soldiers, with others reported missing. Additionally, the town lost twenty structures, including the local hotel and the entire block on the north side of the road. It reportedly also shattered windows

[40] Forrest, *Odyssey in Gray*, 309. The soldiers' decision to break up apparently did not surprise Forrest. Only days earlier, at Anderson, he wrote that they would not fight. "They are whipped without a battle. Fools!" Ibid., 307.

[41] Ibid., 310 (quotation); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 422.

[42] Forrest, *Odyssey in Gray*, 312.

[43] Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas*, 35; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, May 31, June 14, 19, 1865; Ernest Wallace, *Texas in Turmoil: The Saga of Texas, 1849–1875* (Austin: Steck-Vaughn, 1965), 146; Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 423.

throughout town. The estimated value of property lost totaled nearly seventy thousand dollars.[44]

The small town of La Grange, in Fayette County, endured turbulence equal to that in larger communities. Obviously anticipating trouble, as early as May 6 the editor of the *La Grange Patriot* urged citizens to work together for protection. The expected disturbance began in a relatively organized fashion, however. On May 20 a committee chaired by Capt. I. G. Killough declared its intention to divide government property in the county among soldiers and needy families. The initial organization disappeared by Monday, May 22, with the arrival of a group of soldiers reportedly from Walker's Division. The men pilfered wagons, mules, leather, wool, and more than fifty military uniforms. Soldiers of Col. James Ebenezer McCord's 46th Texas Cavalry regiment overturned another wagon. Apparently dissatisfied with their yield, the looters also pillaged the local hat factory, stealing approximately 2,500 headpieces.[45]

The June 3 edition of the *Patriot* reported the sacking of not only the commissary stores, but the spread of the plunder to private possessions. The paper related that property around town "became the subject of *military hocus pocus* . . . that would have amused and delighted the most perfect amateur in the arts of capture." The account explained that some of the veteran troops "had not a very nice sense of discrimination between *meum* and *tuum*, and private rights were not sacredly regarded in all cases." As in Houston, late arrivals seized upon the belongings of private citizens upon failing to find government property. Thieves broke into and pillaged stores owned by men named Ujffy, Price, White, and Nichols, among others. Price lost everything to the thieves. Nichols opened his doors to prevent their destruction, only to lose everything. Another man, Henry Frosh, lost his mule, saddle, and bridle.[46]

The estimated value of damaged or stolen property in La Grange totaled nearly thirty thousand dollars, two-thirds of which was privately owned. Roughly one hundred men accounted for the greater part of the destruction. Citizens reportedly agreed that the soldiers deserved the government property for their years of service. The *Patriot's* editor, however, expressed the community's regret that the commanders failed to devise "a more equitable and orderly mode of its distribution." An entry in the *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph* concluded that the "private plundering can but receive the condemnation of all good men."[47]

The *Galveston Daily News*, quoting the *Gonzales Enquirer*, reported that

[44] *Dallas Herald*, June 15, 1865.

[45] *La Grange Patriot*, May 6, 20, 1865; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 7, 1865.

[46] *La Grange Patriot*, June 3, 1865 (quotations); *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 3, 7, 1865.

[47] *La Grange Patriot*, June 3, 1865; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 3, 7 (2nd quotation), 1865.

that small community southwest of La Grange endured two separate raids by men of Walker's Division, who claimed to have General Walker's permission to confiscate all public property. On Tuesday, May 23, the two groups stole wagons and drove off approximately three hundred government mules. The report mentioned no abuse of private property in this instance but did note similar events at the nearby communities of Columbus, Alleyton, and Halletsville.[48]

In June the editor of the *Bellville Countryman* seemed apprehensive as he printed, "quietness generally prevails throughout this county now. We hear of no further disturbances of property, public or private. All are anxiously waiting for something to turn up." One week later he reiterated his description of a tranquil county. He explained that that part of the state had experienced no upheaval "since the soldiers passed through on their way to their homes." He celebrated the apparent order throughout the area because it precluded the need for the presence of "numerous bodies of troops" quartered among them.[49]

The cities in central and south-central Texas, like those on the coast and the countryside between, suffered at the hands of disbanding soldiers. In San Antonio, upon hearing of the surrenders of Generals Joseph E. Johnston and Richard Taylor, soldiers confiscated the public gold and silver and established committees to oversee its distribution. According to one account, each enlisted man and officer received approximately $160. No such organization governed the distribution of other public property. In fact, according to newspaper reports, women, children, and other civilians received greater shares in the scramble than did the soldiers. At least one citizen, A. S. Kottwitz, reported damage to his private business. Here again latecomers threatened private property and even their more fortunate comrades for a share of the spoils. Another account tells of an attack by soldiers on a store of luxury goods because the looters believed the owner to be a cotton speculator. Some soldiers resented cotton speculators, many of whom allegedly profited handsomely during the war.[50]

Outside the city, further lawlessness ravaged the countryside. Northeast of San Antonio, in the German community of New Braunfels, one

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[48] *Galveston Daily News*, May 30, 1865.

[49] *Bellville Countryman*, June 10, 17, 1865.

[50] Walker, "Reconstruction in Texas," 40–50; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 5, 1865; Wallace, *Texas in Turmoil*, 145. According to one newspaper, the citizens calmed after making arrangements to feed soldiers as they arrived, and the city became "comparatively tranquil again" by May 30. Douglas Forrest, who reached San Antonio from Hempstead in early June, recorded no disturbances. These accounts notwithstanding, Enrique D'Hamel, a soldier who arrived in the city from Brownsville two weeks later, found the city in "great disorder." This discord, caused by what D'Hamel described as "jayhawkers, thieves, and burglars," not necessarily soldiers, continued despite the nightly patrol of the civilians' "Vigilance Committee." A Confederate refugee en route to Mexico described San Antonio as a city teeming with "desperadoes" who had "taken possession of the city and were rioting in old royal fashion." The same emigrant

civilian reported the everyday theft of horses in broad daylight. Organized groups of ex-soldiers regularly preyed on the property of residents in the area. The same citizen questioned if peace would bring order out of the chaos and compared the condition of the state to a wounded animal, concluding, "the last convulsions are always the most dangerous."[51]

Farther north the state's capital city of Austin lured numerous disbanded soldiers as well as general rabble. On May 25 Amelia Barr, later an author, then living in Austin, noted that soldiers arrived by the hour without officers or orders. Another witness, De Witt Clinton Baker of Austin, confirmed the description of the chaotic scene, pointing out, however, that the minute the soldiers learned the location of the quartermaster and commissary stores, "an immediate direction was given to the uneasy spirit which prevailed." Soldiers and others thronged to all government buildings and demanded access. When denied their goal, they gained entry forcibly. At that point, according to Baker, "the grab game commenced."[52]

"There is nothing but plunder and sack going on," Barr wrote, "and the citizens are as bad as the soldiers." Baker concurred, listing "numbers of men who had never taken any part in the fighting part of the war . . . women, children, and negroes" among the looters. Barr described the condition of the town and surrounding areas as "dreadful." She wrote that she could not even sew for all of the "looting and quarreling going on." The future novelist astutely observed, "it seems as if every one has a claim against the Confederacy, and were paying themselves." She lamented, "my heart aches for Texas, subjugated and all lost, even honor."[53]

The depredations in Austin continued into June as ex-soldiers and civilians pillaged government stables and distributed horses, saddles, and other supplies. Former soldiers focused primarily on procuring horses and mules to facilitate their journeys home. At least initially, they concentrated on government property. This they stole even from each other, whether the victim "was going to a wedding or funeral, for the doctor or to church, no difference if a hundred miles from home." Raiders stole or destroyed close to sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder and half as much lead from local arsenals, resulting in numerous serious injuries. Others

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reported, "they had plundered a dozen stores, had sacked and burned a commissary train." *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 5, 1865; Enrique B. D'Hamel, *The Adventures of a Tenderfoot: History of 2nd Regiment Mounted Rifles and Company G, 33rd Regiment and Captain Coopwood's Spy Company and 2nd Texas in Texas and New Mexico, by E. B. D'Hamel* (Waco: W. M. Morrison, 1965), 21–22; Forrest, *Odyssey in Gray*, 317–321; Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 428.

[51] Goyne, *Lone Star and Double Eagle*, 172.

[52] Frank Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, p. 14 (quotations), (CAH); Amelia Barr, *All the Days of My Life: An Autobiography* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1913), 249–250.

[53] Amelia E. Barr, *All the Days of My Life*, 249–250; Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, p. 14.

seized household goods, including leather, cotton, flour, sugar, bacon, and salt. They walked away with fifty thousand pairs of cotton cards and even large quantities of quinine. One woman justified her actions, explaining that her "brother-in-law had been in the war all through the thing," and she had "never realized a cent from it yet." Baker described the prevailing attitude as "hold fast what you get and catch what you can."[54]

Baker concluded, "the whole affair looked more like holiday sport than sober reality." Although the "riotous mob" unfortunately shifted its focus from public goods to "the pillage of private property," an excerpt from his account of the chaos in the city depicts an almost comical scene:

> Individuals might be seen going home loaded in the most grotesque manner. Here a man with a bale of rope in his hands, and a string of tin cups around his neck; there another with two or three old saddles on his back. Here one with a can of balsam copaiba; there another staggering under the weight of a heavy side of leather. Here a woman might be heard vociferating to a negro an order to take a sack of flour to her house. . . . Cotton was borne off by the bale, sackful, armful, hatful, pocketful, by men, women, children and negroes, irrespective of services rendered in the army of the Confederate States.[55]

The state treasury presented an especially enticing target to looters. On June 11 at 9:00 P.M. approximately forty disbanded soldiers from South Texas, led by a man known only as Rabb and still carrying their colors, rode into the capital city and demanded payment. Citizens initially paid reverence to the scruffy horsemen, who marched directly to the Capitol and forced their way into the vault. At that point, warned by Gen. N. G. Shelley of the impending attack, Capt. George R. Freeman sounded the church bell to alarm the local guard. The captain reported that he could already hear the robbers' attacks on the vaults from his home.[56]

After seizing $17,000 of the approximately $27,000 of available gold, and ignoring the silver, Confederate currency, Louisiana banks bills, state bonds, and other valuables, the thieves fled the city. The citizen-guard fired on the group, mortally wounding one named Campbell. The would-be thief fired back at least once, wounding Hamilton, before falling. Campbell died of his wounds several days later. No one pursued those who escaped.[57]

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[54] Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, pp. 14–16 (quotations), 28; Barr, *All the Days of My Life*, 249–250; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, May 30, 1865; Wallace, *Texas in Turmoil*, 145–146.

[55] Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, pp. 14–16, 25.

[56] Barr, *All the Days of My Life*, 250; Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 429; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 16, 1865; Report of George R. Freeman to Gen. Gordon Granger (cited hereafter as Freeman Report), George R. Freeman Papers (CAH); Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, pp. 22, 24, 26.

[57] Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 429; *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 16, 1865; Freeman Report (CAH); Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, pp. 23, 26, 28. The *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph* de-



George R. Freeman led a group of local men in their efforts to defend the state treasury in Austin from looters on June 11, 1865. *Photograph courtesy of the Center for Amerıican History, University of Texas at Austin. DI-01713.*

Romanticized tales abound claiming that Gen. Joseph Shelby's men again rode in and saved the day. Captain Freeman, however, presented a report of the incident "for the purpose of correcting exaggerated and erroneous statements made . . . by a party claiming to be conversant with the facts." Although at least two accounts of Shelby's march to Mexico depict a violent gun battle in which the general's men killed every raider, Freeman insisted that Shelby's men never participated. According to his report, two of Shelby's captains arrived to offer the group's services *after* the episode. Freeman declined their offer because he and his own men "were already masters of the situation," though he asked them to camp near the Capitol, to be available if needed. Despite the accounts by Shelby's chroniclers that tell of raiders who "fell in writhing heaps, blood spattering . . . as Shelby's men fired again and again," Freeman insisted that "there was simply a volley from perhaps half a dozen rifles [those of Freeman's men] and the groans of a single wounded man."[58]

The breakup of regiments and the seizure of property also befell the South Texas region, from which the state treasury looters came. A civilian who left Brownsville on the last day of May en route to Houston reported "a great deal of robbery on the road." A soldier stationed at Brownsville recalled the men there seizing government cotton before abandoning their posts. Gen. James E. Slaughter and Col. John S. Ford agreed to distribute the public property among their men upon their return to the city after the May 13 Battle of Palmito Ranch. There, Ford's Confederates defeated Col. Theodore H. Barrett's Union force in a relatively small en-

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scribed the group as "12 or 15" men and, like Hamilton's account, estimated the monetary loss at $17,000. Kerby estimated it at "$5,000 in gold."

[58] Freeman Report (CAH); Brown, "Annals of Travis County," 23–24 (1st, 2nd, and 4th quotations); Daniel O'Flaherty, *General Jo Shelby, Undefeated Rebel* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), 238 (3rd quotation); Davis, *Fallen Guidon*, 40–43. Freeman's report states that only eighteen men assisted him. Of the sources cited here, only O'Flaherty's account places Shelby himself at the scene.

gagement. Recent scholarship has dispelled the longstanding myth that Ford's men knew nothing of the Confederacy's demise. In fact they fought primarily to protect from Union hands a large quantity of cotton owned by Richard King and Mifflin Kenedy. To a lesser extent, they fought for pride, a chance to inflict one last defeat upon their Yankee foes. At any rate, they knew that the war was lost, and they certainly did not fight with realistic hopes of achieving Southern independence. Thus, the motives and actions of the Confederate Texans who fought at Palmito Ranch, with full knowledge of the war's outcome, proved comparable to those of their peers around the state. Despite Slaughter's cooperation, according to the *Matamoras Daily Ranchero*, the troops arrested their former general and held him until they received the property they desired. This achieved, the men released Slaughter and left town without further commotion. Some of Ford's men, however, later wandered the area, robbing travelers regardless of their loyalties or position.[59]

Thomas North, a Northern civilian across the border in Matamoras, Mexico, reported that the disbanded soldiers organized into "predatory bands" and roamed the countryside. These bandits robbed all who passed but, according to North, "took special delight" in victimizing the area's Northern merchants. He reported that the thieves robbed a particular store of approximately three or four thousand dollars' worth of goods. With no legal remedy and faced with the threat of retaliation, the victims remained helpless.[60]

The turmoil of the breakup that swept through the Brownsville region at the southern extremity of the state also hit the northeastern area. Disorder reached Tyler earlier than it did other cities. The Union prisoners at Camp Ford, the prisoner-of-war camp in Tyler, received their paroles on May 13. By the following day most of the soldiers assigned to various duties at the prison had vacated their posts. Those who remained, mostly officers, commemorated the occasion by drinking themselves to intoxication with those prisoners still in town.[61]

The looting of Confederate property began on Saturday, May 20, when soldiers looted the stores of the Field Transportation Department operated by Capt. S. C. Kirby. That same day, amid much "grumbling,

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[59] *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 16, 1865; D'Hamel, *Adventures of a Tenderfoot*, 21 (quotation); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 420; *Matamoras Daily Ranchero*, May 31, 1865; Robert W. Shook, "Federal Occupation and Administration of Texas, 1865–1870" (Ph.D. diss., North Texas State University, 1970), 21; Phillip Thomas Tucker, *The Final Fury: Palmito Ranch, the Last Battle of the Civil War* (Mechanicsburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 2001), vii–ix, 61–63, 165; Jeffrey Wm. Hunt, *The Last Battle of the Civil War: Palmetto Ranch* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), 1–4, 129–130, 136.

[60] Thomas North, *Five Years in Texas; or, What You Did Not Hear During the War from January 1861 to January 1866* (Cincinnati: Elm Street Printing Co., 1871), 183.

[61] Vicki Betts, *Smith County, Texas, in the Civil War* (Tyler, Tex.: Jack T. Greer Memorial Fund of the Smith County Historical Society, 1978), 77.

growling, and discontent," works commander Col. G. H. Hill attempted to protect Confederate property by issuing furloughs to all interested soldiers. In response to the looting by Kirby's men, Hill organized his remaining troops to act as guards. That day Hill wrote to Maj. Thomas G. Rhett, "you never in your life saw such excitement." He informed Rhett of his plan to close and defend remaining stores, but he predicted it would "be very hard to keep the men together long, [and] . . . almost impossible to feed them." Soldiers at the depot that day distributed corn, wheat, and other supplies to the citizens of Tyler. Hill closed his correspondence to Rhett with a request for "a good officer to help me close things up."[62]

The following day, mob rule continued as soldiers raided the quartermaster stores in Tyler and the medical laboratory three miles outside of town. After hearing of the depredations, Hill and several of his men arrived in time to disperse the mob, which then proceeded to sack the post's stable. The colonel found twenty horses and mules saddled and awaiting theft, though he recovered these. He claimed that he and only six men stopped the approximately thirty raiders and arrested two. His small force managed to return much of the booty and dumped twenty barrels of whiskey into the street. The next day Hill offered his remaining supplies to Joseph Shelby for his excursion to Mexico. He informed the general that he should immediately send a force to retrieve the supplies because he considered the post "at the mercy of the mob." A distraught Hill concluded, "the grab game is now the order of the day."[63]

On Tuesday and Wednesday the women of Tyler attempted to loot what remained in care of the Commissary Department. Colonel Hill turned away the first attack. During the Wednesday raid Col. Yandell Blackwell of Shelby's Division arrived with approximately one hundred men. Blackwell positioned his men to protect the remaining supplies and dared the thieves to advance. Several of Blackwell's men then ran a trail of gunpowder across the entrance to the arsenal building. According to Edwards's account, "not a skulker moved," though the women goaded them on. The throng dispersed, and Shelby's soldiers went to work collecting the very material they had protected. They considered themselves deserving of the property because they remained an organized unit under some semblance of Confederate authority. In addition to wagons, horses, and mules, the men gathered "great loads of shell and canister, grape and shrapnell, Enfield cartridges, revolvers, caps and accouterments of all kinds."[64]

[62] William A. Albaugh III, *Tyler, Texas, C.S.A.* (Harrisburg, Penn.: The Stackpole Co., 1958), 205 (quotations); Betts, *Smith County, Texas*, 77.

[63] Albaugh, *Tyler, Texas*, 205–207 (quotations); Betts, *Smith County, Texas*, 77–78.

[64] Edwards, *Shelby and His Men*, 535–536 (quotations); Albaugh, *Tyler, Texas*, 207–208; Davis, *Fallen Guidon*, 33–34; Betts, *Smith County, Texas*, 78.

On May 27 the journal entry of Kate Stone, a Louisiana refugee living in Tyler, reflected the ongoing chaos in the community, even after Blackwell's actions:

> Anarchy and confusion reign over all. Jayhawking is the order of the day. The soldiers are disbanding throughout the Department and seizing Government property wherever they can find it. The government offices here have been sacked. All work is over and those who can are going home. . . . The officers are scattering to the four winds, and Jayhawkers and private soldiers are stopping and robbing them whenever found. Col. Bradforte was the first here to desert his post. We hear that the mules were taken from his ambulance and wagon. Maj. Rhett, Gen. Hayes, and indeed everyone we hear of has suffered the same fate . . . . Gen. Kirby Smith has also been robbed.[65]

Stone expressed satisfaction in knowing that nothing remained for the Union forces. She quipped, "'to the victor belongs the spoils,' but he will not get his due in this Department." Stone expressed further satisfaction in seeing the soldiers seize the public property, but hoped that they would not allow the "desperadoes" to rob the civilians. Apparently, those soldiers who robbed their officers did not qualify as "desperadoes." Interestingly, Stone wrote, "some of the people deserve robbing, for they joined with the soldiers in sacking the Departments." Although Stone clearly believed that the soldiers, not the citizens, deserved the Confederate property, she reported receiving gifts from her "friends in the Ordinance [*sic*] Department." She reported her "delight" with her "extra furnishings."[66]

Residents of Tyler also witnessed an explosion similar to that at Navasota. The blast at Tyler, however, caused more humor than harm. In an attempt to destroy the remaining gunpowder, local men poured it into a stream near town. When they realized that the water would not destroy the explosive substance the men concluded to pour a trail of powder from the stream and ignite it with their rifles. The ensuing explosion shattered windows throughout town and demolished the arsenal building. A later newspaper account reported that the explosion left "a hole in the earth big enough to plant a battleship." One version of the event asserted that the townspeople arrived at the scene to find the men alive but with "most of their clothing blown off." Capt. James P. Douglas, in charge of the fiasco, reportedly quipped to the local newspaper editor, H. V. Hamilton, "Van, we've played hell."[67]

Farther east, near the Louisiana border, discord swept the city of Mar-

[65] Anderson, *Brokenburn*, 345–346.

[66] Ibid., 345, 348.

[67] *Tyler Daily Courier Times*, Oct. 3, 1928 (1st quotation); Betts, *Smith County, Texas*, 78 (2nd quotation); Albaugh, *Tyler, Texas*, 219–220 (3rd quotation).

shall, site of a major arsenal for the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department. Historian Randolph B. Campbell asserted that Confederate troops in the area exhibited weariness as early as mid-April. Campbell correctly observed that, "conditions around Marshall in April and May, 1865, were apparently typical of East Texas." In the weeks before the breakup, soldiers around the town had assailed citizens, prompting an order restricting the issuance of passes to soldiers and detailing a cavalry patrol to arrest offenders.[68]

All work on fortifications at Marshall ceased on May 14. By May 20 officers at the post issued furloughs to remaining men who wished to return to their residences in time to harvest their wheat. When the breakup in Marshall began and sentries deserted their posts, the powder mill and ammunition manufactory immediately fell victim to locals, blacks, soldiers, and even children. Here, as in Tyler, Shelby's men availed themselves of the supplies. This time, however, no offer had been made.[69]

Khleber M. Van Zandt, a former major in the 7th Texas Infantry, served as area tax collector for the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department. Upon hearing of Lee's surrender, and citing the need among citizens of Marshall, Van Zandt arranged to leave open the local government warehouses. Word of the opportunity spread quickly, and the community descended on the stores. He maintained that "there was no desire on the part of the people to take more than they needed, and the supplies were well distributed." During the breakup soldiers who traveled through Marshall found no further provisions offered because the soldiers' home, run by the Ladies Aid Society, had fallen victim to the chaos. Patients at the military hospital found themselves without caretakers when their attendants deserted them.[70]

Private property in and around Marshall also fell victim to the bedlam, though it is unclear in this instance whether the perpetrators were civilians or soldiers. The local newspaper reported the cutting of area telegraph lines. Two crooks absconded with three bales of cotton and a handcar from the home of James Wagnon, several miles from town, near the Southern Pacific Railroad. The following night thieves stole two horses from the stable of Reverend T. B. Wilson. Maj. John F. Womack reported the burglary of his home and smokehouse. From the former the

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[68] Randolph B. Campbell, *A Southern Community in Crisis: Harrison County, Texas, 1850–1880* (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1983), 218–219 (quotation); General Orders No. 27, Headquarters Churchill's Division, Apr. 18, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1282.

[69] Clive J. Luke, *Marshall Powder Mill Site: The 1973–1974 Excavation* (Austin: State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 1978), 9–10; *Marshall Texas Republican*, June 2, 1865; Max Lale, "The Military Occupation of Marshall, Texas, by the 8th Illinois Volunteer Infantry U.S.A., 1865," *Military History of Texas and the Southwest*, 13, no. 3 (1976), 41–42.

[70] Lale, "Military Occupation of Marshall," 41–42 (quotation); *Marshall Texas Republican*, May 26, 1865.

thieves pocketed jewelry and other valuables. Other reported losses around the town included various kinds of livestock. The local newspaper editor, R. W. Loughery, declared it necessary to "lock all the doors and button down the windows of dwellings to keep out burglars; to take in every household article at night, and place it under lock and key." He wrote, "this is no sensational paragraph." Finally, he alluded to "a certain amount of rascality, thieving and demoralization rarely equaled."[71]

During the days that followed the breakup in Marshall, the danger of a massive explosion at the powder mill and magazine loomed. In his paper Loughery warned the locals of the danger created by the recklessness of what he described as a "motley crowd" of looters, including men and boys, soldiers and citizens. A Major Alexander staged a small explosion to demonstrate the severity of the potential disaster. Alexander's explosion shattered windows in nearby houses. Loughery further warned his readers that the magazine contained another sixty thousand pounds of powder, in addition to the little ammunition that remained. The explosion Loughery anticipated occurred three months after the breakup. The reported death toll included at least one Union soldier, Corp. George Bottle, of the 8th Illinois Volunteer Infantry. W. A. Adair, only a child at the time, later told his grandson that he recalled seeing the bodies of Union soldiers thrown high into the air.[72]

Another border community, Clarksville, across the Red River from Indian Territory, witnessed the pillage of government and private property. On three different occasions returning soldiers and local citizens raided the sugar supply at Bryarly's landing. In addition to the public supply stored there, the thieves escaped with large quantities owned by R. M. Hopkins, a Mr. Wilson, and Joseph Bryarly. The robbers' haul included the entire worth of Bryarly, a soldier who had yet to return from service. After admitting that returning soldiers committed at least the first robbery, the local newspaper printed a scathing indictment of the other thieves:

> We understand that an officer of that bloodless body, the *reserve* corps, who never faced a more dangerous enemy than these Sugar barrels, has been prominent in the action. . . . On Wednesday last, these heroes captured a wagon load of Sugar which had been purchased . . . by REAL soldiers . . . men who had not been fed regularly on Sugar, but somewhat on lead; and these heroes of victorious campaigns against private property pounced upon and divided it.[73]

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[71] Mrs. E. M. Loughery, *War and Reconstruction Times in Texas: 1861–1865* (2nd ed.; Austin: Von-Boeckmann Jones, 1914), 31–32.

[72] *Marshall Texas Republican*, June 2, 1865; Lale, "Military Occupation of Marshall," 45; Luke, *Marshall Powder Mill Site*, 10. Loughery also expressed his desire for local citizens to retrieve firearms taken by blacks during the chaos, although he believed that they had "no evil intention" and that they merely intended to sell the weapons.

[73] *Clarksville Standard*, June 10, 1865.

Other small communities in North and East Texas suffered at the hands of looters. In Gilmer, the owners of a new steam-powered shoe factory found it virtually destroyed. Citizens and soldiers alike robbed food stores in Mt. Pleasant, Rusk, and Jefferson. One commissary officer reported losses of "28,000 bushels of corn, 418,000 pounds of flour, 9,000 bushels of wheat, 66,000 pounds of bacon, 19,000 pounds of salt, [and] 1,238,000 pounds of sugar." At Crockett, Kirby Smith himself reported witnessing "squads of men going to their homes, taking with them different species of public property."[74]

According to his biographer, when Kirby Smith reached Houston on May 27, he considered himself "a general without an army." During his trek he witnessed the disintegration of his forces and described undisciplined hordes "thronging the roads, suspending travel and making life and property insecure." Initially unwilling to concede his authority, Kirby Smith demanded a report from Magruder on "this most unexpected and humiliating conduct." Further, two days after reaching Houston, he called for a court of inquiry to determine the "causes and manner of the disbandment of the troops in the District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona."[75]

Kirby Smith's court traced the dissolution of the forces in the department to the demoralization that swept the *civilian* population of Texas after Lee's surrender. That sentiment, according to the findings, profoundly affected the soldiers, who acquiesced to the "feeling of non resistance spread among them by the people of the state." Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, the military court found that the citizens submitted before the soldiers. The court also rightfully absolved the officers of any responsibility for the actions of their charges, judging them helpless to prevent the disgraceful behavior. The officers should not be held responsible, according to the court, for "the acts of an armed and overwhelming mob who had become deaf alike to the dictates of duty, reason, and honor."[76]

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[74] Shook, "Federal Occupation of Texas," 21 (1st quotation); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 423 (2nd quotation); Wallace, *Texas in Turmoil*, 146. Across the Louisiana border in Shreveport, few soldiers remained by May 19. Those who remained descended the Red River on pontoon boats or stole horses or mules from local farmers the following day. Most refused to accept official discharge or parole. On May 21 the people of Shreveport, more citizens than soldiers, flooded the streets and commenced looting government property. A soldier who witnessed the scene described it as "awful, terrible beyond portrayal." Soldiers found a supply of millions of dollars in Confederate currency, a bitter reminder of their months of unpaid service. Speculators fervently purchased the stolen goods while the remaining Confederate officers fled the city. In the words of a witness, "the stars and bars mysteriously departed, but citizens in fine apparel became quite numerous." Tunnard, *A Southern Record*, 337–338; John D. Winters, *The Civil War in Louisiana* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 423–424.

[75] Joseph Howard Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith, C.S.A.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 473–474 (1st–3rd quotations); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 425 (4th quotation).

[76] Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 474 (quotations); Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 425.

On May 30, the day after the meeting of the court of inquiry, Gen. Kirby Smith delivered his final address to the soldiers of his defunct army. Although his court managed to place much of the blame for the soldiers' actions on the broken will of the public, the general's address placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Texas Confederates themselves. Addressing the soldiers directly, Kirby Smith began by explaining his motivation for refusing to surrender and for his decision to relocate his headquarters to Houston, before berating the Texans for their actions:

> My purpose was to concentrate the entire strength of the Department, await negotiations, and, if possible, secure terms alike honorable to soldiers and citizens. Failing in this, I intended to struggle to the last; and with an army united in purpose, firm in resolve, and battling for the right, I believed God would yet give us victory. I reached here to find the Texas troops disbanded and hastening to their homes. They had forsaken their colors and their commanders; had abandoned the cause for which we were struggling, and appropriated the public property to their personal use.
>
> Soldiers! I am left a commander without an army—a General without troops. You have made your choice. It was unwise and unpatriotic, but it is final. I pray you may not live to regret it. The enemy will now possess your country, and dictate his own laws. You have volunteerily destroyed your organizations, and thrown away all means of resistance.[77]

That same day Kirby Smith declared his department open to Federal occupation. Of his ruined department he concluded, "the soldier and citizen alike, weary of war, are ready to accept the authority and yield to the laws of the United States." Kirby Smith officially surrendered the Confederate Army of the Trans-Mississippi aboard the Union steamer *Fort Jackson* in Galveston harbor on June 2, 1865, on terms similar to those earlier offered to Lee.[78]

During the breakup, and for the three weeks between the official surrender of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department and the arrival of Federal troops, no organized state or national force offered protection to the public. The Confederate national government ceased to exist, as did the authority of the state government. Many former Confederate military and civilian officials, including ex-generals Kirby Smith and Magruder, and former governor Pendelton Murrah, urged citizens and soldiers to work together to maintain order and preserve public property, before themselves fleeing the country amid rumors regarding their fate at the hands of the victors. In addition to the attempts made by these offi-

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[77] Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 474–475; *Clarksville Standard*, June 17, 1865.

[78] Kirby Smith to Sprague, May 30, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 193–194 (quotation); Parks, *General Edmund Kirby Smith*, 478; Terms of Surrender of Confederate Trans-Mississippi Army, May 26, June 2, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, pp. 600–601.

cials, local citizens banded together in communities around the state to protect themselves and their property from returning soldiers, jayhawkers, and each other.

The officials' pleas scarcely affected individuals intent on pillage, just as their earlier "fight-on" addresses to soldiers fell on deaf ears. Governor Murrah offered the most notable attempt to calm troubled public affairs. On May 25 from Houston, he issued a proclamation to local law enforcement officials around Texas. Murrah asked county sheriffs, civil and military officials, and "all good citizens" to "collect up and preserve all . . . public property." Despite his earnest appeal for the protection of property, the governor's message assumed a tone of helplessness. He realized the futility of attempting to regain lost property and apparently hoped only to avoid violence and total chaos. Because this property belonged to the public, Murrah reasoned:

> [J]ustice forbids that it should be destroyed or appropriated without legal authority, by individuals or combination of individuals, in payment for their claims against the Confederacy. If it is to be distributed to the citizens and soldiers, it should be distributed in proportion to their claims. It is not right that one should receive full payment by an unlawful seizure of public property, and others receive nothing. I have no allusion to property already distributed among the soldiers.[79]

Five days later a disgusted Kirby Smith asked the governor to deploy virtually nonexistent state troops to maintain order and protect property. Murrah's futile entreaty to the inhabitants of his state, however, represented the final forlorn attempt by an organized body above the local level before the arrival of Federal troops. From there the ultimate responsibility fell to the residents of Texas to watch over their respective communities. Around the state, citizens formed "home guards" for protection, with varying degrees of participation and success. The editor of the *Clarksville Standard*, Charles De Morse, expressed statewide sentiment in an editorial titled "Mutual Protection."

> Upon the disbandment of large armies great numbers of stragglers pass singly, or in small bodies to their homes. It would not be consistent with our knowledge of human nature, to suppose that all those individuals, or squads are governed by strict principles of honor. It therefore becomes necessary that communities should band together for mutual protection; the protection of life, and property.[80]

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[79] *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 3, 1865 (quotations); Frederick Ann Meiners, "The Texas Governorship, 1861–1865: Biography of an Office" (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, 1985), 378; Frank Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, p. 17 (CAH). Murrah also called a special session of the state legislature to meet in Austin on July 6 and for an election of delegates on June 19 to a state convention. Neither took place.

[80] Kerby, *Kirby Smith's Confederacy*, 425; Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas*, 36; *Clarksville Standard*, June 10, 1865.

De Morse proudly proclaimed the town's success in preventing extensive looting and their desire and capability to maintain that good track record. It remains unclear whether De Morse aimed to congratulate his readers or deter potential plunderers:

> The citizens of Clarksville, and vicinity . . . have endeavored to make the supplies of subsistence in their midst do the utmost possible good, and follow the natural order of distribution. All supplies are gone now; and they have been distributed to indigent women, and to soldiers returning to their homes. In this a good work has been done, amidst occasional reported threats of disturbance, and pillage. . . . Our citizens are organized, and ready at a moment's warning; and if there are any who still feel like trying the experiment, they are officially invited to come. Their reception shall be very warm, and prompt—a true soldiers' greeting; and if they do not carry away much in their wagons, or on their ponies, they may in their bread baskets. We have plenty of arms, and ammunition, and some tried soldiers to use them.

The item concluded by attributing most of the depredations to anyone other than Confederate soldiers. For what De Morse considered the exceptions who "appropriated" what they considered owed them for their years of service, he apologized. He could find "no plausible excuse," however, for "the strictly felonious actions of citizen plunderers, of both public, and private property."[81]

An announcement in the same edition reminded citizens of their duty to serve the community by assisting with the community's home guard, the "Red River Guards." The statement called for the protectors to meet each morning at nine o'clock at the courthouse square. To pressure residents to serve, the leaders of the guard considered those who neglected to perform "punctually" as "abandoning the organization, and not entitled to its protection."[82]

Most communities survived the weeks between the breakup and the arrival of Federal troops by depending on such forces as the Red River Guards. Citizens at such locales as Austin, Huntsville, and Marshall also relied on homegrown organizations. In the capital the city council adopted a resolution on June 4 calling for a volunteer police force "in view of the disorder and lawlessness then prevailing at Austin." Residents of many other towns and cities looked to the remnants of Confederate regiments, those of X. B. Debray and A. M. Hobby in Houston and Galveston, respectively, for example.[83]

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[81] *Clarksville Standard*, June 10, 1865.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Frank Brown, "Annals of Travis County," ch. 24, p. 22 (quotation), (CAH); *Houston Tri-weekly Telegraph*, June 14; Lale, "Military Occupation of Marshall," 42.

The single lingering organized Confederate regiment in Texas, Joseph Shelby's Missourians, remains the most intriguing of the "defenders." During their march to Mexico these men both restored order and plundered public stores for supplies themselves. Before reaching Mexico, according to one account, Shelby's men "acquired" an impressive assortment of arms, including "ten brand-new Napoleon howitzers, 40,000 rounds of small ammunition, bushels of gun caps, pistols, and cartridges, and 500 dragoon sabres." Although both modern and contemporary authors romanticized the details of the regiment's postwar exploits, the contingent's presence and role in restoring order in certain cities after the breakup is evident. In addition to their other actions during the breakup, Shelby's men assisted citizens in such communities as Waxahachie and Waco after the army's disintegration.[84]

On May 29, 1865, Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan assumed command of the newly created Federal Military Division of the Southwest. Charged with preserving order in Texas until the establishment of civil government and with carrying out the surrender of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department, Federal units under the direction of Sheridan's subordinate, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, entered the state in late June. Union soldiers marched into northeast Texas, along the Rio Grande in South Texas, and occupied Galveston. While these units advanced, Sheridan organized an additional 9,500 cavalrymen into two columns with Major Generals George A. Custer and Wesley Merritt commanding. Sheridan directed Merritt's men to San Antonio and Custer's column to Austin. The number of Federal soldiers in postwar Texas peaked at approximately fifty-two thousand immediately after the initial occupation. Despite the unavoidable resentment exhibited by some Texans, local officials in Marshall welcomed the sight of an organized body of soldiers intent on restoring order and safety to their lives and community. Residents of other Texas towns doubtless shared these sentiments.[85]

Federal authorities established stations at sites around the state at Houston, Galveston, Bonham, San Antonio, Marshall, and Brownsville. At these locations former Confederates could take the oath of allegiance to the United States, receive their paroles, and return government property taken during the breakup. Persons discovered in possession of stolen public property could be treated "as prisoners of war, sent north for imprisonment, and [have] their property forfeited." General

[84] Daniel O'Flaherty, *General Jo Shelby: Undefeated Rebel* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), 235 (quotation); John N. Edwards, *Shelby and His Men*, 536–537; Edwin Adams Davis, *Fallen Guidon*, 33.

[85] Report of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, May 29, 1865–November 14, 1866, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 297–303; Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas*, 40; Lale, "Military Occupation of Marshall," 42.

Granger officially deemed all lawbreakers, including jayhawkers, horse thieves, and guerillas, "enemies of the human race" who would be "dealt with accordingly."[86]

Around the state Union soldiers traveled to communities to establish order and collect property. On Thursday, June 22, Granger ordered the 23rd Iowa Volunteers from Houston to Columbus, one hundred miles west of that city and site of some disturbances during the breakup, to "preserve order and protect public and private property." Charged with the same task, the 114th Ohio Volunteers journeyed by rail to Millican, in Brazos County. A farmer in Denton County recalled an unnamed regiment of black soldiers searching for mules with the "C.S." brand. By the end of the month Sheridan announced that the presence of Federal units provided for the safe return of the state's war refugees. In the same order, the general declared home guards illegal, insisting that the U.S. military's presence furnished sufficient protection. Finally, contending that the influence of the state's residents could "put down this species of robbery and murder," Sheridan announced his intention to hold local communities responsible for the actions of guerillas and other rogues in their respective areas.[87]

In correspondence to General Grant on July 1, 1865, Sheridan declared the state of Texas "ready for its provisional governor if it is the wisdom of the President to send one." In Austin a force of thirty men (including ex-Confederate soldiers), under the command of the state treasury protector, Capt. George R. Freeman, attempted with Granger's consent to preserve order until the arrival of Federal soldiers. Granger's units, including the 1st Iowa and the 7th and 12th Indiana Volunteer Cavalry regiments, occupied the capital in late July and prepared to aid in establishing the new provisional government. Upon arrival, as a show of force these units erected a stockade named the "bull pen" to hold lawbreakers. On the evening of Tuesday, July 25, at five o'clock, Federal soldiers raised the United States flag in Austin for the first time since early 1861.[88]

The surrender of the Confederate Department of the Trans-Mississippi differed significantly from that of other Southern departments. Sheridan indignantly reported, "there is nothing practical in the surren-

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[86] General Orders No. 4, Headquarters District of Texas, June 19, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 929.

[87] Special Orders No. 2, Headquarters District of Texas, June 22, 1865, O.R.A., ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 969 (1st quotation); David J. Eddleman Collection (University of North Texas Archives); General Orders No. 5, Headquarters Military Division of the Southwest, June 30, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, pp. 1031–1032 (2nd quotation); Sheridan to Grant, July 1, 1865, ibid., pp. 1035–1036.

[88] Sheridan to Grant, July 1, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, pp. 1035–1036 (quotation); Shook, "Federal Occupation of Texas," 85.

der of Texas troops of Kirby Smith's command." Disgusted by the lack of a formal surrender, the general chaos of the war's closing scenes in Texas, and the fact that the defeated soldiers left the field on their own terms, Sheridan likened the department's final days to "more like a move than anything else." He later wrote that the surrender, "bore upon its face double dealing on the part of the rebel commander, or his agents, as the Texas troops had declined to surrender, and had disbanded to their homes, destroying magazines and carrying with them arms and ammunition from different arsenals. . . . it was their constant boast that they were not conquered and that they would renew the fight at some future day." Any such statements were just that—boasts. After Kirby Smith officially surrendered his army in Galveston on June 2, he fled to Mexico, in violation of the terms agreed upon. Sheridan fumed that Kirby Smith knew the situation in Texas, and during the negotiations, the Confederate general was simply buying time for the Arkansas, Louisiana, and Missouri troops to reach their homes.[89]

Clearly, the war west of the Mississippi River ended without the ceremony that accompanied the surrender at Appomattox. Why did the trans-Mississippi Confederates behave so differently? Certainly the absence of Union forces presents one significant difference that cannot be overlooked. The appropriation of public property by demobilizing ex-Confederate soldiers, of course, was not unique to Texas. However, it is doubtful that such a wide portion of the Lone Star State would have been pillaged if a significant Federal force had been present. Additionally, by the end of the war, in other Southern states that witnessed more extensive combat, fewer supplies remained for the taking. Further, Confederate soldiers in the East experienced significant combat, and had at least the satisfaction of "going down fighting." Many trans-Mississippi Confederates had never participated in large battles or campaigns. Because of this, some ended the war feeling helpless to affect its outcome or contribute to their cause. Many of these soldiers had spent years in military service, away from wives and children, away from farms and shops, and ended the war feeling that such sacrifice had been wasted—not because of defeat, but because they never had the chance to do anything to stave off defeat. Finally, these men had been unpaid for as many as sixteen months. They considered the taking of government property their only means of compensation, and the feeling that their sacrifice had been wasted only intensified the demand for recompense. Unfortunately, in the absence of order, this self-compensation often spread to private belongings. After

[89] Sheridan to Bvt. Maj. Gen. Rawlins, June 12, 1865, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 858 (1st and 2nd quotations); Report of Sheridan, May 29, 1865–November 14, 1866, Operations in Texas and on the Rio Grande, *O.R.A.*, ser. 1, vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 297–298 (3rd quotation).

months of sagging morale, the breakup resulted from such feelings of bitterness and helplessness.[90]

Their decision to stop fighting is easier to explain. It is inaccurate to point to a failure of nationalism, a lack of courage, or even the emotions that resulted in the chaos of the breakup to account for their capitulation. By May 1865 Texas Confederates had realized the futility of continued resistance, particularly after the defeat of armies farther east. The reality of defeat had set in for these soldiers, who then chose to spare their homeland, and indeed their own lives, from unnecessary destruction, and return to their families. Had trans-Mississippi Confederates continued to resist they would have faced the combined might of all the Federal armies of the eastern, western, and trans-Mississippi theaters. If several Confederate armies had been unable to defeat those Federal forces, the single, small, disorganized, and demoralized trans-Mississippi army obviously could not have done it. Simply put, by May 1865 the war was over and these men recognized it. Finally, trans-Mississippi Confederates had no "country" left to protect. The cause's largest and most potent armies had been beaten into surrender, the Confederate capital was in Federal hands, and the national government in Richmond had collapsed. There simply was no reason to continue the struggle.

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[90] For an example of returning former Confederate soldiers seizing public property (with civilian help) after the Johnston-Sherman surrender in North Carolina, see William A. Fletcher, *Rebel Private Front and Rear: Memoirs of a Confederate Soldier* (New York: Dutton, 1995), 194–213. For a vivid description of the surrender ceremony at Appomattox, see Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, *The Passing of the Armies: An Account of the Final Campaign of the Army of the Potomac, Based Upon the Personal Reminiscences of the Fifth Army Corps* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Son's, 1915), 191–195. For more recent treatments, see William Marvel, *A Place Called Appomattox* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) and William Marvel, *Lee's Last Retreat: The Flight to Appomattox* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

Twenty-four-year-old Amelia Barr, later a well-known author, witnessed the Confederate Army's breakup in Austin and described it in her diary. She wrote, "there is nothing but plunder and sack going on, and the citizens are as bad as the soldiers." This is a portrait of Amelia at the age of eighteen. *Photograph courtesy of the Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Austin.*

XXXIII. Handbook of Civil War Texas Online Table of Contents